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Motivation and outline
The increasing anthropogenic disturbance of the Earth’s radiation balance with the corresponding change
in the Earth’s climate system can be expected to become one of the most challenging global problems
for mankind. In contrast to other global problems, the specific difficulty of the climate problem arises
from the long delay between anthropogenic actions and climate response. Already today, the net radiative
disturbance due to anthropogenic activities is estimated to be about 1.6 Wm−2 with increased atmospheric
carbon concentration as the main single contributor (IPCC, 2007; Raupach and Canadell, 2010). However,
mankind has so far only partially experienced the consequences of this disturbance because of the inertia
of the climate system and, in particular, the thermal capacity of the oceans which cause a delay in the
corresponding temperature reaction (Cess and Goldenberg, 1981; Knutti and Hegerl, 2008). From this
inertia, it follows in turn that already induced changes can only be reversed on very long time scales.
Consequently, once the effects of climate change have started to seriously affect the well-being of society
and ecological systems, possible conventional response options are not effective for mitigating these effects
on a short time scale. Furthermore, it is already not possible to regard today’s atmospheric greenhouse gas
(GHG) - and in particular carbon concentrations - as safe with respect to potential tipping points in the
climate system, which are expected to trigger non-linear and probably dramatic climate change (e.g., Lenton
et al., 2008; Zickfeld et al., 2010). Therefore, a profound mitigation strategy requires taking into account
the different time scales of changes and effects and also the various anthropogenic influences on the climate
system.
So far, society has failed to control the main anthropogenic source of the radiation balance disturbance:
the emission of carbon dioxide. Neither emission reductions in the Kyoto Protocol nor announced emission
reductions in the Copenhagen Accord have been or are sufficient to result in a significant change in the
emission trend. After a short reduction in carbon emissions from fossil fuel burning by 1.3 percent in 2009
due to the financial crisis, carbon emissions have increased to a new record level of about 30.6 Gt CO2
in 2010 (Friedlingstein et al., 2010; IEA, 2011). To emphasize the necessity of significant emission cuts in
the near future, one can look at the chances for complying with the goal of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to restrict temperature increase to 2◦C in order to prevent
dangerous climate change (UNFCCC, 2010). A compliance probability of 50 percent requires cumulative
carbon emissions to be below 1000 Gt C (Allen et al., 2009; Meinshausen et al., 2009; Raupach et al., 2011).
However, cumulative carbon emissions by the end of 2008 were about 530 Gt C, so that more than half of
this emission budget has already been used (Raupach and Canadell, 2010).
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Current efforts to mitigate climate change fail not just with respect to absolute emission reductions on a
global scale, but also with respect to considering the various anthropogenic influences on the climate system
and the role of natural carbon sinks. First, the anthropogenic influence on the Earth’s radiation balance
does not just contain GHG emissions, which increase their concentration in the atmosphere and, therefore,
the fraction of absorbed thermal radiation, but also contains land-use changes and aerosol emissions, which
affect the fraction of solar radiation reflected to space (albedo). The latter influences have a negative
radiative forcing and, therefore, a cooling effect, reducing the GHG-induced radiative forcing effect of about
2.6 Wm−2 to the above mentioned net radiative forcing of 1.6 Wm−2 (IPCC, 2007; Raupach and Canadell,
2010). Second, the atmospheric carbon concentration is not just influenced by corresponding emission, but
also by the natural uptake of the terrestrial and oceanic carbon sink. The increase in atmospheric carbon in a
given year relative to that year’s total carbon emissions constitutes the airborne fraction (AF). This fraction
is currently substantially lower than 1, which indicates that the natural sinks are removing anthropogenic
carbon from the atmosphere. Canadell et al. (2007) and Raupach and Canadell (2010) estimate the average
AF to be about 0.45 for the period 1960 to 2008. However, the AF is estimated to have increased at an
annual rate of 0.24 percent (Raupach and Canadell, 2010), indicating that the natural sinks cannot keep
pace with increasing carbon emissions and are showing the first signs of saturation.
Taking into account the various possible influences on the radiation balance and the role of natural
carbon sinks, possible response strategies to climate change could also be to apply technologies which allow
the increase of negative radiative forcing, or technologies which allow the enhancement or mimicking of
the natural uptake of carbon. The former group contains technologies such as the modification of crops
or injecting sulphur into the stratosphere to increase the fraction of reflected solar radiation, and can be
summarized as radiation management (RM). The latter group contains technologies such as ocean iron
fertilization or afforestation to increase the fraction of carbon uptake, and can be summarized as carbon
dioxide removal (CDR). Both groups of technologies are summarized as climate engineering and can be
defined as the large-scale deliberate intervention in the Earth’s climate system in order to mitigate climate
change (e.g., Royal Society, 2009). In particular, certain RM technologies seem to provide a quick and cheap
response option to climate change as these technologies are expected to allow exerting a quick, significant
negative radiative forcing at low cost to compensate for a doubling or even quadrupling of atmospheric
carbon concentration compared to preindustrial levels (e.g., Barrett, 2008; Lenton and Vaughan, 2009;
Royal Society, 2009). However, this is a preliminary and probably biased assessment as it is restricted
to operational cost estimates, without taking into account possible price effects or external effects. In
addition, dynamic efficiency is not appropriately considered (Klepper and Rickels, 2011). Even though RM
seems to allow rather good global compensation of a GHG-induced temperature increase, it does not allow
compensation for the change in all climate variables such as ice coverage or, in particular, precipitation (e.g.,
Feichter and Leisner, 2009; Ricke et al., 2010). Therefore, it is still unresolved if an application of RM will
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result in an increase of welfare in all regions of the world (Klepper and Rickels, 2011). Additionally, it could
be necessary to maintain those compensating RM technologies for several 100 to 1000 years, depending on
the emission path and level of compensation (e.g., Brovkin et al., 2009) so that, in a dynamic perspective,
their possible operational cost advantage can turn around. Furthermore, interrupting such compensating
RM technologies due to unforeseen side effects will result in a rapid climate change if GHG-induced radiative
forcing is still present so that the social costs of such an interruption could even exceed those of unmitigated
climate change (Goes et al., 2011). Consequently, one could argue that, first of all, CDR technologies
should be developed, or at least that their operational readiness is a precondition for the application of RM
technologies (Klepper and Rickels, 2011).
Even though both CDR and RMmeasures are summarized as climate engineering, they have very different
characteristics. CDR measures are currently assessed as being too limited in their potential to allow a quick
change in the radiation balance at feasible costs (e.g., Lenton and Vaughan, 2009; Klepper and Rickels,
2011). In contrast to RM measures, they take effect much more slowly and have higher operational costs,
but they address the root of the problem by directly affecting atmospheric carbon concentration and have,
therefore, more similarities to conventional emission control measures. Besides, as they allow removing past
carbon emissions, they can extend the remaining emission budget for complying with the 2◦C ceiling and
probably constitute a supplementary measure to emission control (Klepper and Rickels, 2011). This has been
acknowledged to some extent by policy markers, as CDR measures are included in the Kyoto Protocol. Yet,
these CDR measures are restricted to the terrestrial carbon sink, because in the present climate agreement
only Land-Use, Land-Use Change and Forestation (LULUCF) projects are included (UNFCCC, 2001). Also,
these measures are restricted in total volume (UNFCCC, 2001, Art. 3.4). Even though the current carbon
uptake of the terrestrial sink is estimated to be slightly larger than that of the ocean sink, the former is
subject to strong fluctuations that are not yet well understood. By looking at the change in the atmospheric,
terrestrial and oceanic carbon reservoirs from 1800 to 1994, Sabine et al. (2004) show that the terrestrial
biosphere has been a total net source of about 39 Gt C. They conclude that ’the ocean has constituted the
only true net sink for anthropogenic CO2 over the past 200 years’ (p. 370).
The ocean contains about 65 times more carbon than the atmosphere. This difference is explained
not only by the size of these two reservoirs, but also by the chemical reactivity of CO2 in water and the
various carbon pumps in the ocean. Most of the CO2 dissolves in water, forming carbon acid first and
then bicarbonate (HCO−3 ) and carbonate ions (CO
2−
3 ). The sum of these three elements describes the
total amount of carbon in the ocean, called dissolved inorganic carbon (DIC). The amount of DIC in the
ocean consists of bicarbonate ions (c. 89 percent), carbonate ions (c. 10 percent) and CO2 (< 1 percent)
(Najjar, 1992). Regarding the last figure, the atmosphere “sees” only a tiny fraction of the carbon present
in ocean surface water within the chemical process of pCO2 equilibration between the atmosphere and the
ocean. Without this chemical reaction, about 70 percent of the anthropogenic carbon would remain in the
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atmosphere (Sarmiento and Gruber, 2006). The chemical reactivity of CO2 constitutes a chemical sink
for CO2 in the ocean. The effectiveness of this chemical sink can be quantified by the buffer factor, which
measures the fractional change in atmospheric CO2 relative to the fractional change in DIC: ζ =
∂[CO2]/[CO2]
∂[DIC]/[DIC]
for a given release of CO2 into the atmosphere. A low buffer factor, therefore, indicates that a large fraction
of the atmospheric CO2 perturbation can be taken up by the ocean. The value of the buffer factor is
proportional to the ratio between DIC and alkalinity (Sabine et al., 2004).1
The buffer factor measures the ability of the ocean to take up carbon from the atmosphere, but not the
speed of this uptake. Compared to the total size of the ocean, only a small fraction of it is in direct exchange
with the atmosphere. Whereas it takes around one year for the upper layer of the ocean to equilibrate with
the atmosphere, the uptake bottleneck is the transport of anthropogenic CO2 to the deeper parts of the
ocean, which is effected by the biological pump and the solubility pump. The biological pump is driven by
two cycles: the organic matter cycle and the calcium carbonate cycle. Within the first cycle, phytoplankton
captures CO2 through photosynthesis and produces its organic tissue by utilizing the inorganic nutrients
that are dissolved in seawater. The reverse process is respiration and mineralization of this organic matter.
Whereas photosynthetic production is restricted to the euphotic zone, remineralization is not and, as a
consequence, occurs on average deeper in the water column.2 The organic matter cycle causes surface
depletion and deep enrichment of DIC, but causes slight surface enrichment and deep depletion of alkalinity
in the top layer. Therefore, the organic matter pump decreases surface ocean pCO2 and hence, pCO2 in the
atmosphere (Najjar, 1992). The second cycle works in the opposite direction. Its driving forces are plants
and animals that build their CaCO3 skeletons in the euphotic zone from dissolved calcium and carbonate
ions. When these skeletons sink in the water column, they dissolve back into calcium and carbonate ions.
Ocean circulation transports these ions back to the surface layer. This cycle creates a surface depletion and
deep enrichment in DIC and alkalinity. The effect of the calcium carbonate cycle on alkalinity is about twice
as strong as its effect on DIC. As a consequence, it increases pCO2 in the upper layer and, therefore, increases
atmospheric CO2. Both cycles are present mainly in the upper layer of the ocean. The term ”biological
pump” designates the small fraction of organic matter and skeletons that survives remineralization in the
euphotic zone and sinks to deeper layers. Due to their influence on DIC and alkalinity, and hence pCO2,
both cycles, the organic matter cycle and the calcium carbonate cycle, are important factors for the chemical
equilibration of carbon between the atmosphere and the upper layer of the ocean. For overall equilibration,
however, the transport of carbon into the deep ocean, which is especially effected by the solubility pump,
is more important. The solubility pump is driven by two phenomena: thermohaline circulation and the
1Alkalinity measures the ability of seawater to maintain its pH value when carbon acids are added. The pH value determines
the distribution of DIC between the three different carbon forms, but is itself affected by the additional uptake of carbon.
2The euphotic zone is the layer that receives enough light for photosynthesis to occur. The depth of this layer is determined
by the amount of incoming sunlight and the activity of the water (Sarmiento and Gruber (2006) p. 111). The aphotic zone is
the layer below the euphotic zone.
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solubility of CO2. Surface water in equilibrium with atmospheric CO2 takes up additional CO2 on its way
to the poles, as the solubility of CO2 increases with decreasing temperature. The formation of deep seawater
is driven by thermohaline circulation, which transports cold and high-solubility high-latitude surface waters
into the deep ocean. These two phenomena act together to pump carbon from the atmosphere into the
ocean’s deeper layers. However, for increasing atmospheric CO2, this uptake process is limited mainly by
the turnover speed, and the total ocean will still be undersaturated for a long time (in the order of 103
years) (Ko¨rtzinger and Wallace, 2002).
The absolute value of the long-term atmospheric carbon stabilization level and the time pattern of its
achievement will depend crucially on the marine carbon cycle. For a given impulse emission of anthro-
pogenic carbon it is estimated that, on time scales of several hundred years, between 70 and 80 percent of
anthropogenic carbon will be taken up by the chemical buffering of the ocean. The range indicates the sat-
uration dependent on the total amount of anthropogenic carbon impulse (Archer et al., 1997).3 Therefore,
the marine carbon cycle is perceived to be the most important cycle with regard to the climate (Najjar,
1992), and any approach to mitigate global warming that ignores the ocean ignores optimization poten-
tial. Accordingly, several questions arise for economic analyses related to climate change. First, what is
an appropriate description of the global carbon cycle, in particular with respect to the oceanic carbon sink
in economic models? Second, since natural forces transport carbon into the deep ocean where it affects
society less adversely than in the atmosphere, the logical question is: Which carbon removal measures can
be applied to accelerate the process of downward carbon transfer? Third, to integrate these measures into
economic optimization, how can the carbon uptake be measured and verified, how can carbon credits be
assigned, and how to deal with carbon that it is only temporarily stored and expected to leak back into the
atmosphere at some point in the future? Fourth, what are the critical costs and critical carbon amounts to
be removed from the atmosphere in order to provide an option for climate change mitigation in comparison
to existing options? Fifth, what is the dynamic optimal application of such measures in climate change
policy?
The papers in this cumulative thesis provide answers to these questions by investigating the role of CDR
measures in relation to RM measures, by considering accounting and market requirements to one specific
oceanic CDR measure, ocean iron fertilization, and by deriving the dynamic optimal carbon sequestration
strategy for various climate policies.
The first paper, entitled “The real economics of climate engineering”, written together with my coauthor,
Gernot Klepper, seeks to frame the discussion on climate engineering by providing an overview of current
knowledge on the feasibility and costs of the various technologies. It explains the differences between the
3On time scales of several thousand years, this fraction increases to about 90 percent due to the chemical sedimentary
CaCO3 buffer, whereas on time scales of several ten to hundred thousand years, the remaining anthropogenic carbon will be
taken up by terrestrial CaCO3 and silicate weathering (Archer et al., 1997).
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various radiation management and carbon dioxide removal technologies using a simple representation of the
Earth’s radiation balance. The cost overview contains both operational and social costs by also discussing
potential external effects. Given this overview, and based on the economic studies existing so far that
analyze the implications of climate engineering, the paper then discusses the economic consequences of
considering such technologies for the climate change reaction portfolio. Furthermore, with respect to the
uncertainties about the impacts resulting from side-effects and the termination effect, an application of
radiation management can result in a lock-in effect. Consequently, the paper argues that further economic
research should focus more strongly on portfolios of climate engineering measures and put more emphasis
on carbon dioxide removal measures. Own contribution: In this paper, I explained the simple representation
of the Earth’s radiation balance, provided the cost estimates of the various technologies, and reviewed and
discussed the various existing economic studies related to climate engineering.
The second paper, entitled “Methods for greenhouse gas offsets accounting: A case study of ocean iron
fertilization”, written together with my coauthors, Katrin Rehdanz and Andreas Oschlies, addresses one
main characteristic of most carbon dioxide removal technologies: the partly temporary storage of carbon.
The paper assesses the impact of various accounting methods applied to large-scale carbon dioxide removal
projects. The various accounting methods are applied to hypothetical large-scale Southern Ocean iron
fertilization (OIF) projects for different durations. Ocean iron fertilization (OIF) is especially suitable for
comparing the outcomes of different approaches, since fluctuations in oceanic carbon uptake during and after
OIF and additional releases of other greenhouse gases such as N2O have to be accounted for. Therefore, the
paper discusses how to deal with these fluctuations and the release of other greenhouse gases (leakage), and
calculates deduction rates to address the latter issue. Own contribution: In this paper, I did the majority
of the work, covering all relevant aspects of the article. I explained the various accounting methods and
applied them to the modeled data of various hypothetical Southern Ocean iron fertilization experiments for
different periods of time. The data for the carbon uptake in the various experiments as well as data on N2O
emissions was provided by Andreas Oschlies. Based on the latter, I calculated appropriate deduction rates
and compared the various accounting methods with respect to their economic and environmental effects.
The third paper, entitled “Economic prospects of ocean iron fertilization in an international carbon mar-
ket”, written with my coauthors, Katrin Rehdanz and Andreas Oschlies, addresses the economic prospects
of ocean iron fertilization (OIF) within a climate agreement such as the Kyoto Protocol. It considers hypo-
thetical, short-term, but large-scale OIF in the Southern Ocean for the duration of 1, 7 and 10 years in a
post-Kyoto agreement and derives criteria for assessing the efficiency of OIF as a climate engineering option.
The paper models a static compliance problem for various countries with a basic global CO2 market for the
next commitment period (2012-2020), including domestic carbon emission reductions and emission trading.
The paper provides information on critical unit costs and critical amounts for OIF and compares these to
other mitigation options. Including OIF in a post-Kyoto agreement is expected to have implications for the
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distribution of welfare. Accordingly, the paper also attempts to determine the distributional aspects arising
from including carbon credits from OIF. Own contribution: In this paper, I did the majority of the work,
covering all relevant aspects of the article. I derived and calibrated the basic static compliance problem
and incorporated a forestry sector. Based on the results of the previous paper, I calculated the critical unit
costs and critical amounts for OIF. Furthermore, I derived the change in welfare for the various groups of
countries due to the inclusion of OIF in such a market.
The fourth paper, entitled “Optimal global carbon management with ocean sequestration”, written with
my coauthor, Thomas Lontzek, investigates the dynamic socially optimal intervention in the global carbon
cycle. The paper introduces a two-box model description of the global carbon cycle into economic models to
explicitly include the largest non-atmospheric carbon reservoir, the ocean. This enables the achievement of
a better representation of the global carbon cycle than the proportional-decay assumption usually resorted
to in economic models. The paper analyzes the optimal amount of extraction and consumption of fossil
fuels whereby the related emissions can be released into the atmosphere and injected into the deep ocean
for the purpose of ocean sequestration in a microeconomic partial analysis framework. The paper clarifies
the implications of the non-renewable description of the carbon cycle and, therefore, also for the partial
non-renewable description of the atmospheric carbon stock for optimal tax paths. Own contribution: In this
paper, I did the majority of the work, covering all relevant aspects of the article. I investigated the optimal
properties of ocean sequestration embedded in the decision about global optimal energy consumption. I
derived the optimal tax paths and clarified the influence of the non-renewable description of the global
carbon cycle on these tax paths with respect to the literature. I calculated a numerical example to discuss
the potential role of ocean sequestration in an optimal global carbon management strategy.
The fifth paper, entitled “The role of sequestration costs with a ceiling on atmospheric carbon concentra-
tion”, investigates the dynamic global optimal carbon sequestration decision in the presence of a ceiling on
atmospheric carbon concentration. It considers aspects which have so far only been analyzed in the context
of a damage function to measure the consequences of climate change for society. The paper clarifies the im-
plications of four relevant aspects in the presence of a ceiling in a microeconomic partial analysis framework:
the implications of stock-dependent extraction costs, the implications of modeling the global carbon cycle
by a two-box model instead of proportional decay, the implications of modeling sequestration costs convexly
rather than linearly, and the implications of oceanic instead of geologic carbon storage. Again, using a
two-box model allows the non-renewable aspects of the global carbon cycle to be accounted for and implies
that carbon emissions have to decline at the ceiling due to the ongoing saturation of the ocean with respect
to anthropogenic carbon. The paper shows that there is a distinct difference in policy recommendations
with respect to carbon sequestration according to the underlying assumptions of sequestration costs.
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Abstract
In 2008 Scott Barrett wrote a paper on “The incredible economics of geoengineering” in which he argued that
the potential extremely low cost of climate engineering (CE) measures together with their quick response of
the earth’s temperature to such interventions will change the whole debate about the mitigation of climate
change. In his paper he did rely on very preliminary published results on the working of the different
CE-options and of the cost of their introduction. We argue that more recent insights into the impact of
CE-techniques and their associated costs change the prospect and the evaluation of the different options for
manipulating the climate system of the earth. Whereas Barrett was mostly focusing on the cost of running
CE-measures, we argue that the overall economic cost are quite different from those that were estimated a
few years ago. On this basis, we point out that in particular uncertainties about side-effects suggest that
economic research should shift its focus to portfolios of CE-measures and put more emphasis on measures to
control atmospheric carbon concentration in order to deal with the lock-in effect implied by the high social
costs of a truncation of measures which directly influence the radiation balance.
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1. Introduction
The international consensus about limiting the average temperature increase to 2◦C was confirmed once
again at the recent meeting of the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention (UNFCCC) in
Cancun (UNFCCC, 2010). But greenhouse gas emission (GHG) trends and the corresponding reduction
announcements challenge the credibility of this target. Estimates in the World Energy Outlook (2010)
show that while it is indeed still possible to meet this target via conventional emission control measures,
dramatic emission cuts will be imperative in the near future (IEA, 2010). A postponement of these emission
reductions would involve a drastic increase in mitigation costs and would seriously undermine the probability
of staying within the 2◦C target. In comparison with a more efficient mitigation course, the fairly moderate
emission reductions in the Copenhagen Accord up to 2020 are estimated to involve an additional $US 1
trillion in investment costs in the period from 2010 to 2035 (IEA, 2010). Expanding the cumulative emission
budget for the period 2000 to 2049 from 1000 Gt CO2 to 1437 Gt CO2 would be sufficient to increase the
maximum probability of exceeding the 2◦C target from 42 percent to 70 percent (Meinshausen et al., 2009).
Furthermore, even today’s atmospheric GHG - notably carbon concentrations - cannot be regarded as safe
with respect to potential tipping points in the climate system with dramatic climate change as a consequence
(e.g., Lenton et al., 2008; Zickfeld et al., 2010). In the light of this development, it is not surprising that
scientists have started discussing alternative technical measures for counteracting climate change. Climate
engineering is the blanket term used to refer to such measures.
Climate engineering (CE) is defined as the large-scale manipulation of the earth’s radiation balance
for the purpose of mitigating anthropogenic climate change (e.g., Royal Society, 2009). The measures can
be distinguished according to whether they influence the carbon concentration in the atmosphere (Carbon
Dioxide Removal - CDR) or directly affect the earth’s radiation balance (Radiation Management - RM).
CDR measures address the root of the problem, but their limited potential means that it will take decades
before they have an influence on temperature. On the face of it, a number of RM measures apparently hold
out prospects of influencing temperature within a matter of years, but their actual application might lead
to a new, artificial climate with various characteristics that are hitherto unknown. While at first sight CDR
measures seem to be very similar to existing emission reduction measures, RM measures definitely provide
a distinctive new option in the bid for climate change mitigation. This assessment is bolstered by initial
estimates suggesting that the operational costs for these measures would be much lower than conventional
emission control, implying that the global problem of climate change could be solved now by a single or
small group of countries (Schelling, 1996; Barrett, 2008)
Accordingly, two central pillars in the debate about CE are discussed by economists: (1) What would
be the optimal level of CE in an optimal climate change reaction portfolio, and (2) How is conventional
emission control affected by the use of CE or possibly even mere research into CE? The assessment of these
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issues is essential for decisions on whether and how the various CE measures might be applied and how
their application might affect the future of international climate mitigation negotiations. This paper seeks
to outline a framework for the discussion by providing an overview on the current knowledge we have about
the feasibility and the costs of the various CE options. With a discussion of potential external effects,
the cost overview encompasses not only operational but also social costs. On the basis of this overview and
existing economic studies analyzing the implications of CE, the paper then investigates the insights available
on the economic consequences of considering such technologies for the climate change reaction portfolio.
Attempts at engineering the climate for the modification of weather variables reach back to the 19th
century (Fleming, 2010). As early as 1965, advisors of US President Johnson suggested counteracting the
warming of the earth by spreading out reflective particles on the ocean. In the following decades, the debate
focused more on the enhancement of natural carbon sinks. While the possibility of enhancing oceanic carbon
uptake by iron fertilization has so far only been tested in small-scale field experiments, the possibility of
enhancing terrestrial carbon uptake by land-use change and afforestation measures (LULUCF) was written
into the Kyoto Protocol. Ideas about directly influencing the radiation balance (e.g., Budyko, 1977, 1982;
Teller et al., 1996, 2002) regained a place in the climate change debate through the work of Crutzen in the
year 2006. Based on the measurement of the effects of the Pinatubo eruption in 1991, he calculated the
amount of sulfur that would need to be injected into the stratosphere to counteract the global warming
resulting not only from continuously increasing greenhouse gas emissions but also from the expected loss of
cooling due to reduced industrial sulfur emissions.1 Since then, an increasing number of scientific publications
have investigated the various options and their side-effects. In 2009, the Royal Society Report published an
overview report of this kind that also discusses related political, ethical, and governance issues.
Economic matters related to CE were first addressed by Schelling (1996) in a special issue on the topic
in Climatic Change. He points out that the CE option might turn the climate change problem upside down
by reducing the global problem of emission control to a problem where a single state or a small group of
states alone can decide on how to counteract climate change. Similar issues are explored by Barrett Barrett
(2008), who concludes that the economics of CE present a very different set of incentives from mitigation.
He argues that CE shifts the challenge from the payment issue that has hitherto been central to the climate
change debate to a governance issue. Victor (2008) argues that, with respect to governance, we need to
create major initial incentives for intensive research into, and assessment of, the various measures with a
view to determining which measures qualify for inclusion in a CE portfolio. In his assessment he suggests
that in the event of deployment, CE would probably not be restricted to a single measure but take the
1Crutzen points out that industrial sulfur emissions counteract an ill-defined fraction of global warming from increased
greenhouse gas emissions by reflecting solar radiation back into space. However, these sulfur emissions have severe impacts
on human health and ecosystems so that political declarations were announced to reduce them. The cooling effect could be
approximated by injecting a much smaller amount of sulfur not into the troposphere (like industrial emissions) but into the
stratosphere, where the measure could also be extended to compensate for a doubling of atmospheric CO2 concentration.
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form of a portfolio of various CE measures, including compensation mechanisms. Kousky et al. (2009) also
discuss a portfolio approach, concentrating on the risk of catastrophic climate change and arguing that a
well-designed portfolio would comprise mitigation, adaptation, and CE measures.
This overview of the literature sets out to challenge two important aspects that have been taken for
granted. One central assumption about CE is that it costs much less than conventional emission control.
However, this assumption derives from scientific modeling studies and engineering feasibility studies that do
not contain detailed cost estimates. Furthermore, research is advancing so fast that for several measures the
cost estimates in the Royal Society (2009) are already outdated. Accordingly, the present article summa-
rizes the most recent available information about the operational costs, discusses factors neglected in these
estimates (like price effects), and explains why it is important to take a closer look at dynamic efficiency
in comparing RM measures with CDR or emission control measures. Second, while a number of important
economic issues related to CE have been addressed in the overviews referred to above, others have been
largely ignored. A small number of papers have been published that analyze the economic aspects of CE
from a theoretical or qualitative perspective in greater detail and with a special emphasis on incentives and
strategic interactions. Accordingly, we review these papers and draw conclusions with respect to the new
insights we can gain from them with respect to the impact that the consideration of CE measures might
have and the economic consequences of actual CE implementation.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly explains the climate system and the existing CE
options that can influence it. Section 3 presents an overview of the currently available information related
to the operational and social cost of various CE technologies. Section 4 reviews studies that analyze the
implications of CE for the existing climate policy portfolio. A distinction is made between models which
take a central planner’s perspective (Section 4.1) and models which investigate the issue from a decentralized
perspective (Section 4.2). Section 5 discusses and concludes.
2. Classification of climate engineering
For the classification of the various CE measures we consider a simplified representation of the earth’s
radiation balance based on Feichter and Leisner (2009) and Heintzenberg (2011). Short-wave solar irradiation
on the atmosphere is determined by the solar constant S0. About 70 percent of this irradiation is absorbed
(51 percent by the earth’s surface, 17 percent by aerosols and clouds in the troposphere, and 2 percent by
ozone in the stratosphere). Accordingly, about 30 percent is reflected back into space by the atmosphere and
the surface of the Earth. The relation of reflection to irradiation is called albedo, A. These two variables
S0 and A, determine the earth’s overall short-wave solar radiation energy input, FSW = S0(1 − A). The
irradiation absorbed is converted into latent heat and is returned to space as long-wave thermal radiation.
Fraction α of the long-wave thermal radiation is absorbed in the atmosphere mainly by water vapor and other
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greenhouse gases (GHG). From there it is emitted back to the earth’s surface and out into space. Without
this absorption, the average temperature on earth would be -18◦C instead of 15◦C. On balance, solar
irradiation FSW is equivalent to thermal radiation, FLW , the latter being determined by the temperature
on the ground and in the atmosphere. From this simplified representation temperature T at ground level
can be expressed as
T = 4
√
S0(1−A)
2σ(2− α)
(1)
where σ is the Stefan Boltzmann constant (Feichter and Leisner, 2009). So far, anthropogenic intervention
influences the albedo A and the absorption fraction α. The former is mainly influenced by changes in land
use and aerosol emissions, the latter by emissions of GHGs. Change in land use and aerosol emissions lead
to an increase of A and hence produce a cooling effect compared to preindustrial levels. Overall, this cooling
effect is outweighed by the warming effect from GHG emissions, which represent an increase of α over and
against its preindustrial level. The IPCC (2007) estimates that in sum the average net anthropogenic effect
amounts to about +1.6 (+0.6 to +2.4) Wm−2. Consequently, since the radiation budget is in a state of
imbalance, the temperature of the earth is bound to increase. The reason why the radiative forcing induced
so far has not been fully translated into a temperature increase has to do with the inertia of the earth’s
climate system and in particular the thermal capacity of the ocean (e.g., Cess and Goldenberg, 1981; Knutti
and Hegerl, 2008). The temperature reaction induced by the existing disturbance of the radiation balance
is expected to take several more decades before it comes to full fruition (Hansen et al., 2005).
All variables in (1) can be influenced by RM measures. Accordingly, RM can be further distinguished
according to whether it influences solar irradiation by changing S0 or A (Solar Radiation Management) or
influences thermal radiation by changing α (Thermal Radiation Management). CDR measures only influence
α by affecting the atmospheric carbon concentration. CDR measures can be further distinguished according
to whether carbon removal is dominated by biological, chemical, or physical processes. Table 1 gives an
overview of the various CE measures.
Table 1: Classification of various CE measures
Reducing solar irradiation (lower S0; SRM) Space measures
Radiation Stratospheric measures
Management Increasing albedo (higher A; SRM) Cloud measures
(RM) Surface measures
Increasing FLW radiation (lower α; TRM) Cloud measures
Carbon Dio- Biologically based measures
xide Removal Reducing FLW -absorbing atmospheric carbon (lower α ) Chemically based measures
(CDR) Physically based measures
Source: Stephens and Keith (2008); Feichter and Leisner (2009); Heintzenberg (2011)
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The classification in Table 1 is not entirely correct because feedback mechanisms mean that RM mea-
sures also influence carbon uptake, while changes on the Earth’s surface mean that CDR measures can also
influence the planetary albedo. The comparison between RM and CDR measures is anything but straight-
forward given that RM potential is usually measured in Wm−2 whereas the CDR is measured in carbon
units (C), e.g. gigatons (Gt) C or atmospheric carbon concentration units (ppm). Neither of these units
of measurement is readily translatable, since the influence of atmospheric carbon concentration on the ra-
diation balance is non-linear. An increasing atmospheric carbon concentration implies that also increasing
amounts of carbon have to be removed to observe the same change in the radiation balance.2 Consequently,
comparison between these two measures must take the prevailing atmospheric carbon concentration into
account. In economic terms, we could say that the higher the atmospheric carbon concentration is, the less
costly RM measures become relative to CDR measures as a way of changing the radiation balance. However,
the higher the atmospheric carbon concentration already is, the longer RM measures have to be maintained
until natural processes have reduced the atmospheric carbon concentration to a level where the RM measure
can be discontinued. Accordingly, RM measures become more expensive in terms of accumulated costs.
This issue is addressed in the next section.
3. Operational and social Cost
We can think of the cost of CE activities in three ways. The first (and most common one at present) looks at
the cost of setting up and running a particular CE technology at current prices for capital goods and material
inputs. The second perspective takes account of the fact that large-scale implementation of a certain CE
technology will raise demand for certain materials and goods, so that their prices may rise significantly.
Substantial expansion of certain industries may even be necessary to meet the demand for products required
by a CE activity. Thirdly, the appropriate cost perspective for an analysis of the overall economic effects
of a CE activity involves determining the social cost of the activity, i.e. looking at the operational costs
plus the external costs - net, of course, of potential external benefits. At present, knowledge about the price
effects and the social cost of CE is more or less non-existent.
Currently available information about the operational costs of CE activities allows only a rough estimate.
The published cost estimates are based on modeling studies of the CE technologies and engineering feasibility
studies, not on empirical tests. New modeling results about the necessary amounts of iron, lime, or sulfur
to be spread out on the oceans or injected into the stratosphere will likely change the current cost estimates
substantially. For example, the requisite amount of sulfur injected into the stratosphere to offset a warming
corresponding to a doubling of atmospheric carbon concentration was estimated in the Royal Society Report
2Given the atmospheric carbon concentration is 450 ppm, the necessary amount of carbon to be removed for a change of 1
Wm−2 in the radiation balance is estimated to be about 178 Gt C; given the atmospheric carbon concentration is 750 ppm,
this amount increases to 297 Gt C.
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(2009) to be between 1 and 5 Mt S. More recent estimates suggest that between 9 and 10 Mt S is probably
nearer the mark, provided it is spread out as sulfur trioxide or sulfuric acid over an area 30◦S and 30◦N.
Otherwise the amount required could be as high as 75 Mt S (Heckendorn et al., 2009; Pierce et al., 2010).
Consequently, the estimated operational costs for changing the radiation balance by 1 Wm−2 with this CE
technology could go up to $US 67 B (using existing airplanes) (Klepper and Rickels, 2011). In the Royal
Society Report they were estimated to be about $US 200 M.
Alongside the imponderables always inherent in theoretical modeling studies, one major uncertainty
besetting estimates of operational costs from an economic perspective arises from price effects. Many CE
technologies require large investments or complicated infrastructures and major material inputs in order to
be effective from a global perspective. So they may have a strong impact on those markets representing the
sources of such goods and materials. In the cost studies we have, these effects have been neglected. For
example, measures like spreading out lime on the ocean or injecting salt aerosols into marine stratus clouds
would require a huge number of ships, which in its turn would lead to a substantial demand shift on the
global ship market. Similar effects can be expected for the global airplane market if measures like sulfur
injection into the stratosphere were to be realized on a large scale. Price effects may also occur on the supply
side of CE activities. Afforestation may increase the supply of wood once the trees mature; carbon capture
may lead to the creation of CO2 certificates changing the market price of carbon. These effects may also
lead to a change in relative prices in the world economy.
Scientific studies on the different CE technologies have shown that the use of CE may have unintentional
side-effects, referred to in economics as “external effects”. It is essential to take these potential side-effects
into account and include them in the analysis of the social cost of CE. They can take the form of external
costs or external benefits. Side-effects can be related to the material in use or the spreading mechanism.
They could also materialize as impacts on certain ecosystems or overall changes in the climate system.
Global side-effects may arise in the climate system if the greenhouse gas-induced change in the absorption
of thermal radiation is compensated for by changing, say, the reflection of solar irradiation. The reason is
that the greenhouse gas-induced radiative forcing is more or less equal across regions, whereas the negative
radiative forcing of RM measures is strongest at places with high irradiation. Consequently, using RM
measures to compensate for GHG-induced radiative forcing can be expected to result in effects that differ
from region to region (e.g., Ricke et al., 2010). This regionally uneven change implies that other climate
variables will also react to RM in a regionally differentiated way. For example, RM activities may successfully
reduce the global temperature, but as a side-effect they may also lower precipitation in some regions of the
world (Trenberth and Dai, 2007; Feichter and Leisner, 2009). However, these effects are not well understood
yet, and current simulation models disagree on the impacts for various regions (e.g., Robock et al., 2008;
Rasch et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2009; Ricke et al., 2010).
Given these uncertainties about the reaction of the earth system at both the local and the global level,
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it is not surprising that we have no assessment studies that attempt to place an economic value on regional
side-effects and in particular the side-effects related to the reaction of the climate system to RM activities.
Since this is also true of the price effects of a large-scale deployment of RM and CDR, the currently available
information consists merely of estimates relating to operational costs.
Table 2 gives an overview of the published estimates for CDR measures, including information on their
potential, the expected investment requirements, and the major uncertainties related to these estimates.
The table also indicates the side-effects that may arise, both positive and negative.
Table 2 does not include physical carbon removal techniques because the currently proposed methods are
either not covered by our definition of climate engineering (carbon injection into the deep ocean) or cannot
be considered effective CDR technologies (enhancing downwelling currents) (Keith, 2000; Zhou and Flynn,
2005, respectively). Also excluded are continental afforestation and oceanic macro-nutrient fertilization
measures, which could be realized either by nutrient supply from land via pipelines or from the deep ocean
via artificially enhanced upwelling. These biological carbon removal measures are omitted from the discussion
because they are either inefficient or ineffective (Lampitt et al., 2008; Bathiany et al., 2010; Oschlies et al.,
2010).
The cost estimates in Table 2 show that the operational costs of the CDR techniques are within the
range of the costs that have been projected for conventional emission control for the year 2035, for example
by the IEA (2010). However, such a comparison is not entirely above criticism, one reason being that it
significantly underestimates the total cost of CDR. Various CDR technologies are expected to require large
investments in installations and logistic infrastructures, and these investments are frequently omitted from
the estimates of the operational costs in Table 2. In addition, the operational cost of a CDR technology
refers to the outlays for input, labor, and capital, whereas the marginal abatement cost of emission control is
defined as the amount of social product (GDP) lost if the emissions of a ton of CO2 are avoided. Accordingly,
emission control costs take into account the processes of adjustment with which an economy responds to
the increasing demand for resources and the accompanying price effects. Those processes are ignored in the
operational cost computations for CE measures. Another economic source of expenditure left out of account
both in the operational cost of CDR and in the abatement cost of emissions is associated with the external
effects of CDR and emission control respectively. The external costs of CDR tend to be negative, thus
prompting underestimation of the overall economic cost. There is only one aspect that can contribute to a
lower estimate of the cost of CDR, namely technological progress and the scale effects possibly occurring in
conjunction with the large-scale deployment of CDR measures.
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Table 2: Overview of current operational cost estimates and potential side-effects for various CDR technologies
Measure Potential
Operational
costs in
$US/tCO2
Main investment
requirements
Uncertainties Side-effects Sources
Biological based carbon dioxide removal
Bio-char
production
5 Gt
CO2/year
45
(15-76)
Bio-char production
units
Net carbon storage potential
due to use as energy source; use
as fertilizer may reduce costs
Use as fertilizer increases net
primary production; residuals
from pyrolysis process might
limit application for food
production
Chan et al. (2008); Asai et al.
(2009); van Zwieten et al. (2009);
McCarl et al. (2009); Washington
State University (2009); Woolf et al.
(2010); Roberts et al. (2010);
de Gryze et al. (2010); Major et al.
(2010)
Southern Ocean
iron fertilization
5 Gt
CO2/year
45
(8-82)
Iron sulphate
production and
treatment, ship fleet
for spreading
(20-500 ships)
Necessary amount of iron
sulphate; coagulation of iron
sulphate; increase in export
production; leakage (even
though accounted for in the
estimate for potential)
Impacts on marine
biogeochemistry, ecology, and
biodiversity; increases nutrient
supply for fish stocks, change in
OMZ, temporary acceleration of
ocean acidification
Chisholm and Morel (1991);
de Baar et al. (2005); Zeebe (2005);
Aumont and Bopp (2006); Boyd
et al. (2007); Boyd (2008); Smetacek
and Naqvi (2008); Oschlies et al.
(2010); Rickels et al. (2010);
Wallace et al. (2010)
Afforestation 4 Gt
CO2/year
60
(19-101)
Measurement of carbon uptake
and leakage varies between
studies; unintended carbon
release due to fire, storms;
impact on albedo
Ecological effects and
implication for biodiversity;
land requirements
Ellis (2001); Murray (2003); van
Kooten and Sohngen (2007); Royal
Society (2009)
Chemical based carbon dioxide removal
Spreading
pulverized
olivine
4 Gt
CO2/year
42
(27-57)
Exploitation,
transport,
pulverization, and
spreading
infrastructure
Access to target area (tropical
catchment areas of large rivers)
for spreading
Increase in soil and oceanic pH
value; ecological impacts (e.g.
input of silicic acid into oceans)
Schuiling and Krijgsman
(2006)Hangx and Spiers
(2009)Ko¨hler et al. (2010)
Spreading
pulverized
calcium
hydroxide
1.5 Gt
CO2/Gt
CaCO3
50
(45-54)
Exploitation,
transport, thermal
treatment, storage
for separated CO2,
fleet for spreading
(about 3000 ships)
Exploitation and spreading
logistics, uptake limited due to
ocean circulation, storage of
separated CO2
CCS-related side-effects;
reduced ocean acidification
Kheshgi (1995); Harvey (2008);
Cquestrate (2008)
Spreading
pulverized lime
0.3 Gt
CO2/Gt
CaCO3
65
(57-72)
Exploitation,
transport,
pulverization
infrastructure, fleet
for spreading
(between 4000 and
6000 ships)
Exploitation and spreading
logistics, uptake limited due to
ocean circulation
reduced ocean acidification Harvey (2008)
Air Capture
(sodium
hydroxide)
1.0-1.2 Mt
CO2/unit/year
250
(69-430)
$US 247-480 M/unit Storage of captured carbon,
energy provision
CCS related side-effects Pielke Jr (2009); Keith (2009);
Lackner (2009, 2010); Dai et al.
(2010); Socolow et al. (2011)
Comparison to existing abatement technologies
Conventional
emission control
for limitation to
2◦C increase by
2050
21 Gt CO2
(in 2035)
90-120
(in 2035)
$US 940 B/year
(2020-2035) $US
1280 B/year
(2030-2035)
Simulation results Side-effects associated with
nuclear power, CCS, and biofuel
production
IEA (2010)
Detailed derivation of estimates can be found in Klepper and Rickels (2011).
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Table 3: Overview of current operational cost estimates and potential side-effects for various RM technologies
Measure
Annual
potential in
Wm−2
Operational
costs in B
$US/Wm−2
Main investment
requirements
Uncertainties Side-effects Sources
SRM surface measures
Modification of
crop and forest
albedo
-1 No quantitative assessment
available, but operational costs and
investment requirements are expect
to be relatively low
Genetic modifications;
replacement of existing plants
Increases effectiveness of
afforestation; side-effects due to
genetic modifications
Ridgwell et al. (2009); Royal Society
(2009)
SRM cloud measures
Modification of
marine stratus
clouds by
injection of salt
aerosols from
Flettner ships
-4 0.135 R&D $US 27 M;
Setting-up $US 30
M; Ship fleet $US
1.7 B; additional
logistic and
maintenance costs
(e.g. ports)
Automatic operation of ships;
replacement and maintenance
requirements; Flettner rotors
Salt is non-toxic and residence
time is low (< 2 weeks);
climatic side-effects
Latham et al. (2008); Salter et al.
(2008); Jones et al. (2009); Rasch
et al. (2009)
TRM cloud measures
Modification of
cirrus clouds by
injection of
bismuth
(III)-iodid
-1 to -4 No quantitative assessment available. Spreading is suggested to be
done from airplanes on scheduled flights, implying cost in the order
of magnitude or even lower as for modification of marine stratus
clouds; otherwise cost estimates from sulfur injection can be applied;
understanding of cloud dynamics low and in turn necessary
spreading amounts are highly uncertain.
Bismuth (III) iodide is non-toxic
and residence time is low (<2
weeks); climatic side-effects
Sanderson et al. (2008); Mitchell
and Finnegan (2009); Mitchell
(09.02.2011)
SRM stratospheric measures
Sulfur injection;
existing
airplanes
(>18km)
Unlimited 16-67 Airplane fleet $US
18-56 B; base
station $US 1 B per
unit
Coagulation between
already existing and newly
injected particles and
therefore spreading amount;
estimation of fuel costs;
sulfur logistics; existing
airships would only allow
spreading height of 6 km
Recovery of ozone layer slows
down; increase of anthropogenic
sulfur emissions by 10 to 17
percent; ratio of diffuse irradiation
to direct irradiation increases
resulting in higher net primary
production and lower solar power
generation; perception of sky
changes (less blue skies, more red
sunsets); space observation
affected; climatic side-effects
Rasch et al. (2008a,b); Robock
(2008); Robock et al. (2008); Tilmes
et al. (2008); Robock et al. (2009);
Kravitz et al. (2009, 2010);
Heckendorn et al. (2009); Murphy
(2009); Mercado et al. (2009);
Pierce et al. (2010); Keith (2010);
McClellan et al. (2010); Ricke et al.
(2010); Jones et al. (2010)
Sulfur injection;
newly designed
airplanes
(>18km)
Unlimited 2-12 Airplane fleet $US
6-36 B; base station
$US 1 B per unit
Sulfur injection;
newly designed
airships
(>18km)
Unlimited 5-18 Airship fleet $US
19-66 B; base
station $US1 B per
unit
Injection of
engineered
nanoparticles
Unlimited No quantitative assessment available; prototypes do not exist; irrespective
of construction costs, spreading amount estimated to be 0.1 Mt implying
cost reductions up to the order of 200 in comparison to sulfur injection
Residence time of nanoparticles;
climatic side-effects
Keith (2010)
Comparison to existing abatement technologies
Conventional
emission control
(450 to 550 ppm
CO2 by 2100)
-2 to -5 200 $US 940 B/year
(2020-2035) $US
1280 B/year
(2030-2035)
Time period for comparison;
based on annual share of GDP
(0.5 to 1 percent); simulation
results
Side-effects associated with
nuclear power, CCS, and biofuel
production
Royal Society (2009); IEA (2010)
Detailed derivation of estimates can be found in Klepper and Rickels (2011).
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We turn now to the different RM technologies that have been proposed. As in the case of CDR, knowledge
about the cost of RM is confined mostly to the operational side, whereas little attention has been paid so
far to market and price effects or external costs. Table 3 provides an overview of the available estimates
on operational costs for potential RM measures on an annual basis, including information on the potential,
the investment requirements, the main uncertainties involved in these estimates, and the potential side-
effects. Again, the potential effects of demand on markets for inputs in RM technologies do not figure in the
operational costs. The table also shows the positive and negative side-effects that could potentially influence
the social cost of RM.
Table 3 does not show measures for modifications in space designed to change solar irradiation. Such
measures, e.g. placing mirrors in the earth’s orbit, are highly inefficient and exceed the Royal Society
estimate based on conventional measures by a factor of between 8 and 9 (Klepper and Rickels, 2011). Nor
does the table feature surface measures addressing the albedo of urban areas (e.g. roofs and streets), deserts,
and the ocean surface, because these measures are either ineffective on a global scale, inefficient, or based on
a technology that is as yet non-existent (Klepper and Rickels, 2011). The technology for the modification
of marine stratus clouds refers only to Flettner ships. Technically speaking, the modification could also be
performed by airplanes, but there are no studies available on such an approach.
The overview of the various RM technologies shows that in particular marine stratus and potentially
cirrus cloud modification are relatively cheap in terms of operational costs. Bearing in mind the cost
development of stratospheric sulfur injection since the publication of the Royal Society report referred to
earlier, it seems likely that the estimated costs for these technologies will also increase. Nevertheless, the
estimated costs for sulfur injection into the stratosphere with existing airplanes would seem to be affordable
for a rich country or a small group of rich countries. However, all measures that look to be capable of reducing
the radiative forcing associated with a doubling of atmospheric CO2 concentration to pre-industrial levels
potentially involve large external effects on the climate system. As we have said, these effects are not yet
well understood, but they certainly have the potential to cause high social costs.
As set out in the previous section, a comparison between RMmeasures and CDR or conventional emission
control measures is by no means straightforward. Alongside the non-linear relationship between atmospheric
carbon concentration and changes in radiative forcing, the comparison is bedeviled by differences in the
intertemporal features of RM over and against CDR and emission mitigation. Whereas CDR measures
address the root of temperature increase by lowering atmospheric carbon concentration, RM measures
have to be sustained until natural processes have sufficiently lowered atmospheric carbon concentration.
Consequently, comparison between the cost of CDR and of RM activities depends crucially on the reference
period chosen.
The Royal Society (2009) bases its comparison on the period up to 2100. The assumptions are that
an unmitigated scenario will result in an atmospheric carbon concentration of 750 ppm in the year 2100,
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which will be reduced to a stabilization scenario (450 to 550 ppm) by emission control. The accumulated
cost of this emission control scenario is translated into cost per Wm−2 per year and is then compared to
the cost of RM measures per Wm−2 per year. This approach ignores the fact that in 2100 emission control
would result in a comparatively low CO2 concentration. By contrast, if the same temperature had been
achieved via RM, the atmospheric concentration would still be about 750 ppm. As a consequence, the RM
measures would have to be maintained until the concentration had declined by natural processes to levels
that are not considered harmful. Consequently, the comparison of costs presented in the Royal Society
(2009) overestimates the costs of conventional emission control, since it does not include the follow-up cost
of maintaining RM activities for temperature control. A truly appropriate cost comparison would have to
be based on a dynamic analysis in which the cost of achieving the effect on temperature obtained by the
mitigation of a given emission - say one Gt CO2 - is compared to the cost of achieving this same temperature
effect by means of an RM measure. To the best of our knowledge, a dynamic cost comparison of this kind
has yet to be attempted, but it would be highly desirable for comparisons between RM, CDR, and emission
control.
4. Economic models of climate engineering
As we saw in the previous section, the information about operational costs available at present only allows for
a very limited comparison with existing mitigation measures. Economic adjustment processes to a large-scale
deployment of climate engineering measures are not included in these estimates. Furthermore, no reliable
cost estimates exist for the external effects. Accordingly, economic analyses on climate engineering have
so far been restricted to analytical approaches deriving general implications of CE from theoretical models
and (illustrative) quantitative results based on highly aggregated simulation models like DICE. The existing
literature focuses on RM measures because on the face of it these represent a distinctive new option with
respect to their effectiveness in influencing the radiation balance, their ostensibly low operational costs, and
not least their novelty value in the climate change reaction portfolio. Research approaches can be divided
into those that investigate CE from a central planner’s perspective and those that adopt a decentralized
perspective.
4.1. Centralized climate engineering decisions
We begin by discussing the research that investigates the globally optimal application of CE in a static
framework. In such a framework there do not appear to be many new insights to be gained from analyzing
CDR measures, as their economic impact would only differ from existing emission control with respect to
cost. However, including both RM and CDR measures would allow for factoring in feedback mechanisms
like the positive effect of a temperature decrease caused by the application of RM on carbon uptake by
biologically based CDR measures.
21
Moreno-Cruz and Smulders (2010) consider these feedback mechanisms to some extent, although they
only consider RM measures and conventional emission control. In their theoretical model, the sum of
mitigation costs and global damage costs are minimized in a static framework, while mitigation costs are de-
termined by the application of conventional emission control and RM measures. Social costs are determined
by atmospheric carbon concentration, temperature increase, and side-effects of RM. The influence of the
atmospheric carbon concentration on social costs is non-monotonic because the authors consider both ex-
ternal benefits with respect to a CO2-induced increase in plant productivity and external costs with respect
to CO2-induced ocean acidification. The temperature is determined by the atmospheric CO2 concentration
and the application of RM measures, while temperature in its turn also affects natural CO2 uptake. Con-
sequently, the temperature feedback effect from RM measures on carbon uptake is included in the analysis
but not the possibility of any complementary effects with CDR measures. 3 The influence of temperature
and side-effects of RM on social costs is monotonic and convex, as is the influence of emission control and
RM measures on mitigation costs.
The results of the model are straightforward. Given that it is possible to increase welfare by the appli-
cation of RM, RM is used in such a way that marginal costs are equal to marginal benefits and conventional
mitigation measures are to some extent substituted for by RM. The substitution effect depends on the cur-
vature of cost functions for both measures. Additionally, the substitution effect is limited by the influence
of CO2 concentration on economic damages, which is negative once a certain concentration threshold has
been exceeded. However, the important result that Moreno-Cruz and Smulders (2010) come up with is that
the application of RM does not necessarily imply a higher atmospheric carbon concentration but may even
produce a lower concentration compared to the situation where only mitigation measures are in use. This
result depends on the magnitude of the substitution and the feedback effect on natural carbon uptake.
The authors show that it is possible to construct a situation where zero or even negative values for
the optimal carbon emission tax occur. In this theoretically specified case, the effect of increased carbon
concentration on the global temperature is controlled via RM measures. At the same time, the benefits of
an increased fertilization effect are so high that the carbon concentration deriving from emission control
measures would be too low.
The crucial assumption for the results in the paper by Moreno-Cruz and Smulders (2010) is that the
application of RM makes it possible to increase global welfare, or, to put more explicitly, that the social
benefits induced by the reduction of temperature will outweigh the social costs accruing from the side-effects.
This central assumption is further investigated by Moreno-Cruz et al. (2010). They determine the optimal
level of RM with respect to external effects in the climate system by drawing on the findings of the study
3Beside the positive temperature effect, it would also be legitimate to consider the positive effect on carbon uptake deriving
from the increase in diffuse irradiation over and against direct irradiation as a result of stratospheric sulfur injection (Mercado
et al., 2009).
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by Ricke et al. (2010).4 While on a global average the application of RM does indeed make it possible to
compensate for a greenhouse gas-induced temperature increase, the extent of this compensation will vary
regionally. Moreover, other climate variables like precipitation or polar ice coverage may be either too large
or too small compared with the original situation. To account for these effects, the authors use a residual
vector model that measures the deviation in temperature and precipitation from the situation without
climate change. As mentioned, the application of RM does not make it possible to reverse both variables to
the situation without climate change. The residual vector model measures aggregated squared residuals of
these two variables on an annual basis for various regions on the earth. The variables are normalized and
measured in standard deviations obtained from the situation without climate change to account for regional
variability. The authors determine the global optimal level of RM by minimizing the regional aggregated
deviations weighted by population, economic output, or land area.
With this model they are able to show that while such a globally optimal level leads to a high degree of
compensation for both temperature and precipitation, there are also regions where the deviation is larger
than it would be with unmitigated climate change. These regions would suffer a reduction in welfare from
the globally optimal policy. Therefore, instead of looking for a globally optimal RM level, the authors
suggest going in search of find a Pareto-improving RM level. The Pareto-improving level is determined by
increasing the RM level until an additional amount of RM would start to make a region worse off again with
respect to the aggregated squared deviation in temperature and precipitation.
Based on the data by Ricke et al. (2010), the region determining the Pareto-improving RM level is
Western Africa, with an RM level that is 78 percent of the global optimum. The authors argue that a
Pareto-improving RM level would be possible, implying that every region or country would have an incentive
to accept such an RM level. However, it should be noted that this conclusion is based on the deviation
in physical units and not on a monetized and regionalized impact assessment. In addition, precipitation
and temperature change is equally weighted, even though some regions might be more seriously affected by
temperature, others by precipitation, and others again by the change in the variability of these variables.
Finally, the analysis does not consider “climate change winners” because it measures the deviation from
the situation without climate change without taking account of the fact that various regions stand to gain
from climate change. In fact, from the “climate change winners” perspective, it seems doubtful whether a
Pareto-improving RM level actually exists. Nevertheless, to our knowledge this paper is the first to address
regional variation in side-effects and highlights the fact that the optimal level of RM is not necessarily the
one that fully offsets greenhouse gas-induced temperature increase.
Adopting a dynamic perspective makes it possible to analyze one distinctive feature of RM measures:
their reaction advantage over existing mitigation options in the presence of unforeseen climate change dy-
4Ricke et al. (2010) use the general circulation model HadCM3L to investigate the regional change in temperature and
precipitation caused by a doubling of CO2 concentration with and without RM compensation.
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namics. It also enables us to investigate the implications of controlling for the increase in global temperature
while doing nothing to address the root of the problem. Moreno-Cruz and Keith (2009) analyze these fea-
tures by considering two different decision-making stages with a time interval between them. In the first
stage, uncertainty exists about the climate sensitivity revealed in the second stage. In the first period, the
optimal level of emission control is determined, and once climate sensitivity is known, the optimal level
of RM is chosen based on this new information. The economic damages are determined by the CO2 con-
centration, the side-effects of RM, and the temperature increase, the influence of the three variables being
additive-separable, monotonic, and convex. Consequently, in contrast to Moreno-Cruz and Smulders (2010),
positive CO2 fertilization effects are not considered. The temperature increase is determined by climate
sensitivity. The mitigation costs are convex, while the costs of RM are linear, implying that the level of RM
is determined by its effectiveness in decreasing temperature and its side-effects. The mitigation costs and
social damages due to increased temperature are calibrated with Nordhaus’ DICE model (2008), while the
social damages due to the increase in CO2 concentration are calibrated based on the analysis by Brander
et al. (2009). With respect to the effectiveness of RM in decreasing temperature and the influence of its
side-effects on social damages, various scenarios are considered.
This model set-up captures the uncertainty of climate change and with it the difficulty of determining
the optimal mitigation level in advance. As pointed out by Solomon et al. (2009), it may be the case
that even today’s CO2 concentration is already sufficient to trigger irreversible damage via sea-level rise
or changes in precipitation patterns. As expected, the authors confirm the substitution effect between RM
and mitigation. The higher the effectiveness of RM and the lower the impact of the side-effects of RM, the
lower the mitigation effort at the first stage will be. However, the authors also show that even in the case of
low effectiveness and high side-effect impact, RM will be used to some extent at the second stage if climate
sensitivity turns out to be substantially high based on the convexity of the optimization problem.
The inter-temporal substitution effect illustrates the insurance character of RM measures. If there is
a measure that is conducive to response if climate change turns out to be worse than expected, it will be
optimal to choose a lower level of precaution. Moreno-Cruz and Keith (2009) also analyze the case where
the benefit of an RM measure is in itself uncertain with respect to effectiveness in lowering temperature. As
expected, this results in higher mitigation efforts at stage one compared to the case with complete knowledge
about effectiveness. The authors argue that in a situation like this emission control and RM become risk
complements.
These implications of CE and particularly RM are confirmed and extended in the articles by Gramstad
and Tjo¨tta (2010) and Goes et al. (2011). Both apply the DICE model taken from Nordhaus (2008) and
consider four scenarios: 1) business as usual (BAU), 2) optimal emission control, 3) optimal emission control
and RM application, and 4) optimal application of RM only. Both articles show that the third scenario
(emission control plus RM) is optimal with respect to social welfare and confirm the substitution effect
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between emission control and mitigation in this scenario. Gramstad and Tjo¨tta also indirectly confirm the
reaction advantage of RM by showing that in the optimal scenario (3) there are only minor welfare losses
associated with postponing RM action for 20 or 30 years.
However, with respect to the insurance character of RM, Goes et al. (2011) show that welfare losses in the
fourth scenario exceed even those in the BAU scenario (compared to the optimal scenario) if the application
of RM is interrupted. Though this result is based on a modified damage function placing additional weight
on the rate of temperature change, it shows that the insurance character of RM might be lost owing to the
possibility of interruption, which would imply possible rapid climate change (e.g., Matthews and Caldeira,
2007; Brovkin et al., 2009; Ross and Matthews, 2009). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the results are
derived from the scenario with only RM application to counteract climate change. As pointed out by Bickel
and Agrawal (2011) assuming that the application of RM is still accompanied with some level of emission
control or a least an sufficient increase in emission control is possible once RM application is truncated,
increases the number of scenarios with RM application which pass cost-benefit tests.
The analysis of Bickel and Agrawal (2011) shows that more emphasis should be put on possible scenarios
how to phase out RM application. Despite its advantage in responding to rapid climate change, the use of
RM as an insurance might result in a lock-in effect. This idea is developed e.g. by Brovkin et al. (2009).
In their analysis, the authors consider the application of various levels of RM to reduce the temperature
increase associated with a cumulative emission of 5000 Gt C, where 90 percent of this amount is emitted
in the period between 2000 and 2300.5 Their emission scenario results in a peak temperature increase by 7
◦C in 2350. The authors show that the application of RM allows for temperature reduction and results in
a lower CO2 concentration than the one modeled without RM compensation. However, they point out that
the compensating effect of RM would need to be maintained for several thousand years because even in year
10000 there would still be 40 to 60 percent of the emitted carbon in the atmosphere. The results produced
in Brovkin et al. (2009) underline the fact that an analysis of CE measures needs to consider CDR and RM
measures simultaneously.
Rickels and Lontzek (2011) analyze the potential of CDR measures in a dynamic context by considering
the possibility of increasing oceanic carbon uptake, but again in an isolated manner without the simultaneous
consideration of RM measures. Their analysis follows in the footsteps of Marchetti (1977), who suggested
injecting carbon directly into the ocean.6 This measure may not be climate engineering in the strict sense
of the term, as the measure would require capturing industrial CO2 emissions and does not remove carbon
from the atmosphere. But Rickels and Lontzek analyze this measure in a rather stylized way so that the
5Though this amount seems to be rather high in absolute terms, it implies lower carbon emissions in the period from 2000
to 2100 than the SRES A2 Scenario of the IPCC. It also represents a rather conservative estimate for the earth’s fossil fuel
resources. The analyses by Sinn (2008) and Edenhofer and Kalkuhl (2009) show that there is good reason to believe that a
large fraction of these resources will be used.
6Marchetti (1977) was the first author to use the term geo-engineering in the context of climate change mitigation.
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results also apply to oceanic CDR measures like iron fertilization or chemical enhancement of alkalinity.
The authors show that applying this measure extends the period in which fossil fuels can be extracted
in reasonable amounts. Without this measure, extraction amounts of extraction would necessarily decline
much earlier due to the inertia of the carbon cycle.
Furthermore, they show that atmospheric carbon peak concentration is lower if the technology is applied
but that the long-term atmospheric carbon stabilization level might increase due to the fact that the ocean
becomes supersaturated with anthropogenic carbon resulting in carbon leaking back into the atmosphere in
the long-run. This issue raises the question how to deal with CDR technologies that involve carbon leakage
or temporary storage characteristics. The assessment of temporary versus permanent storage requires a
positive value for time. The Kyoto-protocol defines the period of 100 years as basis for the assessment of
permanence (UNFCCC, 1997), implying a discontinuous value of time. This decision was not based on
scientific rationale but on a political will (Leinen, 2008).
Not just to this respect, discussion of the pros and cons of CE measures calls for an assessment of their
potential impacts on climate change and potential side-effects that reaches well into the future. For such
an assessment, the determination of appropriate social discount rates is crucial. This topic goes beyond
the scope of this article, and we refer to e.g. Dasgupta (2008) and Heal (2009) for recent overviews of the
aspects to be considered.
4.2. Decentralized climate engineering decisions
In analyses of centralized climate engineering decisions, one crucial assumption is that the application of CE
- and in particular RM measures - will actually bring about an improvement of global welfare that still needs
to be empirically validated. It is very unlikely that this assumption will be fulfilled for single regions or
countries. If this is not the case, the question arises as to whether a small number of countries might choose to
use RM measures without international consent. This is feasible for a number of measures if one considers the
implementation costs and their effectiveness in controlling temperature (Schelling, 1996; Barrett, 2008, 2009).
Consequently, the scientific community has a particular interest in papers that investigate the use of RM
from a perspective where several actors may decide independently on the RM measure. The different actors
do not necessarily need to represent different countries. They could also represent different generations.
In a static framework, this issue is addressed in the second part of the article by Moreno-Cruz and
Smulders (2010). Again, social damages are determined by the CO2 concentration, temperature increase,
and side-effects caused by RM, as set out in the previous section. The authors consider n actors, e.g.
countries, where one actor can unilaterally deploy RM. The remaining n-1 actors can only determine their
level of emission control. Each of the n-1 countries minimizes its own social costs (the cost of emission
control plus economic damages), taking into the account the emission control measures opted for by the
other actors and the level of RM chosen by the one actor. The unilateral actor minimizes global social costs
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by selecting the level of RM, taking the emission control opted for by the n-1 actors as given.
In such a situation, the substitution effect between emission control and RM action is influenced by the
free-rider problem. From a global perspective, countries would choose a lower level of emission control than
is optimal even without the unilateral RM deployment. The possibility of using RM amplifies the free-rider
effect, resulting in even lower emission control plus higher RM deployment than is globally optimal.
To our knowledge, there are no other analyses discussing the implications of RM deployment from a de-
centralized perspective, which is surprising. In particular, the static analysis by Moreno-Cruz et al. (2010)
referred to in the previous chapter would be an interesting starting point for a decentralized optimization
perspective, with respect not only to the optimal level of RM but also to new incentives with a bearing on
climate change negotiations. Rickels et al. (2011) discuss the latter point with reference to CDR. They ana-
lyze the implications of integrating carbon credits from large-scale iron fertilization into a static compliance
problem for the year 2020. Besides analyzing the market requirements (prices, amount of carbon credits) for
iron fertilization to compete with emission control and afforestation, they also investigate the distributional
impacts.
As expected, their results indicate that “carbon credit selling countries” (most of them developing coun-
tries) experience a reduction in profits whereas “carbon credit buying countries” are more or less indifferent
between extending carbon credit supply from CDM activities and opting for carbon credit supply from iron
fertilization instead. The authors argue that it might be possible to design a new option in which allocation
of carbon credits from iron fertilization is conditional on accepting emission reduction targets. This would
create new incentives for developing countries to join a global climate regime, while developed countries are
more or less indifferent. Overall, the new option would require more ambitious emission reduction targets
to ensure carbon price stability.
Such new incentives for mitigation of climate change by CDR measures might require modifications to
the negotiation framework for international climate treaties. This question is addressed in an intertemporal
framework by Barrett (2010), who analyzes possible international treaties about the level of emission control
and air capture. He assumes the cost of emission control to be convex and that of air capture to be linear and
relatively high. Furthermore, he assumes that applying air capture does not in itself imply social damages
due to side-effects. Barrett posits a three-stage decision game. In stage one, countries decide on whether
to participate in an international treaty, in stage two those participating decide on their level of emission
control and/or air capture, while in stage three non-participants decide on their level of emission control/air
capture. He argues that separate treaties for emission control and air capture are not cost-efficient due to
the difference in marginal costs for the measures, while due to the relatively high constant marginal costs
of air capture, a combined treaty based on cost-effectiveness might not be self-enforcing. Consequently, if
new measures like air capture are integrated into international treaties, the preference for cost-effectiveness
would need to be reassessed. Cost-effectiveness in second-best treaty arrangements might imply that air
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capture would not be used, even though its usage would increase welfare. Barrett argues that, in such a
situation, separate treaties covering the different technologies may be superior to cost-effectiveness.
Analyses of globally optimal CE measures have identified a fundamental substitution effect between
emission control and CE. This may no longer be true if consideration extends to a large number of actors
valuing the use of CE differently. This eventuality is investigated by Moreno-Cruz (2010). He uses the basic
model set up by Moreno-Cruz and Keith (2009), but transfers it to a two-country decision problem where
countries are differently affected by climate change and the side-effects of RM. In the two-stage decision
problem, both countries decide simultaneously about emission control in stage one and about RM action in
stage two. In stage two, the social damages due to climate change and the side-effects of RM are known, i.e.
there is no uncertainty about climate sensitivity. Again, countries minimize social costs resulting from the
expense of emission control/RM action plus economic damages. First, the author considers the case where
both countries are similar in their perception of climate change and RM-related social damages. Once more,
the outcome confirms the technical substitution effect between emission control and RM action, resulting in
lower aggregate emission control in stage one. In contrast to Moreno-Cruz and Keith (2009), this result is
based on cost-effectiveness only and not on the reaction advantage of RM action with respect to uncertain
climate sensitivity. Alongside the substitution effect, the two-country decision problem is also affected by
the free-riding factor. Both countries anticipate that a lower level of emission control will result in a higher
level of RM action in the second stage and have an incentive to realize lower emission control in the first
stage. However, the author argues that because the two countries are very similar, the influence on emission
control is dominated by the substitution effect and not by the strategic effect.
Turning to a more interesting case, the author assumes that the countries are differently affected by
climate change and RM-related side-effects. He demonstrates that a situation may arise in which one country
does not take RM action in the second stage because it is strongly affected by these side-effects. Despite
this, the other country will still take RM action conditional on the aggregate emission level observed in stage
one. Accordingly, the country strongly affected by RM-related side-effects has an incentive to increase its
emission control in stage one so that the other country will choose a lower level of RM in stage two. The
author points out that this effect might result in a situation where aggregate emission controls exceed that
in a situation where the option of RM action is not available. Such a situation could arise if one country is
assumed to be “climate change winner” and the other country a “climate change loser”. The former would
have little incentive for emission control. If it is also an “RM loser” it will have an incentive to increase
emission control, taking into account that the “climate change loser” has a strong incentives to choose a
high level of RM.
Note that the results in Moreno-Cruz (2010) do not necessarily require the countries to be differently
affected in physical or economic terms. It would be sufficient for them to value RM-related side-effects
differently, due, say, to ethical considerations. This idea is taken up in the analysis by Goeschl et al. (2010),
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where the authors consider two generations which do not overlap. Effectively, they also use a two-stage
decision problem in which uncertainty about climate sensitivity exists. It is assumed that climate sensitivity
and hence the related climate change-induced social damages are either high or low. The uncertainty about
climate sensitivity is revealed in stage two, and the economic damages are also only realized in stage two.
The first generation decides on its level of emission control and whether or not it intends to invest in R&D
for the development of RM measures. This latter decision determines the availability of the option of taking
RM action in stage two. Consequently, the second generation decides about whether it will use RM or
not, provided the necessary R&D has been done in stage one. RM action also causes side effect-related
economic damages. The first generation behaves altruistically, minimizing the sum of emission control costs,
R&D investment, and economic damages, where the latter are only realized in stage two. The costs for
emission control are assumed to be convex, the R&D investment costs for the development of RM to be a
fixed amount, and the cost of RM action in stage two to be zero. The social damages causes by RM-related
side-effects are assumed to be linear and the social damages caused by climate change to be convex, implying
convex benefits for RM action.
However, the distinctive feature of the model proposed by Goeschl et al. (2010) is that the economic
damages are assessed differently between generations and that the first generation takes into account this
possibility in its altruistic optimization decision. In the reference case without different assessment, the first
generation invests in R&D, and the second generation takes RM action if climate sensitivity turns out to
be high. Again the substitution effect is observed, implying a lower level of emission control in stage one
than would have been chosen without the RM option. The authors then analyze the case where the second
generation’s assessment of the economic damages caused by RM-related side-effects is lower than that of the
current generation. Consequently, the second generation might also have an incentive to take RM action
if climate sensitivity turns out to be low, even though this was not intended by the first generation. As
a result, the first generation deviates from optimal behavior in the reference case. Three strategic options
are available for the first generation: (1) increasing emission control and investing in R&D so that the
second generation has lower incentives for RM action; (2) increasing emission control but refraining from
R&D investment so that the second generation cannot take RM action; (3) decreasing emission control and
investing in R&D, accepting that RM will be used at stage two. The strategic option realized depends on
the choice of parameters.
The authors also consider the case where the second generation assesses the economic damages caused
by RM-related side-effects to be very large. Consequently, the second generation might have an incentive to
refrain from RM action, even if climate sensitivity turns out to be high. Again, the first generation changes
its behavior, having two potential options: (1) increasing emissions control and saving the investment for
R&D and (2) reducing emission control substantially and investing in R&D so that the second generation
is “forced” to take RM action. Both cases show that, in general, different assessments of RM or CE might
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alter the substitution effect observed in the analyses discussed in the previous section. Furthermore, the
authors emphasize that the current generation cannot take an isolated decision about CE research without
considering the potential options for its application.
5. Discussion and conclusion
Two fundamental issues are considered in the economic analyses of CE: the determinants and the level of
the social cost of CE, and the investigation of the incentives for the use of CE. With respect to the social
cost of CE measures, very little information is available. It is mostly confined to the operational cost of
CE measures. The cost figures published increase over time. However, these estimates include neither price
effects nor any quantitative assessment of potential external costs. Consequently, it is obvious that current
estimates strongly underestimate the true social cost of CE. Given current knowledge, it seems that the
main restrictions on CDR measures are the ability to capture CO2 and the potentially high operational
costs. RM measures, on the other hand, are expected to be mainly limited by current uncertainty about
their social cost. The very limited knowledge we have about the social cost of RM, notably with respect to
regional variation in the extent of temperature increase control and the potential for reduced precipitation,
may possibly stay the way it is, unless such measures are tested or applied on a large scale.
Furthermore, existing cost estimates for the various measures have been investigated in a rather piecemeal
way. As pointed out by Victor (2008), the application of CE measures will probably take place in the form
of a portfolio composed of various measures. Consequently, feedback and interaction effects have to be
investigated further. For example, the effectiveness of afforestation measures could be raised if they were
combined with genetic leaf modifications, so that not only carbon is removed but also the albedo of forest
areas is improved. Also, measures that may seem ineffective on a global scale, like increasing the albedo
in urban areas, might support emission control on a local scale via energy efficiency gains and temperature
decrease.
These economic analyses should be seen as an initial theoretical exploration of a field where empirical
assessments are still almost completely absent. But they have provided important new insights and indicate
many directions for further research. Theoretical economic analyses have shown that from a centralized
perspective it is rational to replace emission control by CE. This result is based on cost considerations and
also, in the case of RM measures, on their reaction advantage. The substitution effect is supported by the
positive interaction with natural carbon uptake, as pointed out by Moreno-Cruz and Smulders (2010). But
as we have seen, an explicit assessment of the interaction effects between CDR and RM measures is still
conspicuous by its absence.
In general, the results in from the centralized perspective are preconditioned by the assumption that
CE action makes it possible to increase social welfare. With respect to the potential side-effects, this can
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be considered a crucial assumption that needs to further investigated. Nevertheless, the work of Moreno-
Cruz et al. (2010) shows in principle that different globally optimal levels are possible, depending on the
weighting given to the different climate variables. Furthermore, the work done by these authors shows that
such a globally optimal level might not be the level agreed upon from the perspectives of different countries.
This addresses the more realistic question of how decisions on CE could and should be taken. From a
decentralized perspective, the substitution effect might be amplified over and against the first-best situation
or else undermined by strategic effects. In the first case, different actors might further lower their already
low emission reduction efforts if some countries indicate an intention to counteract dramatic climate change
by RM action (moral hazard effect). In the second case, countries that suffer from RM action or simply
dislike it might increase their emission control to reduce the incentives for RM action. As shown by Goeschl
et al. (2010), such strategic incentives do not only exist between countries but also between generations.
This study also provides theoretical confirmation that the decision about research on CE cannot be divorced
from the decision on its application.
Overall, it seems that CE-related economic research neglects CDR measures or considers them only
indirectly. Moreno-Cruz and Keith (2009) argue that emission control and RM measures constitute risk
complements but do not explicitly include CDR measures in their analysis. Even though political will might
restrict RM action to climate change emergencies, societies could find themselves in a position where the
social costs due to side-effects of the RM measures are higher than expected but would even be exceeded
by rapid climate change as a result of a truncation of RM action. In such a situation, it would be necessary
to reduce carbon concentrations quickly. But if this were restricted to the natural carbon sink processes,
it would take decades, if not centuries. Taking into account the potential lock-in effect by RM application
implied by combining the results of Brovkin et al. Brovkin et al. (2009) and Goes et al. (2011), one might
argue that CDR measures should be ready for action if RM measures are applied. That holds in particular
true, if economic analysis starts focusing more on the dynamic efficiency of RM measures, not just with
respect to its reaction advantage, but also with respect to its possible long-term application and the problems
associated with a possible necessary phase-out. Consequently, one could argue that research should focus
more on CDR measures. Given the results obtained by Gramstad and Tjo¨tta (2010), who show that welfare
losses from postponing RM action by 20 to 30 years would be rather modest, a priority for CDR research
would be appear to be reasonable. However, as pointed out by Barrett (2009), restricting research on CE or
even on certain CE measures would be reckless in view of potentially disastrous and sudden climate change.
Furthermore, as argued by Victor (2008), any ban or taboo on certain CE measures or CE in general would
probably lead to the exploration of these measures by less responsible and scrupulous governments and
individuals.
The quickly advancing theoretical insights into the incentives and the functioning of CE measures illus-
trate the complexity of the role of CE in the quest for avoiding dangerous climate change. They show that
31
CE may be able or even may need to play a role in controlling climate change. Yet, the models show that
the balance of emission control and CE activities depends essentially on the relative cost of the different
options for climate mitigation. These costs turn out to be extremely difficult to determine since they involve
not only direct cost but also market effects and external costs. Hence, further work on the real cost of CE
is urgently needed.
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Abstract
Reducing atmospheric carbon concentration by removing past emissions can extend our rapidly diminishing
emission budgets corresponding to the target of limiting the temperature increase to 2◦ C above preindustrial
levels. Forestation measures to offset carbon emissions have already entered the Kyoto Protocol. Other
carbon offset options like ocean iron fertilization or chemically enhanced weathering are currently being
analyzed. The analysis and comparison of such options requires determination of the amount of carbon
credits generated that can be used for compliance. In our analysis we assess the impact of various accounting
methods applied to large-scale sink enhancement projects, taking into account the partly temporary storage
characteristics arising from such projects. We apply the various accounting methods to hypothetical large-
scale Southern Ocean iron fertilization projects for different durations. From an economic perspective,
issuing temporary carbon credits would provide the largest number of carbon credits at an early stage.
This is equivalent to the existing tCER regulation under the Kyoto Protocol. Issuing temporary carbon
credits for short-term ocean iron fertilization would also benefit the environment, as all credits would have
to be replaced in the next commitment period. As some carbon will be stored permanently, this reduces
atmospheric carbon concentration.
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1. Introduction
Today, most countries regard a 2◦C temperature increase above preindustrial levels as the maximum tolerable
limit for global warming (e.g., UNFCCC, 2010, 2/CP.15). An exceedance probability of below 20 percent
for this limit implies an emission budget of less than 250 GtC from 2000 to 2049, of which more than
one third has already been emitted. Extrapolating current global CO2 emissions this budget will only last
until 2024 (Meinshausen et al., 2009). These figures emphasize the necessity of considering all options for
the mitigation of climate change, including large-scale sink enhancement projects (Buesseler et al., 2008).
Such carbon sink enhancement projects would enable us to offset carbon emissions by reducing atmospheric
carbon concentration through the removal of past emissions.
One main characteristic of all sink-enhancement projects is the partly temporary storage of carbon. This
means that part of the storage is temporary, while the rest is permanent. For this reason, some authors
have expressed general doubts about the potential efficacy of mitigating climate change by such projects
(Meinshausen and Hare, 2000; Kirschbaum, 2006). Under the Kyoto Protocol, temporary storage issues
arise only for Land-Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestation (LULUCF) projects in non-Annex I countries.
In Annex I countries, the issue of permanence does not arise (Phillips et al., 2001; Ellis, 2001). These
are countries with binding emission-reduction targets.1 However, Non-Annex I countries have no binding
emission reduction targets and will not compensate for any reduction in carbon stocks as they have no
Assigned Amounts with which to comply (Phillips et al., 2001; Ellis, 2001). The non-permanence problem
for projects within Non-Annex I countries is addressed by issuing temporary carbon credits, which transfer
permanent liability to the buyer of carbon credits. The carbon credits have to be replaced at some point in
time, wether the storage is permanent or not (UNFCCC, 2003). According to Dornburg and Marland (2008,
p.212), this concept of temporary carbon credits provides “a suitable framework for awarding and trading
carbon credits”.
Due to space limitations, increasing the effort to enhance the terrestrial carbon sink is unlikely to be
cost-efficient for sufficient reductions of atmospheric carbon concentration at reasonable cost. For this
reason other sink enhancement options are currently being discussed. Considering further sink enhancement
projects, such as enhancing the oceanic carbon sink by means of iron fertilization or enhancing the mineral
carbon sink by means of chemically accelerated weathering in a post-Kyoto agreement, will probably raise
further questions about the appropriateness of accounting methods. These sink enhancement projects differ
from LULUCF projects with regard to possibilities of intended or unintended release of stored carbon.
Also, in the case of oceanic sink enhancement, they would partly take place in international territory.
1Carbon credits (Emission Reduction Units) are awarded for activities that increase the stored amount of carbon, e.g.,
forestation, while carbon credits (e.g. Assigned Amounts or Certified Emission Reductions) are required for activities that
decrease the stored amount of carbon, e.g., deforestation. If the Protocol is prolonged, the link between the National Inventories
and the compliance with Assigned Amounts establishes a permanent liability for the owner of the carbon storage project.
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Consequently, accounting methods other than those applied to LULUCF projects need to be discussed.
This is particularly important because analysis of the economic potential of sink enhancement over and
against other mitigation options is not feasible without information on the amount of credits generated
to offset carbon emissions. This paper assesses the value of partly temporary storage arising within sink
enhancement projects. It does so by providing an overview of the effect of the various accounting methods
discussed in the literature on the number of credits that can be generated. The various accounting methods
are applied to hypothetical large-scale Southern Ocean iron fertilization projects for different durations.
Ocean iron fertilization (OIF) is especially suitable for comparing the outcomes of different approaches as
fluctuations in oceanic carbon uptake during and after OIF and additional releases of other greenhouse gases
like N2O have to be accounted for.
To address the problem of temporary storage, various accounting methods have been proposed in the
literature (see e.g., Dutschke, 2002; Fearnside et al., 2000; Fearnside, 2002; Marland et al., 2001; Costa and
Wilson, 2000). They can be grouped into three categories: permanent credits, temporary credits, and a
mixture of permanent and temporary credits. There are a number of publications on the various accounting
methods, but studies providing a comprehensive overview of accounting methods from all three categories
are rare. In particular, we have, as yet, no quantitative analyses comparing the number of carbon credits
generated. One exception is the study by Phillips et al. (2001). It considers three accounting methods
issuing permanent credits and one issuing temporary credits to an afforestation project and demonstrates
that the number of carbon credits issued over time varies significantly for the various accounting methods.
Very few studies put large-scale sink enhancement projects like OIF into the context of an international
climate agreement. To our knowledge, the rare exceptions are Sagarin et al. (2007), Leinen (2008), and
Bertram (2010). These provide non-technical overviews of the scientific, legal, and economic issues related
to OIF and summarize the requirements made by carbon markets on the generation of carbon credits by
OIF. However, all three studies discuss OIF in general terms, without any explicit application of accounting
methods to OIF. To our knowledge, our is the first paper to quantitively assess all relevant accounting
methods discussed in the literature for all three categories with reference to a large-scale sink enhancement
project like OIF.
In Section 2 we provide an overview of the relevant accounting methods, taking into account the issue of
permanence and leakage. “Leakage” refers to changes in carbon emissions outside the enhancement region
and to changes in emissions of other GHGs than carbon. In Section 3 we apply the various accounting
methods to the results of hypothetical large-scale Southern Ocean iron fertilization projects (Oschlies et al.,
2010). Section 4 contains a discussion and our conclusions.
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2. Carbon Accounting: Permanence and Leakage
The assignment of carbon credits to carbon sink enhancement projects for carbon storage requires the ful-
fillment of certain criteria. The Kyoto Protocol established such criteria for Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) projects.2 These projects have to be measured by an approved
methodology, the storage has to be additional, the credits have to be verified by a third party, the storage
has to be permanent, and the number of carbon credits has to be corrected for leakage (Grubb et al., 1999).
Leinen (2008) discusses the fulfillment of these criteria for large-scale sink enhancement projects like OIF,
identifying the issues of permanence and leakage as the most critical. In our analysis, we focus on these two
issues, referring to the literature for a discussion of the remaining criteria (Leinen, 2008; Bertram, 2010).
Carbon accounting methodologies can be divided into three categories. In the first category, permanent
credits are issued. Once issued, these credits are equivalent to other carbon credits like Assigned Amounts,
regardless of wether the stored carbon is released in future. In the second category, temporary credits
are issued. These temporary credits can be used for compliance within a commitment period, but they
have to be replaced in a later period. Temporary credits can be renewed if the carbon is still stored. The
third category is a mixture of permanent and temporary credits. Temporary carbon credits are replaced by
permanent carbon credits if the carbon is stored for a sufficient period of time.
In the following Subsections 2.1 to 2.3 we present existing accounting methods related to the three
categories and assess their application to OIF. In line with the IPCC’s definition of permanence, we regard
a time period of 100 years as permanent (UNFCCC, 1997).3 We refer to this time period as the permanence
period. In Section 2.4 we explain how leakage related to large-scale carbon offset projects like OIF can be
accounted for. To account for leakage, two issues need to be addressed. OIF might lead both to changes in
carbon emissions outside the enhancement region and to changes in emissions of other GHGs than carbon.
Both changes might result in a lower net reduction of greenhouse gas forcing than was initially assumed
when considering only the gross effect of OIF. Evaluating the true potential of OIF requires accounting for
such offsets, as called for by the recent London Convention (2007).
2.1. Carbon accounting methods with permanent carbon credits
There are four carbon accounting methods that assign permanent carbon credits: the net method, the
average method, the discount method, and the equivalence method. With the first method, it makes no
difference when the stored carbon is released within the permanence period of 100 years. As a consequence,
2The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) enables a country with an emission-reduction or emission-limitation commit-
ment under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Party) to implement an emission-reduction project in developing countries. The
Joint Implementation mechanism (JI) enables a country with an emission-reduction or emission-limitation commitment under
the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Party) to earn emission reduction units (ERUs) from an emission-reduction or emission-removal
project in another Annex B Party (UNFCCC, 1997, 2003)
3The choice of 100 years was not based on any scientific rationale but was rather a political decision (Leinen, 2008).
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the first method does not attach any importance to time within the permanence period. The other methods
do. In applying the accounting methods to OIF we assume that a cap on the cumulative amount of carbon
credits is implemented because no permanent liability can be established. The cap guarantees that the
release of carbon in later periods is taken into account when calculating the maximum amount of carbon
credits that can be generated by OIF.
2.1.1. The net method
In the literature this method is also referred to as the flow summation method (Richard and Stokes, 2004),
the carbon stocks change method (Ellis, 2001) or the ideal accounting system (Cacho et al., 2003). It accounts
for the annual changes in carbon storage stocks, no matter when they occur within the permanence period.
Consequently, this method considers storage and removal as separate events, awarding carbon credits when
carbon is stored and requiring carbon credits when carbon is released, presuming that a permanent liability
exists. The overall amount of carbon credits will only be positive if carbon is stored beyond the permanence
period. We refer to this amount as Capnet. For a storage project storing one ton C in year 1 and releasing
it in year 99, Capnet would be 0 t C. For release in year 101, Capnet would be 1. Applying the method
to OIF, we assume that carbon credits are provided when carbon stocks increase, though only up to the
Capnet amount.
2.1.2. The average method
This method accounts for the annual changes in carbon stocks, though only up to the average amount of
carbon stored over a defined period of time (Phillips et al., 2001; Marland et al., 2001; Ellis, 2001; Richard
and Stokes, 2004). We refer to this amount as Capavs. For a storage project storing one ton carbon in
year 1 and releasing it in year 99, Capavs would be 0.99 t C. Applying the method to OIF, we assume that
carbon credits are provided when carbon stocks increase, though only up to the Capavs amount which is
calculated over the permanence period.
2.1.3. The discount method
This method accounts for the annual changes in carbon stocks over a defined period of time, applying a social
discount rate in discounting future carbon to the present. The result is called “present tons equivalents”
(PTE) (Thompson et al., 2009; Richard and Stokes, 2004). Though the concept of discounting a physical
unit is not intuitive, van Kooten and Sohngen (2007, p.244) point out that “the idea of weighting physical
units accruing at different times is entrenched in the natural resource economics literature, going back to
economists’ definition of conservation and depletion (Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1968)”. We refer to the present tons
equivalents as Capdis. For a storage project storing one ton carbon in year 1 and releasing it in year 99, the
Capdis would be 0.9448 t C for a discount rate of 3 percent. Applying the method to OIF, we assume that
carbon credits are provided when carbon stocks increase, though only up to the Capdis amount.
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2.1.4. The equivalence method
This method accounts for annual carbon stocks, weighted by the equivalence factor. The method is based
on the idea that to be regarded as permanently stored carbon should be stored for a fixed period of time,
the equivalence time. If the amount of carbon is stored until the end of the equivalence time, the full
amount of carbon is credited. For this reason the method is also called ton-year accounting (e.g., Costa and
Wilson, 2000; Fearnside et al., 2000). To apply the method, the equivalence time needs to be determined.
According to various studies, the equivalence time varies between 42 and 150 years (Marland et al., 2001;
Ellis, 2001), suggesting a degree of arbitrariness that cannot be explained by scientific evidence but rather
by political considerations (Dutschke, 2002; Cacho et al., 2003; Marland et al., 2001). For this reason, the
equivalence method has aroused considerable controversy. Nevertheless, it has a certain appeal because it
provides a pragmatic and simple accounting method for various carbon storage projects of different lengths
(van Kooten and Sohngen, 2007; Murray, 2003).
Costa and Wilson (2000) and Fearnside et al. (2000) propose calculating the equivalence time in relation
to the calculation of the GWP. The equivalence time in years calculated in this way yields the storage time
required to offset the GWP of one ton of carbon released in year 1 and measured in ton-years. However,
different approaches exist regarding the tracking of emissions. Costa and Wilson (2000) track the amount
of carbon in the biosphere (MCW Approach), while Fearnside et al. (2000) and Fearnside (2002) track the
amount of carbon in the atmosphere (Lashof Approach). The MCW Approach determines equivalence time
by integrating over the time-decaying abundance of a ton of carbon over the permanence period, measured
in ton-years. Storing one ton of carbon for this equivalence time is awarded one carbon credit. The amount
of carbon stored is multiplied by the equivalence factor to obtain the annual amount of carbon credits. The
equivalence factor is determined as the reciprocal of the equivalence time. The Lashof Approach assigns
carbon credits according to the area of the integral over the time-decaying abundance of a ton of carbon
shifted beyond the permanence period, again measured in ton-years. The full amount of carbon credits
is therefore only obtained if the carbon is successfully stored until end of the permanence period. Two
possibilities exist for determining the annual carbon credits for the Lashof Approach. The amount of annual
carbon credits is obtained either via linear approximation of the decay pattern of atmospheric carbon,
which would again allow for calculating an equivalence factor, or by calculating the amount of ton-years
shifted beyond the permanence time horizon. We choose the second option, because the decay pattern of
atmospheric carbon is not accurately represented by linear approximation until the end.
We refer to the total amount of carbon credits for the two approaches as CapMequ (MCW Approach)
and CapLequ (Lashof Approach). Applying the Revised Bern model (Fearnside et al., 2000), we obtain an
equivalence time of 46 years for the MCW Approach.4 For a storage project storing one ton of carbon in
4The derivation of equivalence time is explained in more detail in Section 3 below.
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year 1 and releasing it in year 99, CapMequ is 0.9782 and Cap
L
equ is 0.9596. Though the equivalence time is
46 years with the MCW Approach, implying that a storage time of 46 years would be sufficient to earn a
full carbon credit, CapMequ is below 1. Since we consider a permanence period of 100 years in our analysis,
the positive carbon stock from year one can only be accounted for up to the equivalence time (46 years). At
that point the stock is set to zero and remains zero until the year 99. In year 99 it turns negative so that
it is subtracted from the full credit, again weighted with the equivalence factor and only for the remaining
year within the permanence period.
2.1.5. Intermediate results
So far the analysis has shown the impact of assessing time for a permanence period of 100 years. While the
net method does not assign credits to the idealized storage project (storage in year 1 and release in year
99), the remaining methods assign different amounts of credits (see Table 1). As for the remaining methods,
the amount is highest with the average method and lowest with the discount method. However, applying a
different discount rate would change the results. The average method is similar to the equivalence method,
applying an equivalence time of 100 years. For this method, the amount of annual carbon credits can be
obtained via multiplication by an equivalence factor of 1/100, if carbon credit issue within the average
storage method were not based on carbon stocks change but on the carbon stocks. However, we make a
distinction between the two methods because the equivalence method covers approaches that derive the
equivalence time on the basis of the atmospheric carbon decay pattern. Note that if the release in the
Table 1: Numerical example for accounting methods assigning permanent carbon credits
Valuing time over Carbon credits for storage
the permanence period of of 1t C in year 1
Method 100 years and release in year 99
net method no 0
average method yes 0.9900
discount method (3 percent) yes 0.9448
equivalence method-MCW Approach yes 0.9782
equivalence method-Lashof Approach yes 0.9596
idealized storage project took place in year 101, all methods would provide full carbon credits. For the last
three methods, this would imply a modest increase in carbon credits, while for the net method we would
observe an increase from zero to full crediting.
2.2. Carbon accounting methods with temporary carbon credits
Two carbon accounting methods that assign temporary carbon credits are discussed in the literature. Both
of them are applied to account for LULUCF activities under the Kyoto Protocol. With the first method,
temporary credits are valid for a fixed period of time but can be renewed if the carbon is still stored. With
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the second method, temporary credits are valid for a fixed period of time and cannot be renewed, even if
the carbon is still stored (Phillips et al., 2001). Decision 5/CMP.1 of the UNFCCC (2003) refers to the
first method as temporary certified emission reductions (tCER) and to the second as long-term certified
emission reductions (lCER). tCERs expire at the end of the commitment period following the period in
which they were issued, while lCERs expire at the end of the crediting period of the project for which
they were issued (UNFCCC, 2003; Olschewski et al., 2005). This is important as the crediting period is
generally longer than the commitment period. Decision 5/CMP.1 regulates the modalities and procedures
for afforestation and reforestation project activities under the CDM mechanism in the first commitment
period of the Kyoto Protocol. It therefore serves as a guideline for the general modalities of temporary
carbon credits for temporary storage projects. It is important to note that the maximum project duration
is either 30 or 60 years5 (UNFCCC, 2003). The maximum crediting period is shorter than the permanence
period of 100 years and all temporary carbon credits (tCER and lCER) have to be replaced during that
time, wether the storage is permanent or not.
Applying the concept of temporary carbon credits to OIF, we follow Decision 5/CMP.1 and distinguish
between short-term temporary carbon credits and long-term temporary carbon credits. We refer to these
two methods as the shorttemp and longtemp methods. We assume that short-term temporary carbon credits
are issued on the basis of the carbon stocks at the end of a commitment period and have to be replaced in the
next commitment period. For the shorttemp method no cap is required. We assume further that long-term
temporary carbon credits are also issued on the basis of the carbon stocks at the end of a commitment
period, but are valid until the end of the crediting period (60 years). Therefore the carbon stocks at the end
of the crediting period constitute a cap for issuing carbon credits. This implies that the amount of long-term
temporary carbon credits issued in the earlier commitment periods may be smaller than the actual change
in carbon stocks observed during the first commitment period. We refer to the cap for the longtemp method
as Capltemp.
2.3. Carbon accounting methods with permanent and temporary credits
Carbon accounting methods that assign a mixture of permanent and temporary credits are rarely discussed
in the literature. A carbon accounting method could assign permanent credits for the amount of carbon
stored permanently (as discussed in Subsection 2.1) and also assign temporary carbon credits for the amount
of carbon stored temporarily (as discussed above). However, there are other accounting methods that deserve
consideration in connection with the renewal of temporary carbon credits. Dutschke (2002), for example,
proposes that the underlying carbon stocks for the renewal of expired credits can only be taken as a basis at
diminishing rates. The underlying amount of carbon depreciates in accordance with the atmospheric carbon
520 years with two renewable periods of 20 years, if certain requirements are fulfilled.
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decay pattern, but only for a fixed period of time. Thereafter the remaining amount of carbon is considered
to be stored permanently.
Applying this method to OIF, we assume that temporary carbon credits are issued on the basis of the
carbon stocks at the end of a commitment period and have to be replaced in the next commitment period.
Calculation of the underlying carbon stocks requires taking the time-decaying abundance of carbon in the
atmosphere into account. Accordingly, the amount of carbon credits issued within a commitment period is
smaller than the actual amount of carbon stored. Take, for example, a storage project where one ton of
carbon is added to the stored carbon stocks each year. Assume further that the commitment period is five
years. Applying the Revised Bern Model, the amount of carbon credits is not 5 but only 4.35502, because
the one ton added in the first year has already decayed for four years, the one ton added in the second year
has decayed for three years, and so on.
The UNFCCC framework does not provide any guidance on the application of this method. In our
analysis we assume that the crediting period is equal to the permanence period of 100 years and that carbon
credits issued in the final commitment period do not have to be replaced. We refer to this method as the
mixed method.
2.4. Leakage and the carbon accounting methods
The leakage issue addresses all potential offsets that have to be taken into account to obtain the net amount of
carbon credits in the various accounting methods. Potential offsets arise due (1) to carbon emissions outside
the enhancement region (spatial leakage) and (2) to changes in emissions of other GHGs than carbon (GHG
leakage). To account for carbon emissions outside the enhancement region of the OIF projects (spatial
leakage), we apply the accounting methods to global data for oceanic carbon uptake rather than local data.
To account for emissions of other GHGs than carbon (GHG leakage), we introduce a deduction rate.6 The
deduction rate reduces the gross amount of carbon credits to a net amount that then can be used for
compliance. The deducted amount of carbon credits can be retained in a buffer account and can be released
later if no leakage has been observed (Ellis, 2001).
3. Results
3.1. Accounting methods applied to OIF
To demonstrate the effect of the various accounting methods, we apply the results of hypothetical large-
scale Southern Ocean iron fertilization projects, realized as model experiments in Oschlies et al. (2010).7
6Note that in the publication this deduction rate is misnamed as discount factor.
7The focus of our analysis is on OIF as a means of increasing oceanic carbon uptake. However, this is not the only reason
to do OIF. OIF has also been discussed as a method of increasing primary and secondary productivity in the ocean for feeding
fish stocks.
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Within the model experiments, OIF is realized by increasing the phytoplankton growth rate in the Southern
Ocean (south of 30◦) for 1, 7, 10, 50, and 100 years, while the carbon emissions are represented by the
IPCC SRES A2 Scenario (see Appendix A for a description of the model experiments).8 We refer to these
model experiments as Experiments 1 to 5. The maximum phytoplankton growth rate is increased from 0.13
per day at 0◦ C to either 0.26 per day, calibrated against the changes in export production observed for
persistent natural iron fertilization on the Kerguelen Plateau and Crozet Islands in the Southern Ocean
(Blain et al., 2007; Pollard et al., 2009), or to 10.0 per day to simulate an upper bound for OIF. We
refer to the former growth rate as “low fertilization effectiveness” and to the latter growth rate as “high
fertilization effectiveness”. Though the latter rate is beyond a physiologically sensible range, the intended
effect in the model is a further drawdown of macronutrients than observed in the island-induced natural
iron fertilization. As we do not know whether island-induced iron fertilization is sufficient to completely
relieve phytoplankton from iron stress, the “high fertilization effectiveness” sensitivity growth rate explores
a hypothetical scenario of a purposeful OIF impact being larger than that of island-induced natural OIF
(Oschlies et al., 2010). Additionally, its inclusion emphasizes the differences between the various accounting
methods because relative changes in carbon fluxes are larger. The model outcome is summarized by the
annual global oceanic carbon uptake over 100 years for each model experiment and for both growth rates.
Table B.1 in the Appendix shows the annual changes in carbon stocks for oceanic uptake measured in Gt C
compared to the unfertilized control run (baseline) for each model experiment and for both growth rates. It
indicates that in fertilization years the simulated carbon uptake is larger than in the baseline, but at annual
rates diminishing with increasing duration of the fertilization. When fertilization stops, marine carbon
uptake becomes smaller than in the baseline, but again at diminishing rates over time. For further details
on the OIF model experiments, see Oschlies et al. (2010).
In applying the different accounting methods we assume that each model experiment starts in 2012, so
the permanence period lasts until 2112. We further assume that the first commitment period is from 2012 to
2020, because 2012 is when the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol comes to an end. A second
commitment period with new reduction targets is currently being negotiated and should cover the period
from 2012 to 2020 (e.g., European Union, 2009). Following the literature, we assume further commitment
periods of 5 years from 2020 to 2115 and a final commitment period of 7 years, ending in 2112. For the
discount method we assume a social discount rate of 3 percent. For both the equivalence method and the
mixed method, we use an impulse response function for the time-decaying abundance of CO2, F (CO2(t)),
8The SRES A2 non-intervention scenario assumes high population growth and moderate, uneven economic growth, leading
to an increase from today’s emissions of about 8 GtC/yr to about 29 GtC/yr in the year 2100. After 2100, annual emissions
are assumed to decline by 1.45 GtC per year, reaching zero at year 2300.
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Figure 1: Gross amount of carbon credits for the equivalence method on the basis of additional oceanic carbon uptake with
high fertilization effectiveness in Gt C.
with parameter values from the Revised Bern Model (Fearnside et al., 2000):
F [CO2(t)] = 0.175602+ 0.258868e
−0.292794t + 0.242302e−0.0466817t (1)
+ 0.185762E−0.014165t + 0.137467e−0.00237477t,
where t is time in years. Based on these parameter values, we obtain an equivalence time of 45.7556 years
for the MCW approach (equivalence method). The derived equivalence factor is 0.0219.
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Table 2: Caps and cumulative gross carbon credits in commitment period 2012-2020 on the basis of additional oceanic carbon uptake in GtC
High fertilization effectiveness
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4 Exp. 5
1 year OIF 7 year OIF 10 year OIF 50 year OIF 100 year OIF
Carbon Accounting Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative
credits method Cap credits Cap credits Cap credits Cap credits Cap credits
2012-2020 2012-2020 2012-2020 2012-2020 2012-2020
net 3.33 3.33 13.56 13.56 17.96 17.96 74.60 35.00 169.30 35.00
permanent average 4.87 4.87 18.54 18.54 24.13 24.13 77.44 35.00 104.69 35.00
(p.) discount 6.05 6.05 21.26 21.26 26.84 26.84 63.68 35.00 76.26 35.00
equ-Lash. 4.56 0.54 17.62 1.36 23.05 1.38 78.90 1.38 114.84 1.38
equ-MCW 3.64 1.60 14.83 4.04 19.71 4.10 85.34 4.10 144.26 4.10
temporary shorttemp no 8.06 no 32.22 no 35.00 no 35.00 no 35.00
(t.) longtemp 3.94 3.94 16.03 16.03 21.33 21.33 95.90 35.00 122.40 35.00
p. and t. mixed no 5.22 no 24.43 no 27.21 no 27.21 no 27.21
Low fertilization effectiveness
net 0.61 0.61 2.50 2.50 3.53 3.53 19.02 11.32 56.47 11.32
average 0.76 0.76 4.06 4.06 5.65 5.65 23.43 11.32 34.92 11.32
permanent discount 0.95 0.95 5.14 5.14 6.92 6.92 20.08 11.32 25.34 11.32
(p.) equ-Lash. 0.72 0.09 3.74 0.41 5.24 0.42 23.33 0.42 38.31 0.42
equ-MCW 0.61 0.28 2.78 1.22 3.97 1.26 23.38 1.26 48.11 1.26
temporary shorttemp no 1.21 no 9.58 no 11.32 no 11.32 no 11.32
(t.) longtemp 0.61 0.61 3.09 3.09 4.44 4.44 28.10 11.32 40.94 11.32
p. and t. mixed no 0.72 no 7.17 no 8.91 no 8.91 no 8.91
5
0
Table 2 shows for each accounting method, for each model experiment, and for both growth rates the
gross amount of carbon credits generated in the first commitment period (2012-2020) plus the caps that take
carbon release in later periods into account. The figures are based on oceanic carbon uptake as set out in
Table B.1 in the Appendix. According to the scientific literature, the total effect of OIF is described by the
net method. The results of the model experiments show a wide range of changes in oceanic carbon stocks
for the two levels of OIF effectiveness. If OIF effectiveness is low (growth rate 0.26 per day), the model
experiments result in an average annual uptake of 0.56 GtC for a fertilization duration of 100 years. If OIF
effectiveness is high (growth rate 10.0 per day), the corresponding value increases to 1.69 Gt C. Compared
to the values of earlier modeling studies ranging from 0.7 to 1.6 Gt C for iron fertilization in the Southern
Ocean for a fertilization duration of 100 years (Sarmiento and Orr, 1991; Aumont and Bopp, 2006), the
lower bound given by Oschlies et al. (2010) for low fertilization effectiveness is considerably lower.
Table 3: Gross amount of short-term temporary carbon credits on the basis of additional oceanic carbon uptake with high
fertilization effectiveness in Gt C
Shorttemp method
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
Commitment 1 year OIF 7 years OIF 10 years OIF
period Carbon Replace- Carbon Replace- Carbon Replace-
credits ment credits ment credits ment
2012 - 2020 8.06 0 32.22 0 35.00 0
2020 - 2025 6.99 1.07 27.86 4.36 37.81 0
2025 - 2030 6.28 0.71 25.03 2.83 33.69 4.12
2030 - 2035 5.76 0.52 22.99 2.04 30.83 2.86
2035 - 2040 5.34 0.42 21.40 1.59 28.65 2.18
2040 - 2045 5.02 0.32 20.13 1.27 26.92 1.73
2045 - 2050 4.77 0.25 19.09 1.04 25.52 1.40
2050 - 2055 4.52 0.25 18.19 0.90 24.30 1.22
2055 - 2060 4.31 0.21 17.44 0.75 23.25 1.05
2060 - 2065 4.15 0.16 16.80 0.64 22.38 0.87
2065 - 2070 3.99 0.16 16.23 0.57 21.60 0.78
2070 - 2075a 3.94 0.05 16.03 0.20 21.33 0.27
2075 - 2080 0 3.94 0 16.03 0 21.33
aCarbon credits issued in the commitment period 2070-2075 are based on stock change until 2072 only.
Comparing the caps for permanent credits in Table 2, the net method provides the lowest cap for short-term
projects (Experiments 1-3) because all years are weighted equally. The other methods assume a time value
and hence give later years less weight. They provide larger caps for short-term projects because later years
with lower uptake than in the baseline count less. However, later years with higher uptake than in the
baseline also count less. Accordingly the net method provides the largest cap for Experiment 5 (100 years
fertilization). For the short-term projects, the discount method provides the largest cap, followed by the
average method and the equivalence method with the Lashof Approach. Reducing the discount rate to 1
percent, the cap of the discount method is in the same order of magnitude as the two other methods, again
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Figure 2: Gross amount of temporary carbon credits and replacement for Experiment 3 (10 years OIF) on the basis of additional
oceanic carbon uptake with high fertilization effectiveness in Gt C.
for short-term projects.
Looking at the equivalence methods, the Lashof Approach provides larger caps than the MCW Approach
in comparison of results for the short-term projects. This is not intuitive. Under the MCW Approach, 46
years of storage is sufficient to earn a full carbon credit, whereas a time-period of 100 years is required under
the Lashof Approach. This can be explained by the fact that with the MCW Approach both higher and
lower uptakes than in the baseline count as full carbon credits for the years 0 to 54.9 Under the Lashof
Approach, only the change in carbon stocks in the first year counts fully, because time-decaying abundance
is integrated over the complete permanence period of 100 years. For all later years, time-decaying abundance
is integrated over a shorter period (less than 100 years) so that changes in carbon stocks never lead to a
complete carbon credit. Applying the shorttemp, longtemp, and mixed methods, a cap is required only for
the long-term temporary credits in the longtemp method. The other two methods require no cap. The cap
is determined by carbon stocks after 60 years (2072) and is therefore higher than the cap of the net method
for Experiments 1 to 4 and lower than the cap for Experiment 5.
For most methods the amount of carbon credits for short-term OIF projects is limited by the binding
cap. The only non-binding caps for short-term OIF projects arise with the equivalence method under the
Lashof Approach, because due to the inclusion of an equivalence measure it generates only a fraction of the
9The permanence period of 100 years minus the equivalence time of 46 years.
52
mixed method
Experiment3:10yearsfertilization
CreditIssue
Replacement
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2
0
1
2
Ͳ20
2
0
2
0
2
0
Ͳ20
2
5
2
0
2
5
Ͳ20
3
0
2
0
3
0
Ͳ20
3
5
2
0
3
5
Ͳ20
4
0
2
0
4
0
Ͳ20
4
5
2
0
4
5
Ͳ20
5
0
2
0
5
0
Ͳ20
5
5
2
0
5
5
Ͳ20
6
0
2
0
6
0
Ͳ20
6
5
2
0
6
5
Ͳ20
7
0
2
0
7
0
Ͳ20
7
5
2
0
7
5
Ͳ20
8
0
2
0
8
0
Ͳ20
8
5
2
0
8
5
Ͳ20
9
0
2
0
9
0
Ͳ20
9
5
2
0
9
5
Ͳ21
0
0
2
1
0
0
Ͳ21
0
5
2
1
0
5
Ͳ21
1
2
c
a
rb
o
n
cr
e
d
it
sG
tC
Figure 3: Gross amount of carbon credits with mixed method for Experiment 3 (10 years OIF) on the basis of additional
oceanic carbon uptake with high fertilization effectiveness in Gt C.
actual carbon stocks. Figure 1 and Table B.2 in the Appendix show the gross amounts of carbon credits for
the two equivalence methods in short-term OIF projects and high iron fertilization effectiveness. With the
Lashof Approach, carbon credit issuance extends until the final commitment period. The cap is achieved in
the final commitment period and is therefore never binding. With the MCW Approach we have a binding
cap so carbon credit issuance ends after a number of commitment periods. Comparing the amount of credits,
the MCW Approach provides larger amounts of credits at a much earlier stage. Note that with the Lashof
Approach, the amount of carbon credits first decreases, then slightly increases over the commitment periods.
One reason is the pattern of carbon change for the short-term OIF projects. Another is the non-linear time-
decaying abundance of carbon in the atmosphere. The first years after a pulse of carbon into the atmosphere
show higher decay rates, followed by slightly declining decay rates in later years. Consequently, the increase
in ton-years until the end of the permanence period is larger if storage is extended from say 80 to 90 years
rather than 50 to 60 years.
The shorttemp method provides the largest amount of carbon credits in the first commitment period for
short-term OIF projects. In the next commitment period these carbon credits have to be replaced either
by new short-term temporary carbon credits or by other carbon credits, e.g. Assigned Amounts. Table 3
shows the gross amount of short-term temporary carbon credits generated in each commitment period over
the crediting period of 60 years. It also shows the necessary replacement by other carbon credits in each
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commitment period by other carbon credits. In the commitment period 2075-2080, all short-term temporary
credits from the previous commitment period have to be replaced by other carbon credits. These amounts
are equal to the caps for the long-term temporary carbon credits. Figure 2 shows the evolution of temporary
carbon credits and replacement as exemplified by Experiment 3 (10 years of fertilization).
The amount of carbon credits in the first commitment period (2012-2020) for the long-term OIF projects
(Experiment 4 and 5) is not limited by the caps. Accordingly, all methods provide the same amount of carbon
credits within the first commitment period, except for the equivalence method and the mixed method (see
Table 2). For the equivalence method the reason has already been discussed. As they are based on an
equivalence measure, they generate only a fraction of the actual carbon stocks as carbon credits. For the
mixed method, the effect is not caused by an equivalence measure but rather by the lower basis on which
credits are generated. This basis is not determined by the actual carbon stocks but by calculating the time-
decaying abundance of atmospheric carbon for these carbon stocks. This lowers the amount of carbon credits
because the carbon uptake in the years between 2012 and 2020 has already decayed to some extent. As with
the shorttemp method carbon credits have to be replaced in the following commitment period. Table B.3 in
the Appendix shows the amount of carbon credits generated and the necessary replacement by other carbon
credits for the mixed method. The mixed method generates more carbon credits in the first commitment
period than say the net method, but the fraction of credits that turn out to be permanent at the end of
the permanence period is rather low (14 to 17 percent for the short-term OIF projects). Compared to the
shorttemp method, fewer carbon credits are generated in the first commitment period, but the necessary
replacement in the second commitment period is larger due to the calculated decay of the underlying carbon
stocks. Figure 3 shows the evolution of carbon credits and necessary replacement for the mixed method as
exemplified by Experiment 3 (10 years of fertilization). Comparing the evolution of carbon credits in Figure
2 and 3, we see that the shorttemp method provides more carbon credits and lower replacement in each
commitment period than the mixed method. However, the shorttemp method requires complete replacement
in the final commitment period, whereas the mixed method does not, the reason being that a fraction of
initially temporary credits turns out to be permanent.
3.2. Deduction rates for leakage
In the previous section the accounting methods were applied on the basis of global data including the effect
of spatial leakage. Accordingly, the figures in the previous section already constitute net figures with respect
to spatial leakage. Applying local data from the carbon uptake in the fertilized area would have implied
using a deduction rate for spatial leakage in the order of eight percent (Oschlies et al., 2010).
The deduction rate in this section are designed to address the offset from emissions of other GHGs than
carbon by correcting the gross amount of carbon credits to a net amount that can be used for compliance
purposes. Stipulating the oceanic carbon sink by OIF influences the production of a range of trace gases,
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notably methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and dimethylsulphide (DMS) (e.g., Fuhrman and Capone,
1991; Jin and Gruber, 2003; Law, 2008). Enhanced CH4 and N2O emissions, both more powerful GHGs
than carbon, would offset the climate-change mitigation potential of OIF (Fuhrman and Capone, 1991).
Enhanced DMS emissions would potentially contribute to climate change mitigation by increasing the earth’s
albedo (Law, 2008).10 Combined physical-biogeochemical ocean models have shown that OIF could lead,
in particular, to greater N2O emissions (Jin and Gruber, 2003). Following Oschlies et al. (2010) we focus
on N2O emissions for the determination of the appropriate deduction rates as changes in CH4 emissions
are estimated negligible and increases in DMS emissions would potentially contribute to climate change
mitigation.11
N2O is relatively long-lived in the atmosphere and has a GWP 310 times that of CO2 (Forster et al.,
2007). To take this into account, we use the N2O emission anomalies simulated by Oschlies et al. (2010)
relative to the relative to the unfertilized control run. The authors apply two different parametrizations
of N2O production as a function of organic matter remineralization and oxygen concentration. These are
based on Suntharalingam and Sarmiento (2000) and Nevison et al. (2003).12
A calibration based on Nevison et al. (2003) leads to larger N2O emissions during the fertilization period.
On the other hand, after fertilization is stopped, emissions decrease faster compared to a calibration based
on Suntharalingam and Sarmiento (2000) (Figure 4). The plots also indicate that with the calibration based
on Nevison et al. (2003) the fertilization-induced N2O emissions of Experiments 1 to 4 are negative towards
the end of the permanence time period. For Experiment 5 (100 years fertilization) the fertilization-induced
N2O emissions first decrease, then increase, reaching a peak after 84 and 92 years respectively for the two
calibrations before starting to decrease again. To account for the mitigation offset, we use the annual N2O
emissions and the relative GWP for N2O to obtain the equivalent amount of annual CO2 emissions, which
we measure in C.13 These emissions represent the annual carbon offsets induced by N2O emissions. We
subtract the annual carbon offsets from the annual oceanic carbon uptake, thus obtaining annual oceanic
uptake corrected for N2O.
In a next step, we use the corrected amount of oceanic uptake and again apply the various accounting
methods. We do this for low and high OIF effectiveness scenarios and for both calibrations (Suntharalingam
and Sarmiento (2000) and Nevison et al. (2003)), thus obtaining four different scenarios for carbon credits
10Dimethylsulfide (DMS), which might be produced by stimulated OIF blooms, is the principal natural source of sulfur to the
atmosphere. It influences climate by its role in cloud formation and therefore changes the radiative forcing properties (Cullen
and Boyd, 2008).
11Measurements of dissolved CH4 emissions during the Southern Ocean Iron Enrichment Experiment (SOFeX) revealed a
very small increase of less than 1 percent (Wingenter et al., 2004).
12For the parametrization by Suntharalingam and Sarmiento (2000), the control run without OIF fertilization simulates
oceanic N2O emissions of about 3.5 Tg N/year. For the parametrization by Nevison et al. (2003) the control run simulates 4.6
Tg N/ year. Both estimates are well within the 3.8 ±2.0 Tg N/year range of the most recent IPCC report (Denman et al.,
2007). For more details see Oschlies et al. (2010).
13Converting N to N2O requires multiplying by
44.0128
2∗14.0067
. Converting N2O to equivalent CO2 requires multiplying by 310,
which is the GWP of N2O relative to CO2. Converting CO2 to C requires multiply by
12.0107
44.0095
.
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Figure 4: Path of released N compared to the baseline (without OIF) for high fertilization effectiveness in Mt N, Nev03 and Su03
abbreviate calibration based on Nevison et al. (2003) and Suntharalingam and Sarmiento (2000), respectively: a short-temp
projects (1, 7, and 10 years OIF), b long-term projects (50 and 100 years OIF).
based on corrected oceanic uptake. Comparing the four scenarios with the gross amount of carbon credits
from Section 3, we obtain the potential deduction rates that reduce the gross amount of carbon credits to
net carbon credits with respect to N2O emissions. We obtain deduction rates for the amount of carbon
credits in each commitment period as well as for the various caps. The former factors indicate the N2O
offset over time, the latter indicate the overall N2O offset. We refer to the former as the actual discount
factors and to the latter as the overall discount factors. Two accounting methods exists that have no cap,
the shorttemp and the mixed method. For both methods we calculate the average deduction rates over the
commitment periods to also obtain information on overall offset. The average for the shorttemp method
is calculated for the commitment periods until 2075 only, when the last credits are issued. Table 4 shows
the range of possible deduction rates for each model experiment and each accounting method. The lowest
deduction rate is obtained for Experiment 1 and the net method (0.23 percent), the largest deduction rate
is obtained for Experiment 3 and the longtemp method (13.26 percent). The average deduction rate is 7.85
percent. The average range between the lower and upper bound for the deduction rates is 3.97 percent.
The average range would be lower if the presentation would be restricted to one effectiveness scenario (3.50
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Table 4: Range of overall deduction rates with respect N2O offset in percent
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4 Exp. 5
Accounting 1 year 7 years 10 years 50 years 100 years
method OIF OIF OIF OIF OIF
net 0.23 - 7.44 3.66 - 8.19 4.84 - 8.33 6.32 - 11.88 4.74 - 12.44
average 6.53 - 8.43 5.97 - 9.78 5.91 - 9.91 5.18 - 9.76 4.54 - 9.61
discount 5.48 - 8.24 4.63 - 8.51 4.60 - 8.55 4.31 - 8.43 4.10 - 8.42
equ-Lash. 6.17 - 7.76 6.21 - 9.64 6.17 - 9.85 5.45 - 10.05 4.62 - 10.11
equ-MCW 5.20 - 8.67 7.68 - 9.78 7.66 - 10.33 6.58 - 11.67 4.87 - 10.97
shorttemp 7.18 - 11.34 6.65 - 11.70 6.39 - 11.47 4.21 - 8.50 3.96 - 8.07
longtemp 8.05 - 10.29 8.58 - 13.10 8.40 - 13.26 6.14 - 11.74 4.84 - 9.53
mixed 4.28 - 11.82 5.71 - 13.02 6.30 - 12.98 6.18 - 11.43 4.50 - 10.03
percent for low and 1.91 percent for high fertilization effectiveness).
Overall, the net method shows lower values for the upper bound of deduction rates for short-term projects,
but larger values for long-term projects compared with other methods that also generate permanent credits.
Again, the reason is that the net method does not distinguish between earlier and later years. All years
are valued equally, so for short-term projects later years with negative N2O emissions have a higher relative
status. The other methods place a lower weight on later years, so for long-term projects later years with
higher N2O emissions count less. The highest deduction rates for the short-term projects are calculated
for the longtemp method. Here the carbon stocks after 60 years constitute the cap (see Subsection 2.2 and
Section 3), so later years with low or even negative N2O emissions are not taken into account. For the
long-term projects, the longtemp method provides deduction rates in the same order of magnitude as the
other methods.
For Experiment 5 (100 years fertilization) and high fertilization effectiveness Table B.4 in the Appendix
shows the evolution of deduction rates for accounting methods that assign permanent credits. The results
illustrate that for all methods at least until the third commitment period (2025-2030) the actual deduction
rates are lower than the overall deduction rates for the cap. For some methods this holds true for an even
longer period. For example, the equivalence method based on the Lashof Approach has lower actual deduc-
tion rates until the 14th commitment period (2080-2085). Use of the overall deduction rate for deducting
carbon credits ensures that even in early commitment periods sufficient carbon credits are deducted to bal-
ance the overall offset, although the actual offset is lower in early commitment periods. Applying the actual
deduction rates for the commitment periods would result in lower deductions in the early commitment pe-
riods and higher deductions in the later commitment periods compared with the application of the overall
deduction rate to the cap. In the short-term projects, however, no difference exists between applying the
actual or the overall deduction rate in the accounting methods for which the cap is already binding in the
first commitment period.
Deducted permanent carbon credits are not necessarily lost. They can be retained within buffer accounts
57
Table 5: Range of actual deduction rates corresponding to N2O emissions for the shorttemp method in percent
Shorttemp method
Commitment Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4 Exp. 5
period 1 year OIF 7 years OIF 10 years OIF 50 years OIF 100 years OIF
2012 - 2020 3.87 - 7.76 2.44 - 5.43 2.22 - 5.00 2.22 - 5.00 2.22 - 5.00
2020 - 2025 5.05 - 9.88 3.96 - 8.12 3.48 - 7.27 2.79 - 6.03 2.79 - 6.03
2025 - 2030 5.94 - 11.56 5.06 - 10.02 4.67 - 9.38 3.24 - 6.83 3.24 - 6.83
2030 - 2035 6.66 - 12.44 5.92 - 11.40 5.59 - 10.94 3.60 - 7.48 3.60 - 7.48
2035 - 2040 7.24 - 12.74 6.56 - 12.30 6.29 - 12.01 3.86 - 7.95 3.86 - 7.95
2040 - 2045 7.69 - 12.71 7.02 - 12.85 6.80 - 12.71 4.10 - 8.35 4.10 - 8.35
2045 - 2050 8.00 - 12.61 7.42 - 13.23 7.22 - 13.17 4.29 - 8.67 4.29 - 8.67
2050 - 2055 8.31 - 12.32 7.73 - 13.42 7.55 - 13.42 4.47 - 8.96 4.47 - 8.96
2055 - 2060 8.58 - 11.84 8.09 - 13.59 7.83 - 13.48 4.62 - 9.20 4.62 - 9.20
2060 - 2065 8.59 - 11.32 8.43 - 13.61 8.20 - 13.62 5.30 - 10.37 4.73 - 9.37
2065 - 2070 8.22 - 10.57 8.59 - 13.34 8.38 - 13.42 5.94 - 11.42 4.80 - 9.48
2070 - 2075 8.05 - 10.29 8.58 - 13.10 8.40 - 13.26 6.14 - 11.74 4.84 - 9.53
Average 7.18 - 11.34 6.65 - 11.70 6.39 - 11.47 4.21 - 8.50 3.96 - 8.07
from which they can be released later, if leakage is lower than expected (Ellis, 2001). Consequently, applying
the overall deduction rate ensures that sufficient carbon credits are stored in the buffer account if leakage
is higher than expected. The situation is different for temporary credits, which have to be replaced anyway.
If leakage is higher than expected, fewer carbon credits will be issued, and a larger fraction of existing
temporary carbon credits has to be replaced. Consequently, temporary carbon credits might be deducted
by the actual deduction rate in each commitment period. For the short-term projects, this situation only
applies to the shorttemp and mixed methods. For the longtemp method, the cap is already binding in the
first commitment period. For the shorttemp method and short-term OIF projects Table 5 shows the range
of deduction rates over time until the final commitment period. The range is again based on both scenarios
for fertilization effectiveness and both calibrations. Applying the actual deduction rates to the amount
of carbon credits in each commitment period for the shorttemp method would result in lower deductions
of carbon credits in at least the first two commitment periods. But replacement by other carbon credits
would be higher in the following commitment periods. Considering all model experiments and all accounting
methods we find a maximum overall deduction rate of 13.26 percent and an average value of 7.85 percent
to address the offset by enhanced N2O emissions. In addition to offsets from emissions of other GHGs than
carbon, offsets from CO2 emissions emerging in operation need to be considered, in particular from fossil
fuel burning to power ships. Climos, a company proposing commercial OIF, estimates the deduction rate for
emissions from operation to be approximately 1 percent.14 However, this estimate does not consider different
durations for OIF. For short-term OIF projects, for example, the CO2 emissions released by implementation
and monitoring are relatively higher than for long-term OIF projects. Given these and other uncertainties
14http://www.climos.com/faq.php
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regarding CH4 emissions, it seems appropriate to apply slightly larger deduction rates and to retain the
deducted amount of carbon credits in a buffer account, which can be released later if complete leakage is
observed with respect to N2O emissions, CH4 emissions, and operation. However, using the Climos estimate
and taking into account the fact that even an increase of 20 percent in CH4 emissions would offset less than
1 percent of the OIF-induced carbon sequestration within the model experiments (Oschlies et al., 2010), an
average overall deduction rate of 10 percent and a maximum value of 15 percent might serve as a rule of
thumb.
4. Discussion and conclusion
Our objective in this paper has been to analyze how carbon credits generated by large-scale sink enhancement
projects could be accounted for. Different approaches are discussed in the literature. Our quantitative
assessment is based on an application of the various accounting methods to hypothetical large-scale Southern
Ocean iron fertilization projects, fertilizing the Southern Ocean (south of 30◦) for 1, 7, 10, 50, and 100 years.
To determine the amount of carbon credits generated, we have applied all relevant carbon accounting
methods, grouped into three categories according to the kind of credits they issue. In the first category we
have summarized accounting methods that issue permanent carbon credits: the net method, the average
method, the discount method, and the equivalence method (permanent methods). Two equivalence methods
exist, based on different concepts of time equivalence (the Lashof and the MCW Approach). In the second
category we have summarized accounting methods which issue temporary carbon credits: the shorttemp
and the longtemp method (temporary methods). The carbon credits issued are comparable to tCER and
lCER for LULUCF projects under the Kyoto Protocol. In the third category we have described a method
that issues temporary carbon credits that are replaced by permanent carbon credits if the carbon is stored
for a sufficient period of time. This method is rarely discussed in the literature. We refer to it as the mixed
method. Applying the various accounting methods to OIF, we have supplemented all methods except the
shorttemp and the mixed method with caps. These caps ensure that carbon credits are issued only up
to an upper bound and no credits are required in periods with negative carbon uptake compared to the
baseline. The shorttemp and mixed method do not require a cap because these methods entail carbon credit
replacement in each period.
For the short-term OIF projects (1, 7, and 10 years of fertilization), the discount method provides the
largest amount of permanent carbon credits, using an discount rate of 3 percent to convert future CO2 units
into present CO2 units. The average and the equivalence method based on the Lashof Approach provide
the second and third largest amounts of permanent carbon credits, respectively. However, the equivalence
method spreads carbon credits out over a longer time period, providing only a fraction of the total credits
in the first commitment period. All other methods provide the full amount of permanent carbon credits in
59
the first commitment period, which makes them more beneficial from an economic perspective. Overall, the
shorttemp method provides the highest amount of temporary carbon credits, followed by the mixed method
and the longtemp method. For the longtemp method, the amount of carbon credits is determined by the
binding cap. But the cap is calculated on the basis of a shorter time period than the caps in the permanent
methods.
Judging the approaches by the time for which they assign credits, the shorttemp method provides the
largest amount of carbon credits in the first commitment period, but the temporary carbon credits have to
be replaced in the next commitment period. However, only a fraction has to be replaced by other carbon
credits since short-term temporary carbon credits are issued in the following commitment period as well.
This fraction declines across the crediting period, so the stream of short-term temporary carbon credits is
constantly larger than the total amount of carbon credits provided by the net method. Consequently, an
amount of carbon credits that is larger than the amount of permanent carbon credits would not have to
be replaced until the end of the crediting period. Furthermore, the shorttemp method provides additional
temporary carbon credits during this period. Given constant or slowly increasing carbon prices and a
sufficiently high discount rate to obtain present values for CO2 units, this might result in economic benefits
that overcompensate economic losses due to complete replacement after the end of the crediting period.
As the duration of OIF increases, the span between the net method and the other methods decreases.
Since the net method does not value time, later years have the same weight as early years. The remaining
permanent methods attach less value to the late years. For an project duration of 50 years, the net method
provides an amount of carbon credits in the same order of magnitude as the other permanent methods.
For a duration of 100 years, the net method provides the largest amount of carbon credits. The results
for the application of the shorttemp and longtemp methods to long-term OIF are limited, because the
crediting period for these methods was set to 60 years. However, for an project duration of 50 years the
longtemp method provides the largest cap. The cap for the longtemp method is equal to credits issued by
the shorttemp method in the final commitment period before the crediting period ends. Consequently, the
shorttemp method again provides larger amounts of carbon credits - albeit temporary - than the permanent
methods.
For the long-term projects (50 and 100 years), the mixed method leads to a lower amount of credits
than most other methods, as it accounts for atmospheric carbon decay. Again, temporary carbon credits
are issued that have to be replaced in each commitment period. However, the carbon credits issued in
the final commitment period are permanent. For the short-term OIF projects, only an average fraction of
15 percent of carbon credits issued in the first commitment period is permanent in the end. We assume
that the crediting period for this method is equal to the permanence period. Reducing the credit period
would therefore increase the fraction of temporary carbon credits that turn permanent. This method is
rarely discussed in the literature, and we have not explored it in great detail but have rather included it for
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completeness, sake. Accordingly, analysis of the effect of other assumptions regarding the crediting period
must be left to future research.
To answer the question of how many carbon credits can be generated, potential leakage needs to be
accounted for. To address spatial leakage of carbon outside the enhancement region, we have used global
rather than local data for oceanic carbon uptake. For local data, the corresponding deduction rate for
spatial leakage would have been about eight percent. To address leakage by other GHGs, we have discussed
deduction rates that lower the gross amount of carbon credits to the net amount. Only the net amount
can be used for compliance. Leakage by other GHGs is mainly determined by enhanced N2O emissions.
Considering all project durations and all accounting methods, we find a maximum deduction rate of 13.26
percent and an average value of 7.85 percent to address the offset by enhanced N2O emissions. The calculated
deduction rates correspond to the overall amount of carbon credits (overall deduction rate). Alternatively,
one could also use deduction rates for each commitment period (actual deduction rate). In earlier periods
these actual deduction rates are lower than the overall deduction rates and would therefore lead to larger
amounts of carbon credits in the early stages. However, applying the overall deduction rate ensures that
a sufficient number of carbon credits will be deducted in early periods to balance offsets. Exceptions are
the shorttemp method and the mixed method, where the corresponding temporary carbon credits have to
replaced in each commitment period. Therefore, if leakage were higher than expected, fewer new temporary
carbon credits would be issued, and a larger fraction of temporary carbon credits already issued would
have to be replaced. However, additional emissions from operation, together with remaining uncertainties
regarding CH4 emissions, will probably lead to the enforcement of higher deduction rates. In particular, the
appropriate deduction rates for addressing leakage induced by operation are rather uncertain. We suggest
raising the average deduction rate to 10 percent and the maximum deduction rate to 15 percent.
The results indicate that overall, and from an economic perspective, the shorttemp method seems most
appropriate for short-term large-scale sink enhancement projects like OIF. This method provides for the
largest amount of carbon credits the lowest deduction rates at an early stage. Also, the fraction that is
permanently provided until the end of the crediting period is larger than with the other methods. From
an environmental perspective, the shorttemp method also seems most appropriate, as no additional carbon
emissions will be released because all credits have to be replaced at some point in time. Instead, even
permanently stored carbon has to be replaced, so the application of the shorttemp method would provide
extra climate benefits by reducing atmospheric carbon concentration.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Hypothetical large-scale Southern Ocean iron fertilization
For the analysis of hypothetical large-scale Southern Ocean iron fertilization, Oschlies et al. (2010) use
the University of Victoria (UVic) Earth System Climate Model (Weaver et al., 2001) in the configuration
described by Schmittner et al. (2008). The oceanic component is a fully three-dimensional primitive-equation
model with 19 levels in the vertical, ranging from 50m thickness near the surface to 500m in the deep ocean.
It contains a simple marine ecosystem model with the two major nutrients nitrate and phosphate and
two phytoplankton classes, nitrogen fixers and other phytoplankton, with the former being limited only
by phosphate. Organic matter is produced, processed, and remineralized according to a fixed elemental
stoichiometry of C:N:P=112:16:1. Detritus sinks with a velocity that increases linearly with depth from 7
m/day at the surface to 40 m/day at 1000m depth and constant below. The production of calcium carbonate
is assumed to be proportional to the production of nondiazotrophic detritus, and its instantaneous export
and dissolution is parameterized by an e-folding depth of 3500 m.
The ocean component is coupled to a single-level energy moisture balance model of the atmosphere and
a dynamic-thermodynamic sea ice component. The terrestrial vegetation and carbon cycle component is
based on the Hadley Centre’s TRIFFID model (Cox et al., 2000).
Because of the difficulty of explicitly modeling the complex iron chemistry and its interaction with marine
biology, the model does not include an explicit parametrization of the iron cycle, but is parameterized against
the changes in export production observed for persistent natural iron fertilization at the Kerguelen Plateau
and Crozet Islands in the Southern Ocean (Blain et al., 2007; Pollard et al., 2009). Although the pragmatic
model does not include an explicit parameterization of the iron cycle, it can nevertheless be tuned to achieve
a reasonable fit with observed biogeochemical tracer distributions, in particular by using a low phytoplankton
growth rate that allows for the persistence of HNLC areas (Schmittner et al., 2008; Oschlies et al., 2008).
The effect of ocean iron fertilization is simulated by doubling the phytoplankton maximum growth rate
from 0.13 per day to 0.26 per day over the fertilized area and during the fertilization period. Increasing the
maximum growth rate mimics the effect of iron in relaxing light limitation (Sunda and Huntsman, 1997),
and the factor-2 enhancement results in an increase in simulated carbon export across z=125m by a factor
of 2 to 3 with respect to an unfertilized control experiment. This is in good agreement with the impact of
natural iron fertilization near Kerguelen and Crozet Islands, where Blain et al. (2007) and Pollard et al.
(2009) estimated particulate carbon export fluxes two to three times higher than in the adjacent unfertilized
regions. Additionally, Oschlies et al. (2010) analyze sensitivity experiments with maximum phytoplankton
growth rates enhanced by factors of 3 and 5 and, in an attempt to simulate an upper bound for possible OIF
impacts, to a hypothetical and very high value of 10 per day, because it cannot be ruled out that natural
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iron fertilization is not saturating and that artificial fertilization could be engineered to have an even larger
impact. None of these experiments showed complete depletion of macronutrients in the fertilized area.
66
Appendix B. Tables
Table B.1: Annual change in oceanic carbon stocks for both levels of fertilization effectiveness in GtC
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4 Exp. 5
1 year OIF 7 years OIF 10 years OIF 50 years OIF 100 years OIF
year high low high low high low high low high low
1 8.91 2.10 8.91 2.10 8.91 2.10 8.90 2.10 8.90 2.10
2 1.58 -0.03 5.56 1.88 5.56 1.88 5.60 1.88 5.60 1.88
3 -0.44 -0.28 4.42 1.58 4.42 1.58 4.40 1.58 4.40 1.58
4 -0.51 -0.19 3.81 1.36 3.81 1.36 3.80 1.36 3.80 1.36
5 -0.46 -0.14 3.42 1.23 3.42 1.23 3.40 1.23 3.40 1.23
6 -0.39 -0.11 3.14 1.13 3.14 1.13 3.20 1.13 3.20 1.13
7 -0.33 -0.08 2.95 1.05 2.95 1.05 2.90 1.05 2.90 1.05
8 -0.30 -0.07 0.01 -0.75 2.79 0.99 2.80 0.99 2.80 0.99
9 -0.25 -0.06 -1.00 -0.76 2.65 0.94 2.70 0.94 2.70 0.94
10 -0.24 -0.05 -0.97 -0.59 2.54 0.90 2.50 0.90 2.50 0.90
11 -0.21 -0.04 -0.88 -0.46 -0.19 -0.86 2.40 0.86 2.40 0.86
12 -0.19 -0.04 -0.79 -0.39 -1.12 -0.86 2.40 0.84 2.40 0.84
13 -0.18 -0.03 -0.72 -0.33 -1.07 -0.67 2.30 0.80 2.30 0.80
14 -0.16 -0.03 -0.65 -0.28 -0.98 -0.54 2.20 0.77 2.20 0.77
15 -0.15 -0.03 -0.61 -0.26 -0.88 -0.46 2.20 0.75 2.20 0.75
16 -0.14 -0.02 -0.56 -0.22 -0.81 -0.40 2.10 0.73 2.10 0.73
17 -0.14 -0.02 -0.52 -0.21 -0.75 -0.35 2.00 0.70 2.00 0.70
18 -0.12 -0.02 -0.49 -0.19 -0.70 -0.31 2.00 0.69 2.00 0.69
19 -0.12 -0.02 -0.46 -0.17 -0.64 -0.29 2.00 0.67 2.00 0.67
20 -0.11 -0.02 -0.43 -0.15 -0.61 -0.25 2.00 0.65 2.00 0.65
21 -0.10 -0.01 -0.40 -0.14 -0.57 -0.23 1.80 0.64 1.80 0.64
22 -0.09 -0.01 -0.39 -0.14 -0.53 -0.22 1.90 0.63 1.90 0.63
23 -0.10 -0.01 -0.36 -0.12 -0.51 -0.19 1.80 0.62 1.80 0.62
24 -0.09 -0.01 -0.35 -0.11 -0.48 -0.19 1.80 0.61 1.80 0.61
25 -0.08 -0.01 -0.33 -0.11 -0.46 -0.17 1.80 0.60 1.80 0.60
26 -0.09 -0.01 -0.32 -0.10 -0.43 -0.15 1.80 0.61 1.80 0.61
27 -0.08 -0.01 -0.31 -0.09 -0.42 -0.14 1.70 0.60 1.70 0.60
28 -0.08 -0.01 -0.28 -0.08 -0.39 -0.14 1.70 0.60 1.70 0.60
29 -0.07 -0.01 -0.28 -0.08 -0.38 -0.12 1.70 0.58 1.70 0.58
30 -0.07 -0.01 -0.26 -0.08 -0.36 -0.12 1.60 0.58 1.60 0.58
31 -0.06 -0.01 -0.25 -0.07 -0.34 -0.11 1.70 0.57 1.70 0.57
32 -0.06 -0.01 -0.24 -0.07 -0.33 -0.10 1.60 0.55 1.60 0.55
33 -0.06 -0.01 -0.24 -0.06 -0.32 -0.11 1.60 0.55 1.60 0.55
34 -0.06 -0.01 -0.22 -0.06 -0.30 -0.09 1.60 0.53 1.60 0.53
35 -0.06 -0.01 -0.22 -0.07 -0.30 -0.10 1.50 0.53 1.50 0.53
36 -0.05 -0.01 -0.21 -0.07 -0.28 -0.09 1.60 0.52 1.60 0.52
37 -0.04 0.00 -0.20 -0.06 -0.27 -0.09 1.50 0.52 1.50 0.52
38 -0.04 0.00 -0.19 -0.05 -0.25 -0.08 1.50 0.52 1.50 0.52
39 -0.05 -0.01 -0.19 -0.06 -0.26 -0.08 1.50 0.50 1.50 0.50
40 -0.06 -0.01 -0.19 -0.05 -0.25 -0.08 1.50 0.49 1.50 0.49
41 -0.04 -0.01 -0.18 -0.06 -0.24 -0.07 1.50 0.49 1.50 0.49
42 -0.05 -0.01 -0.17 -0.05 -0.24 -0.07 1.40 0.48 1.40 0.48
43 -0.05 -0.01 -0.17 -0.05 -0.23 -0.07 1.50 0.47 1.50 0.47
44 -0.05 0.00 -0.16 -0.05 -0.23 -0.07 1.40 0.47 1.40 0.47
45 -0.05 -0.01 -0.16 -0.06 -0.21 -0.06 1.40 0.46 1.40 0.46
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Table B.1: continued
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4 Exp. 5
1 year OIF 7 years OIF 10 years OIF 50 years OIF 100 years OIF
year high low high low high low high low high low
46 -0.04 0.00 -0.15 -0.05 -0.21 -0.06 1.40 0.46 1.40 0.46
47 -0.04 0.00 -0.14 -0.04 -0.20 -0.05 1.40 0.46 1.40 0.46
48 -0.03 0.00 -0.14 -0.05 -0.20 -0.06 1.40 0.46 1.40 0.46
49 -0.04 0.00 -0.13 -0.04 -0.18 -0.06 1.40 0.45 1.40 0.45
50 -0.03 0.00 -0.13 -0.04 -0.18 -0.06 1.40 0.45 1.40 0.45
51 -0.03 -0.01 -0.13 -0.05 -0.18 -0.06 -1.30 -1.49 1.40 0.43
52 -0.03 0.00 -0.12 -0.03 -0.17 -0.06 -1.70 -1.25 1.30 0.46
53 -0.03 0.00 -0.13 -0.03 -0.16 -0.06 -1.70 -1.03 1.40 0.44
54 -0.03 0.00 -0.11 -0.03 -0.16 -0.06 -1.50 -0.90 1.30 0.44
55 -0.03 0.00 -0.12 -0.04 -0.17 -0.06 -1.30 -0.80 1.30 0.43
56 -0.04 0.00 -0.12 -0.03 -0.15 -0.05 -1.30 -0.72 1.30 0.43
57 -0.03 0.00 -0.11 -0.03 -0.15 -0.04 -1.30 -0.65 1.30 0.42
58 -0.03 0.00 -0.11 -0.03 -0.15 -0.04 -1.10 -0.61 1.30 0.43
59 -0.02 0.00 -0.10 -0.02 -0.14 -0.03 -1.10 -0.55 1.30 0.42
60 -0.03 0.00 -0.10 -0.03 -0.13 -0.04 -1.00 -0.52 1.30 0.42
61 -0.02 0.00 -0.09 -0.03 -0.13 -0.04 -1.00 -0.48 1.30 0.41
62 -0.03 0.00 -0.10 -0.03 -0.12 -0.04 -0.90 -0.45 1.20 0.43
63 -0.02 0.00 -0.09 -0.02 -0.13 -0.04 -0.90 -0.42 1.30 0.41
64 -0.02 0.00 -0.09 -0.03 -0.12 -0.03 -0.90 -0.41 1.30 0.41
65 -0.03 0.00 -0.09 -0.02 -0.13 -0.04 -0.80 -0.37 1.20 0.41
66 -0.02 0.00 -0.08 -0.02 -0.11 -0.04 -0.80 -0.36 1.30 0.40
67 -0.03 0.00 -0.09 -0.02 -0.12 -0.03 -0.70 -0.34 1.20 0.41
68 -0.02 0.00 -0.08 -0.03 -0.11 -0.04 -0.80 -0.32 1.30 0.39
69 -0.02 0.00 -0.09 -0.02 -0.11 -0.03 -0.70 -0.32 1.20 0.40
70 -0.02 0.00 -0.08 -0.02 -0.11 -0.03 -0.70 -0.29 1.20 0.40
71 -0.02 0.00 -0.08 -0.02 -0.10 -0.03 -0.60 -0.28 1.30 0.40
72 -0.02 0.00 -0.08 -0.02 -0.11 -0.03 -0.60 -0.27 1.20 0.40
73 -0.02 0.00 -0.08 -0.02 -0.10 -0.02 -0.70 -0.27 1.20 0.39
74 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.10 -0.03 -0.50 -0.25 1.20 0.40
75 -0.02 0.00 -0.08 -0.02 -0.10 -0.03 -0.60 -0.24 1.20 0.39
76 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.10 -0.03 -0.60 -0.24 1.20 0.38
77 -0.01 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -0.50 -0.22 1.20 0.39
78 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 -0.09 -0.03 -0.50 -0.23 1.20 0.39
79 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.08 -0.02 -0.50 -0.21 1.10 0.39
80 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -0.50 -0.20 1.20 0.38
81 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 -0.08 -0.02 -0.50 -0.20 1.20 0.39
82 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 -0.08 -0.02 -0.50 -0.20 1.10 0.38
83 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 -0.08 -0.02 -0.40 -0.18 1.20 0.38
84 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.50 -0.18 1.10 0.39
85 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 -0.08 -0.02 -0.40 -0.18 1.20 0.37
86 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.40 -0.17 1.10 0.38
87 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.40 -0.16 1.20 0.38
88 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.40 -0.16 1.10 0.38
89 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.40 -0.15 1.20 0.37
90 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.30 -0.15 1.10 0.38
91 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.40 -0.14 1.10 0.38
92 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 -0.30 -0.13 1.10 0.37
93 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.40 -0.13 1.10 0.38
94 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.30 -0.13 1.10 0.38
95 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 -0.30 -0.11 1.10 0.38
96 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.40 -0.11 1.10 0.37
97 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.30 -0.12 1.10 0.37
98 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.30 -0.10 1.10 0.38
99 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.30 -0.11 1.00 0.37
100 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.30 -0.10 1.10 0.37
Sum 3.33 0.61 13.56 2.50 17.96 3.53 74.60 19.02 169.30 56.47
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Table B.2: Gross carbon credits for the equivalence method on the basis of additional oceanic carbon uptake with high
fertilization effectiveness in Gt C
Equivalence method
Lashof Approach MCW Approach
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
1 year 7 years 10 years 1 year 7 years 10 years
OIF OIF OIF OIF OIF OIF
Cap 4.56 Cap 17.62 Cap 23.05 Cap 3.64 Cap 14.83 Cap 19.71
Commitment
period Carbon credits Carbon credits
2012 - 2020 0.5364 1.3583 1.3789 1.5994 4.0384 4.0992
2020 - 2025 0.2764 1.1031 1.4572 0.8065 3.2188 4.2515
2025 - 2030 0.2495 0.9942 1.3419 0.7153 2.8499 3.8465
2030 - 2035 0.2314 0.9231 1.2397 0.5160 2.5962 3.4866
2035 - 2040 0.2183 0.8726 1.1690 0 2.1309 3.2212
2040 - 2045 0.2085 0.8359 1.1182 0 0 0.8076
2045 - 2050 0.2017 0.8093 1.0818 0 0 0
2050 - 2055 0.1968 0.7901 1.0558 0 0 0
2055 - 2060 0.1922 0.7774 1.0373 0 0 0
2060 - 2065 0.1905 0.7716 1.0278 0 0 0
2065 - 2070 0.1899 0.7707 1.0259 0 0 0
2070 - 2075 0.1907 0.7756 1.0319 0 0 0
2075 - 2080 0.1929 0.7865 1.0456 0 0 0
2080 - 2085 0.1965 0.8026 1.0672 0 0 0
2085 - 2090 0.2019 0.8256 1.0976 0 0 0
2090 - 2095 0.2097 0.8580 1.1406 0 0 0
2095 - 2100 0.2214 0.9039 1.2012 0 0 0
2100 - 2105 0.2399 0.9781 1.2984 0 0 0
2105 - 2112 0.4128 1.6824 2.2291 0 0 0
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Table B.3: Gross amount of carbon credits with mixed method on the basis of additional oceanic carbon uptake with high
fertilization effectiveness in Gt C
Mixed method
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
1 year OIF 7 years OIF 10 years OIF
Commitment Carbon Replace- Carbon Replace- Carbon Replace-
period credits ment credits ment credits ment
2012 - 2020 5.22 0 24.43 0 27.21 0
2020 - 2025 3.87 1.34 17.01 7.43 24.63 0
2025 - 2030 3.12 0.75 13.43 3.57 18.80 5.83
2030 - 2035 2.61 0.51 11.19 2.24 15.48 3.32
2035 - 2040 2.22 0.39 9.56 1.63 13.17 2.31
2040 - 2045 1.94 0.28 8.33 1.23 11.44 1.73
2045 - 2050 1.73 0.21 7.37 0.96 10.11 1.33
2050 - 2055 1.53 0.20 6.59 0.78 9.02 1.10
2055 - 2060 1.38 0.15 5.98 0.61 8.13 0.88
2060 - 2065 1.27 0.11 5.49 0.49 7.45 0.68
2065 - 2070 1.16 0.11 5.07 0.42 6.87 0.58
2070 - 2075 1.09 0.07 4.75 0.32 6.42 0.45
2075 - 2080 1.02 0.07 4.47 0.28 6.02 0.39
2080 - 2085 0.97 0.05 4.21 0.26 5.68 0.34
2085 - 2090 0.92 0.05 4.01 0.20 5.39 0.29
2090 - 2095 0.88 0.04 3.84 0.17 5.16 0.23
2095 - 2100 0.87 0.01 3.71 0.13 4.97 0.19
2100 - 2105 0.85 0.02 3.62 0.09 4.83 0.14
2105 - 2112 0.83 0.01 3.52 0.10 4.68 0.15
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Table B.4: Actual deduction rates over time for net, average, discount, and equivalence methods based on Experiment 5 with high fertilization effectiveness in percent
net method average method discount method equiv. method (Lashof) equiv. method (MCW)
Nevisona Sunth.b Nevisona Sunth.b Nevisona Sunth.b Nevisona Sunth.b Nevisona Sunth.b
in %
Cap 12.44 8.76 9.61 6.61 8.42 5.89 10.11 6.95 7.95 14.25
2012 - 20 4.60 3.49 4.60 3.49 4.60 3.49 4.35 2.46 2.89 4.46
2020 - 25 7.67 5.73 7.67 5.73 7.67 5.73 5.05 4.42 3.87 6.31
2025 - 30 8.86 6.46 8.86 6.46 8.86 6.46 5.40 4.03 4.35 7.46
2030 - 35 9.51 6.58 9.51 6.58 9.51 6.58 6.63 5.01 4.69 8.37
2035 - 40 10.27 6.80 10.27 6.80 21.36 12.60 6.66 4.88 4.95 9.10
2040 - 45 11.02 6.97 11.02 6.97 100c 100c 7.20 5.15 5.15 9.72
2045 - 50 11.74 7.25 11.74 7.25 0 0 7.68 5.32 5.33 10.23
2050 - 55 12.75 7.72 12.75 7.72 0 0 7.89 5.43 5.49 10.63
2055 -60 14.05 8.54 38.10 26.26 0 0 8.35 5.67 5.87 11.55
2060 - 65 14.83 9.25 0 0 0 0 8.74 5.83 6.99 14.68
2065 - 70 16.77 10.43 0 0 0 0 9.02 6.23 34.47 18.81
2070 - 75 17.65 11.84 0 0 0 0 9.61 6.28 100c 37.05
2075 - 80 18.57 12.45 0 0 0 0 10.00 6.74 0 100c
2080 - 85 19.61 13.73 0 0 0 0 10.38 6.97 0 0
2085 - 90 20.16 14.62 0 0 0 0 10.80 7.27 0 0
2090 - 95 21.08 15.81 0 0 0 0 11.18 7.58 0 0
2095 - 00 21.22 16.56 0 0 0 0 11.58 7.92 0 0
2100 - 05 21.13 16.85 0 0 0 0 11.92 8.24 0 0
2105 - 12 21.16 17.49 0 0 0 0 12.29 8.60 0 0
a Calibration is based on Nevison et al. (2003).
b Calibration is based on Suntharalingam and Sarmiento (2000).
c A deduction rate of 100 percent for a commitment period indicates that the cap was approached in the previous commitment period if N2O
emissions are taken into account.
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Abstract
Staying within the 2◦C temperature increase target for climate change requires for ambitious emission reduc-
tion targets for the 2012-2020 compliance period. Cost-efficiency is a crucial criterion for the achievement
of such targets, requiring analyses of all possible options. Enhancing the oceanic carbon sink via ocean
iron fertilization (OIF) provides such an option. Our analysis reveals that the critical unit costs per net
ton of CO2 sequestered by OIF range from 22 to 28 USD (price level 2000) in a post-Kyoto compliance
scenario. The critical unit costs are defined as those that would make an emitter indifferent between vari-
ous abatement options. With reference to hypothetical short-term large-scale Southern Ocean OIF we are
able to show that seven years of OIF provide a number of credits exceeding those obtainable from global
forestation projects lasting 20 years. From an economic perspective, our results indicate that OIF can be
considered a potentially viable carbon-removal option. However, further research is needed, especially on
adverse side-effects and their ecological and economical consequences.
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1. Introduction
Even courageous climate policies run the risk of catastrophic climate change taking place. If this risk
increases, climate engineering options become a last resort, so they need to be explored in time (e.g., Kousky
et al., 2009; Royal Society, 2009; Keith et al., 2010). Basically, climate engineering can be classified into
(a) carbon dioxide removal and (b) solar radiation management. Carbon dioxide removal addresses the
root of the problem by directly reducing atmospheric carbon concentration, thus extending the world’s
carbon emission budget. Carbon dioxide can be biologically removed by enhancing the terrestrial and the
oceanic carbon sink. The former can be enhanced by forestry activities etc., the latter by iron fertilization
etc.. Forestry activities are included in the present climate agreement (UNFCCC, 2003). Iron fertilization
measures are still at the research stage, and some small-scale in situ experiments have been carried out with
varying results to test effectiveness with respect to carbon sequestration. Dedicated field trials exploring the
potential benefits and side-effects of ocean iron fertilization (OIF) have not yet been carried out, and there
is concern that the uncertainties and risks associated with OIF are so substantial that such trials should
not even be considered (e.g., Strong et al., 2009). For a better understanding of the potential effectiveness
and risks of OIF, Oschlies et al. (2010) have recently extrapolated observations from ongoing natural iron
fertilization “experiments” by sedimentary iron release on the Kerguelen Plateau and the Crozet Islands in
the Southern Ocean (Blain et al., 2007; Pollard et al., 2009). Their results lead us to believe that further
research on the climate engineering potential of OIF is warranted.
Exploring the potential of OIF requires consideration not just of its effectiveness, but also of its efficiency.
This paper addresses the economic prospects of OIF within a climate agreement like the Kyoto Protocol.
We consider hypothetical, short-term, but large-scale OIF in the Southern Ocean for the duration of 1,
7, and 10 years in a post-Kyoto agreement and derive criteria for assessing the efficiency of OIF as a
climate engineering option. Including OIF in a post-Kyoto agreement would also have implications for the
distribution of welfare. Accordingly, we also attempt to determine the distributional aspects involved by
including carbon credits from OIF. To our knowledge, this has not been done before.
In major regions of the oceans (the Eastern Equatorial Pacific, the North Pacific, and in particular vast ar-
eas of the Southern Ocean), macronutrients such as phosphate and nitrate are present in high concentrations
under conditions that would seem to be ideal for total depletion of these macronutrients by phytoplankton
growth (Sarmiento and Gruber, 2006). In fact, these regions display relatively low phytoplankton growth
and have accordingly been named high-nutrient, low-chlorophyll (HNLC) regions. Alongside other limiting
factors, such as silicon limitation north of the Polar Front and light limitation south of the Polar Front (Au-
mont and Bopp, 2006), limited iron concentration has been proposed as the main reason for the existence
of HNLC regions (Martin, 1990). The limitation of phytoplankton growth through iron has been demon-
strated by mesoscale iron fertilization experiments in all major HNLC regions (Boyd et al., 2007). Despite
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large variations in the magnitude of the phytoplankton growth response, all experiments show a substantial
increase in chlorophyll and a strong decrease in surface pCO2 (de Baar et al., 2005). However, modeling
studies have shown that the carbon removal potential of iron fertilization is mainly limited to the Southern
Ocean, the net reduction of atmospheric carbon varying between 56 to 160 Gt C for a fertilization period
of 100 years (Sarmiento and Orr, 1991; Aumont and Bopp, 2006; Oschlies et al., 2010). The reason is that
surface waters are currently subducted into the ocean interior before macronutrients are exhausted . Even
though the range indicates uncertainty about the effectiveness of OIF, the lower estimate for the cumulative
uptake of about 56 Gt C is far from negligible and approximately corresponds to a “stabilization wedge”
introduced by Pacala and Socolow (2004). Nevertheless, the effectiveness of OIF is questioned because of
the risk of unintended side-effects, such as an enhanced production of nitrous oxide (N2O) and methane
(CH4), or changes in the species composition and the food web (Gnanadesikan et al., 2003; Denman, 2008).
Only limited evidence is available about these negative side-effects from previous small-scale OIF experi-
ments, and considerable uncertainty remains about these effects in connection with large-scale OIF projects
(Lampitt et al., 2008; Royal Society, 2009).
While there is a large body of literature on the economic prospects of forestry activities, there are
relatively few studies on the economic prospects of OIF in general, and on the effects of including OIF in an
international climate regime in particular. To our knowledge, the rare exceptions are Sagarin et al. (2007),
Leinen (2008), and Bertram (2010). Sagarin et al. (2007) provide a non-technical overview of the scientific,
legal, and economic issues related to OIF. Leinen (2008) discusses the requirements of carbon markets for
the generation of carbon credits by OIF and argues that potential commercial interest in OIF could fund
further OIF experiments. Bertram (2010) also reviews basic aspects of OIF, but with a more detailed focus
on the legal status, open-access issues, and the way in which the regulation of afforestation and reforestation
activities under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol could be applied to OIF.
However, all three studies discuss OIF in a comparatively general manner. To our knowledge, OIF has not
yet been discussed with respect to an explicit reduction target for 2020. Nor is it clear what consequences
the inclusion of OIF in a post-Kyoto climate agreement would have on possible carbon-credit prices or
distributional effects
In this paper, we consider a hypothetical, large-scale, few-year OIF realized within an international
project as part of a post-Kyoto climate agreement. The agreement covers countries with positive carbon
emission reduction targets (Annex1 countries), countries with negative carbon emission reduction targets
(HotAir countries), and countries without any carbon emission reduction targets (CDM countries). We
model a static compliance problem for the countries with a basic CO2 market for the next commitment
period (2012-2020), including domestic carbon emission reductions and emission trading. It is not likely
that OIF will be implemented in the next commitment period. Nevertheless, we have chosen 2012-2020
because data on economic activity, which are essential for our analysis, are more readily available for the
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next few years than for later periods. Also, our analysis serves as an initial test whether compared to existing
options OIF can play an economically viable role in mitigating of climate change.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains the static general equilibrium 2020 compliance
problem. Subsection 2.1 introduces the basic carbon market with emission trading. In subsection 2.2 we
extend the market by introducing carbon credits from forestry activity. Subsection 2.3 sets out our scenarios
regarding limitations on emission trading and on carbon credits from forestry activity, before subsection 2.4
introduces carbon credits from OIF. In Section 3, we determine the critical unit costs and the critical amounts
for OIF. The critical unit costs and amounts indicate whether OIF credits would be able to compete with
carbon credits from HotAir and CDM countries and carbon credits from forestry activities. We compare
these critical costs and critical amounts to most latest cost estimates and the latest findings on hypothetical
large-scale iron fertilization in the Southern Ocean reported by Oschlies et al. (2010) and Rickels et al.
(2010). In Section 4, we consider distributional aspects related to OIF. We investigate who would gain or
lose if carbon credits from OIF could be used for compliance. Section 5 concludes.
2. The carbon market
2.1. The carbon market without forestation and OIF
Assessing the potential of OIF in a post-Kyoto climate regime requires consideration of a carbon market.
We model the 2020 compliance problem, restricting it to carbon emissions.1 Achieving a given emission cap
A requires a given country to reduce its business-as-usual emission E by the amount R so that E −R ≤ A.
The costs of this action are measured by the abatement cost function AC(R). To reduce costs, we allow for
emissions trading, defining P as the net number of carbon credits traded.2 Consequently, countries face the
problem of determining the optimal amount of domestic emission reduction R∗ and the optimal amount of
credits traded P ∗ so that the sum of abatement costs and emission trading costs is minimized. Denoting
the carbon credit price by pi and indexing the countries by i, the optimization problem for each country
becomes
min
Ri,Pi
Ci = ACi(Ri) + piPi, (1)
s.t. Ei −Ri − Pi ≤ Ai, (2)
s.t. 0 ≤ Ri ≤ Ei. (3)
1From now on, we refer to carbon emissions as “emissions”.
2With respect to emission trading, we simplify notation and refer just to carbon credits. Therefore carbon credits contain
assigned amount units (AAU) from countries with positive and negative emission reduction targets, emission reduction units
(ERU) from joint implementation (JI), certified emission reductions (CER) from clean development mechanism (CDM), and
removal units (RMU) from forestry activites.
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Note that a positive value for Pi indicates a credit-buying country, while a negative value indicates a credit-
selling country. Solving the optimization problem, we obtain for an interior solution 0 < R∗i < Ei the
well-known efficiency result that marginal abatement costs in each country are equal to the carbon credit
price:
AC′(R∗i ) = pi. (4)
The optimal degree of emission reduction becomes a function of the carbon credit price R∗i (pi). The optimal
carbon credit price is determined by the overall compliance condition that the sum of individual emission
reductions must be sufficient to equal the sum of the individual carbon emission caps:
n∑
i
Ei −
n∑
i
R∗i (pi
∗) =
n∑
i
Ai. (5)
To determine emission caps Ai we define a Reference Emission Target for 2020 relative to 2005. The EU
has made a firm, independent commitment to reduce its emissions by at least 20 percent by 2020 relative to
1990, and by 30 percent if an international agreement on emission reduction is adopted (European Union,
2009, Art. 3). Where countries have announced various targets, we have chosen the more ambitious ones.
Where Annex I countries have not announced any targets, we have chosen the emission target from the
Garnaut Climate Change Review final report, which corresponds to the EU 30-percent target (Garnaut,
2008), except for the Hot Air countries Russia and Ukraine. Here we assume an emission target that goes
no further than their current BAU emission projections for 2020 (Anger et al., 2009).3 Based on their large
potential for generating emission reduction credits via CDM, we include China, India, and countries in Latin
America as CDM countries. Here, we assume that no emission targets exist. Consequently, we have three
groups of countries: Annex I countries with positive reduction targets (Annex1), Annex I countries with
negative reduction targets (HotAir), and countries with no reduction targets at all (CDM). For Annex1
countries the individual emission reduction targets for 2020 relative to 2005 add up to 27.5 percent. If we
include the HotAir and and both the HotAir and CDM countries, the overall reduction target decreases to
21.7 percent and -5.4 percent, respectively. A detailed description of the determination of emission caps for
the various countries can be found in Appendix A. Individual emission targets are shown in column 3 of
Table A.2.
To determine the abatement cost functions AC(Ri) we take a top-down approach based on the com-
putable general equilibrium model DART calibrated to the GTAP-7 database (Narayanan and Walmsley,
2008). The DART (Dynamic Applied Regional Trade) model is a multi-region, multi-sector recursive dy-
3Note that by doing so we still obtain a stricter reduction than we would by taking their historical 1990 emissions as a
target.
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namic CGE model of the world economy for analyzing climate policies. For a more detailed description
of the model, see Klepper et al. (2003). The DART version we use divides the world into 12 regions. We
calculate abatement cost functions for nine of these regions, the Annex1 regions: Western Europe (WEU),
Eastern Europe (EEU), United States (US), Japan (JPN)4, and the group Australia, New Zealand and
Canada (OAB); for the HotAir region make up of the former Soviet Union (FSU); and for the CDM regions
China (CPA), India (IND), and Latin America (LAM).
Our calculations are based on the emission targets for Annex1 and HotAir countries from our Reference
Emission Target for 2020. For CDM countries, these targets are equal to their 2020 BAU emission levels.
For the region under consideration, we start with a baseline run without an emission target and reduce the
permitted emissions stepwise, observing the change in GDP over and against the first baseline run to figure
out the relative costs. For a detailed description of this approach, see Klepper and Peterson (2006b). We
fit two analytical functional forms to the relative costs modeled:
Function 1: 1−
GDPredi
GDPbasei
= α1i
(
1− Ri
E1
)2
,
Function 2: 1−
GDPredi
GDPbasei
= β1i
(
1− Ri
E1
)
+ β2i
(
1− Ri
E1
)2
.
(6)
For each region, the resulting parameters for both functions and for adjusted R2 can be found in Appendix
A, Table A.1. To obtain country-specific abatement cost functions for the DART regions with more than
one country, we take the approach proposed by Tol (2005) and assume a 10-percent spread in relative costs
between the country with the highest carbon intensity (CO2/GDP) and the country with the lowest carbon
intensity for a 10-percent reduction. Drawing upon minimum, maximum, and average carbon intensity for
each region, we adjust the parameters α1i for Function 1 and β1i for Function 2 to obtain country-specific
abatement cost functions.
There is some evidence that abatement cost estimates obtained from top-down models like DART tend
to be lower than those obtained from bottom-up models (Wing, 2006). Top-down models allow greater scope
for economic adjustment and provide better estimates of medium-term costs, whereas bottom-up models
are better at estimating of short-term costs (Gallagher, 2008). To take this into account, we include a third
abatement cost function. It has the same functional form as Function 1, but the parameter values are taken
from Tol (2005), who calibrates the parameters to the abatement cost overview by Hourcade et al. (1996).
We denote this abatement cost function as Function 3. The country-specific parameter values for the three
functional forms Function 1, Function 2, and Function 3, are shown in columns 4 to 7 in the Appendix,
Table A.2.
4For Japan, we calculate the abatement cost function based on the equivalent variation instead on GDP to obtain a
monotonically increasing abatement cost function.
78
2.2. Extending the carbon market for carbon credits from forestation
To include forestation in our carbon market, we use the results presented by Hertel et al. (2009), because
neither the DART model (Klepper et al., 2003) nor the calibrated model of Tol (2005) explicitly model the
forestry sector. Hertel et al. (2009) apply the global timber model proposed by Sohngen and Mendelsohn
(2003; 2007). The global timber model is a partial-equilibrium, dynamic optimization model of global timber
markets that maximizes the net present value of consumer surplus in timber markets, taking into account
the costs of managing, harvesting, and maintaining forests. The model determines the optimal age for
harvesting trees, the quantity harvested, the area of land converted to agriculture, and timber management
(Hertel et al., 2009). If a carbon rental fee for landowners is introduced for every additional ton of carbon
stored each year, the value of forest land increases and landowners respond by converting other land into
forests, increasing rotation length, and stepping up management intensity (Sohngen and Mendelsohn, 2003).
The additional cumulative amount of carbon sequestered is obtained by comparing the situation with a
carbon rental fee to the situation without such fee. Hertel et al. (2009) obtain the annual sequestration
potential from the global timber model by calculating the annual equivalent amount of carbon in response
to the carbon rental fee based on a 20-year projection of carbon storage. The equivalent annual amount is
derived from the present-value carbon equivalent, using a 5-percent social rate of time preference.
Using these results, we extend our model to include a forestry sector for each country responding to
the prevailing carbon price with forest carbon sequestration Fi(pi). We assume that the contribution of
the forestry sector to GDP is negligible. Thus the objective function in the abatement cost minimization
problem of a country (1) does not change, but the first constraint (2) does:
Ei −Ri − Pi − F (pi) ≤ Ai, (7)
as does the optimal carbon credit price, because the overall compliance condition changes:
n∑
i
Ei −
n∑
i
R∗i (pi
∗)−
n∑
i
Fi(pi
∗) =
n∑
i
Ai. (8)
Note that Fi is not marked with an asterisk because the carbon sequestration response of the forestry sector
goes into the model as an optimized function.
Based on the global carbon credit supply schemes from forestry activities for the US, China, and the rest
of the world taken from Hertel et al. (2009), we estimate simple linear forest sequestration supply functions
Fi(pi) = fipi. We use the share of additional carbon stored without the US and China presented in Sohngen
and Mendelsohn (2007) to divide the forest supply function of the rest of the world into less aggregated
regions. We use the share of forest areas from FAO (2009) to further divide the forest supply curve of the
remaining aggregated regions of Europe, Central America, South America, and Oceania into country levels.
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The results are shown in Appendix A, column 8 of Table A.2. Column 9 in this table shows the current
annual limits for sequestration by forestation for each Annex1 and HotAir country under the Kyoto Protocol
F¯i (UNFCCC, 2001, Art. 3.4). We assume that for CDM countries no limits to sequestration by forestation
exist.
2.3. Scenarios for the carbon market with forestation
Table 1: Scenarios for emission trading and inclusion of forestation
Emission trading Emission trading Emission trading
restricted including CDM and without limitations
to Annex1 HotAir up to for CDM and HotAir
10 percent of Annex1
reduction targets
No forestation Trade LimitCDM FullCDM
Fi(pi) = 0 NoForest NoForest NoForest
Limited forestation
(Annex Z) Trade LimitCDM FullCDM
Fi(pi) = fipi if fipi < F¯i LimitForest LimitForest LimitForest
Fi(pi) = F¯i if fipi ≥ F¯i (Reference Scenario)
Unlimited forestation Trade LimitCDM FullCDM
Fi(pi) = fipi FullForest FullForest FullForest
Under the Kyoto Protocol, there are limits to the exchange of carbon credits with CDM and HotAir
countries and the use of domestically generated carbon credits from forestation. For a given emission
reduction target, increasing the exchange of credits with CDM and HotAir countries or allowing for more
carbon credits from forestation leads to declining abatement costs, lower carbon credit prices and smaller
amounts of domestic emission reduction Ri in Annex1 countries. This is as expected. Judging by the
announcements of a post-Kyoto climate agreement, the most likely scenario includes emission trading but
restricts the use of carbon credits from HotAir and CDM countries and carbon credits from domestic
forestation projects for compliance purposes (e.g. European Union, 2009, Art. 32). We take this into
account and consider various scenarios allowing emission trading with CDM and HotAir countries and
various others using carbon credits from domestic forestation projects (Table 1). We define the scenario
LimitCDMLimitForest as our Reference Scenario. Here, the volume of trade with CDM and HotAir
countries is limited to 10 percent, and the inclusion of carbon credits from forestation is limited by Annex
Z (UNFCCC, 2001, Art. 3.4).
2.4. Extending the carbon market to carbon credits from OIF
We assume that carbon sequestration via OIF is realized within an international project as part of a
post-Kyoto climate agreement. The reason for this assumption is that without international coordination its
benefits would be inefficiently low and it would be more difficult to establish a mechanism for the monitoring
of effects and side-effects (Kousky et al., 2009). Consequently, determining the optimal amount of OIF does
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not enter the individual country’s objective function, but releases the overall reduction cap. We use I to
denote the number of carbon credits obtained from OIF and used for compliance and C(I) to denote the
costs of OIF. Determining the optimal amount of OIF from a social planner’s perspective requires equalizing
the marginal costs of the various abatement options, which implies pi = C′(I∗).5 The optimal use of OIF
becomes a function of the carbon credit price I∗(pi), so that the overall compliance condition with forestation
and OIF becomes
n∑
i
Ei −
n∑
i
R∗i (pi
∗)−
n∑
i
Fi(pi
∗)− I∗(pi∗) =
n∑
i
Ai. (9)
In connection with large-scale OIF, information about I is not available as a continuous function but
only in the shape of discrete figures (e.g. Oschlies et al., 2010), while estimates for C(I) are rare and still
uncertain (Barker et al., 2007; Bertram, 2010). To solve this problem, we turn the question around and
determine a critical cost level and a critical amount for OIF. These make emitters indifferent between using
carbon credits from emission trading, including forestry activities, and using carbon credits from OIF.
To determine the critical cost level, we assume that the costs of OIF can be expressed by a simple linear
function C(I) = cII, implying that marginal costs are equal to unit costs.
6 We calculate an upper and lower
level for the critical unit costs of OIF. The upper level is calculated by observing the carbon credit price in a
carbon market where credits from OIF are not traded: pi∗0 . Only if cI < pi
∗
0 is fulfilled can OIF be considered
as a carbon-removal option. The lower level is calculated by observing the carbon credit price when credits
from OIF can be traded on the market: pi∗1 . At the lower level, three cases can be distinguished:
Case 1: pi∗1 > cI implies that the optimal amount of I should be larger and OIF should be extended;
Case 2: pi∗1 = cI implies that the optimal amount of I is provided;
Case 3: pi∗1 < cI implies that the optimal amount of I should be smaller and OIF should be reduced.
Depending on the scenario, we obtain different prices for the critical unit costs. To determine the upper
level of the critical unit costs pi∗0 , we choose the scenario LimitCDMLimitForest because it represents the
current status of climate policy for the next commitment period. The restrictions on the use of carbon
credits generated outside the Annex1 countries (in CDM and HotAir countries) or by domestic forestation
in this scenario are based on the belief that those options should only be used to supplement domestic
action. Without these restrictions, carbon credit prices would be lower, hampering technological change
5Note, if large-scale OIF were performed by a company or one country, the optimization would require taking the price
effect of OIF into account. OIF would be provided according to π′(I)I + π(I) = C′(I), resulting in a lower amount of OIF,
than is optimal from a social planners perspective, I < I∗.
6Considering a potential range for carbon credits generated by OIF Iǫ{Imin, Imax}, the characteristics of large-scale OIF
imply that Imin >> 0. The costs of OIF will be dependent on the overall scale of the project scale not on the marginal unit
of carbon sequestered.
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toward a low-carbon economy in the Annex1 countries. Including OIF in a post-Kyoto agreement would
have the same effect. Consequently, it seems more likely that restrictions on existing abatement options
will be loosened before a new, uncertain abatement option like OIF is introduced. To determine the lower
level pi∗1 , we exclude carbon credits from OIF and choose pi
∗
0(FullCDMFullForest) instead. We argue that
including OIF should at least generate the same efficiency gains as extending existing options like unlimited
trade with CDM and HotAir countries and unlimited carbon credits from forestation.
Depending on the scenario, we pick for emission trading and forestry activities, different critical amounts
can be determined. Here we pursue three approaches. In the first approach, we calculate the critical amount
as the average amount of carbon credits necessary to obtain the same decrease in carbon credit price as
by switching from scenarios with NoForest to scenarios with FullForest (equivalence forestation). In the
second approach, we calculate the critical amount as the average amount of carbon credits necessary to
obtain the same decrease in carbon credit price as by switching from scenarios with Trade to scenarios with
FullCDM (equivalence CDM). In the third approach, we calculate the critical amount as the amount of
carbon credits necessary to obtain the same decrease in carbon credit price as by switching from Scenario
LimitCDMLimitForest to the Scenario FullCDMFullForest (equivalence policy). The first and second
approaches are straightforward. They ensure an equivalence of OIF (a) to forestry activities and (b) to
unlimited emission trading. The third approach describes an actual policy option because it implies switching
from our Reference Scenario to a minimum-cost scenario for compliance.
3. Critical unit costs and critical amounts for OIF
Prices and costs for the various scenarios are measured in USD for the price level of 2000. Data on
GDP (for 2005) and population (for 2005 to 2020) were taken from the World Resource Institute. Data
on emissions (measured in CO2) were provided by the IEA (2007). The data for emissions and GDP were
projected to 2020 using information on the average annual percent change for the period 2005 to 2020 (IEA,
2007; OECD, 2008, respectively). The emission reduction targets are those discussed in subsection 2.1.
3.1. Critical unit costs
Table 2 shows the carbon credit prices and the total compliance costs in 2020 both for our three functional
forms and for the various scenarios.7 Carbon credits from OIF are not considered. Our calibrated functions
(Function 1 and Function 2) provide results in the same order of magnitude. Only for the scenarios including
FullCDM (last three scenarios in the Table) does Function 2 provide significantly lower total costs than
7In addition, we calculate the carbon credit prices and total costs for scenarios where the CDM volume is restricted to 20
percent and 30 percent of Annex1 countries targets, respectively. Results are not shown but can be obtained from the authors
on request. As expected, the results indicate that carbon credit prices and total costs decline with the increasing volume of
carbon credits from CDM. The overall results are the same.
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Table 2: Abatement costs and carbon credit prices
Scenario
Function 1 Function 2 Function 3
credit price total costs credit price total costs credit price total costs
USD tCO2 10
9 USD USD tCO2 10
9 USD USD tCO2 10
9 USD
Trade
NoForest
141 292 106 271 248 515
Trade
LimitForest
133 261 102 247 234 459
Trade
FullForest
104 159 89 181 153 195
LimitCDM
NoForest
127 235 98 221 223 437
LimitCDM
LimitForest
(Reference)
119 209 95 209 209 367
LimitCDM
FullForest
94 129 83 151 138 158
FullCDM
NoForest
29 60 35 40 40 83
FullCDM
LimitForest
23 37 24 16 30 45
FullCDM
FullForest
22 34 23 13 28 39
Function 1.8 The reason is that compared to Function 1 Function 2 has a stronger curvature, in particular
for CDM and HotAir countries (see Table A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix). Consequently, the unlimited
use of carbon credits from CDM and HotAir countries leads to low reduction targets and reduces total
costs. But the marginal costs, and hence the carbon credit price, are higher. This effect, lower total costs
but a higher carbon credit price, is dampened for scenarios including FullCDM because the solutions for
Function 2 are restricted. If carbon credit prices are relatively low, negative reduction shares would occur
for some countries. To avoid this, these shares are set equal to zero, implying a restricted solution for these
countries.9
Compared to Functions 1 and 2, Function 3 provides much higher carbon credit prices for scenarios with
Trade and with LimitCDM , but only slightly higher carbon credit prices for scenarios with FullCDM .
The reason is that Function 3 is originally calibrated to lower emission reduction targets than our Reference
Emission Targets. In scenarios with FullCDM , the reductions realized are much lower, so that Function 3
provides similar results to the other two functions. Except for scenarios with FullForest, Function 3 leads
to much higher total costs. The reason is that due to the high carbon credit price, many carbon credits are
provided by forestation F (pi), which has no influence on GDP (see subsection 2.2).
8Function 2 provides moderately lower cost estimates than Function 1, except for two scenarios: TradeFullForest and
LimitCDMFullForest. This can be explained by the fact that the higher carbon credit price for Function 1 mean that more
carbon credits are provided by forestation in scenarios with FullForest. The underlying changes in the forestry sector, e.g.
adjusting the provision of carbon credits, are assumed to have no influence on GDP (see subsection 2.2).
9In total, there are five countries in scenario FullCDMNoForest, seven countries in scenario FullCDMLimitForest, and
nine countries in scenario FullCDMFullForest.
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In sum, the upper level of the critical unit cost ranges from 95 to 119 USD per t CO2 (scenario
LimitCDMLimitForest), or even up to 209 USD, if we consider Function 3. The lower level of the critical
unit cost ranges from 22 to 23 USD per t CO2 (scenario FullCDMFullForest), or up to 28 if we consider
Function 3. The cost estimates based on carbon credit prices in the scenarios are comparable to previous
studies (e.g., Klepper and Peterson, 2006a; Anger et al., 2009) for Function 1 and Function 2, whereas the
carbon credit prices for the various scenarios with Function 3, based on Tol (2005), are much higher. Using
recent sequestration efficiency ratios from patch OIF experiments, Boyd (2008) estimates that the costs are
between 8 and 80 USD per t CO2 sequestered. Although these cost estimates may not be representative for
large-scale OIF (Bertram, 2010), the upper and lower levels in those estimates are below the corresponding
range of the upper and lower levels in our estimates.
3.2. Critical amounts
In the following, we focus on Function 1, since Function 2 provides similar results, but includes restricted
solutions for scenarios with FullCDM . Function 3 overestimates the carbon credit price for all scenarios ex-
cept for those with FullCDM and overestimates total costs for all scenarios except the ones with FullCDM
and FullForest. Applying Function 1 to determine the critical amounts, OIF would have to provide carbon
credits to the tune of 0.944 Gt CO2 (equivalent forestation), 3.274 Gt CO2 (equivalent CDM), and 2.924
Gt CO2 (equivalent policy) to be equivalent. Information on the effectiveness of OIF is required to answer
the question whether large-scale OIF would be able to provide carbon credits to the same extent. For our
quantitative assessment we use the results of hypothetical large-scale iron fertilization in the Southern Ocean
obtained recently by Oschlies et al. (2010) and Rickels et al. (2010).
In their model experiments, Oschlies et al. (2010) realize OIF by increasing the phytoplankton growth
rate in the Southern Ocean (south of 30◦) for 1, 7, 10, 50, and 100 years, while the carbon emissions are
represented by the IPCC SRES A2 scenario (see Appendix B for a description of the model experiments).10
The maximum phytoplankton growth rate is increased from 0.13 per day at 0◦ C to either 0.26 per day
(calibrated against the changes in export production observed for persistent natural iron fertilization on the
Kerguelen Plateau and Crozet Islands in the Southern Ocean (Blain et al., 2007; Pollard et al., 2009)), or to
10.0 per day to simulate an upper bound for OIF. We refer to the former growth rate as “low fertilization
effectiveness” and to the latter as “high fertilization effectiveness”. Though the latter rate is beyond a
physiologically sensible range, but the intended effect in the model is a bigger drawdown of macronutrients
than that observed in island-induced natural iron fertilization. We do not currently know whether island-
induced iron fertilization is sufficient to completely relieve phytoplankton from iron stress. So the “high
10The SRES A2 non-intervention scenario assumes high population growth and moderate, uneven economic growth, leading
to an increase from today’s emissions of about 8 Gt C per year to about 29 Gt C per year in the year 2100. After 2100, annual
emissions are assumed to decline by 1.45 Gt C per year, reaching zero at year 2300.
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fertilization effectiveness” growth rate explores a hypothetical scenario where intentional OIF impact is
much larger than that of island-induced natural OIF (Oschlies et al., 2010). In this paper, we consider the
two different levels of effectiveness but restrict ourselves to the short-term OIF model experiments (1, 7, and
10 years), to which we refer to Experiments 1 to 3. We exclude the findings from the long-term experiments
(50 and 100 years) on the assumption that short-term experiments are a more realistic alternative to existing
enhancement projects. Also, the potentially negative side-effects are presumably much less marked than with
long-term OIF.
Estimating of the actual amount of carbon removed is a complex business. A substantial fraction captured
by increased phytoplankton growth is returned to its inorganic mineral form as a result of respiration in
surface waters (cf., Buesseler and Boyd, 2003; Royal Society, 2009). Also fewer nutrients are available outside
the fertilized region, resulting in lower phytoplankton growth and lower carbon uptake (e.g., Gnanadesikan
et al., 2003; Royal Society, 2009). To account for these issues, carbon-removal is measured in terms of
the net global oceanic carbon uptake derived from the fully three-dimensional and seasonally cycling Earth
System model (Oschlies et al., 2010). The uptake is traced for 100 years to account for later periods after
fertilization has stopped with lower uptake than in the control run. To include OIF as an additional carbon-
removal option in a global carbon market, carbon credits have to be assigned to the OIF-induced sequestered
carbon. Rickels et al. (2010) use these global oceanic carbon uptake data to analyze the impact of various
carbon accounting methods on assigning carbon credits. Four carbon accounting methods exist that assign
permanent carbon credits: the net method, the average method, the discount method, and the equivalence
method. Two carbon accounting methods assign temporary carbon credits: the shorttemp method and the
longtemp method. One carbon accounting method assigns both permanent and temporary carbon credits:
the mixed method. Temporary carbon credits used for compliance have to be replaced at some point in
time, permanent carbon credits do not.
For the analysis of critical amounts we focus on accounting methods that assign permanent carbon
credits, because we are only considering a short-term compliance problem for the period 2012 to 2020.
Issuing temporary credits would require possible replacement issues in later compliance periods to be taken
into account, and this would unnecessarily complicate things. In our analysis, we choose two accounting
methods: the net method and the discount method. We choose the net method because it is implicitly
applied in most OIF modeling studies. It measures the overall effect of OIF over a period of 100 years,
no matter when the carbon fluxes take place within that period. In addition, we choose the discount
method because it is also used for the calculation of carbon credits from forestry activities (see Section
2.2).11 The discount method weights the carbon fluxes in earlier years higher than in later years. We ignore
the average method in our analysis because it leads to results between those of the net and the discount
11Note that the discount rate applies a social discount rate to convert future tons of CO2 into present tons of CO2.
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method, and we ignore the equivalence method because it has aroused controversy in the literature (e.g.,
Dornburg and Marland, 2008). Additionally, with the equivalence method issuing credits spreads out over
a relatively long period and is less attractive from an economic perspective. For comparison, we include
one accounting method that assigns temporary carbon credits. We choose the shorttemp method because
it provides the largest amount of carbon credits in the first commitment period when applied to short-term
OIF. As indicated above, these carbon credits have to be replaced in the subsequent commitment period.
For further details, see Rickels et al. (2010).
Rickels et al. (2010) also analyze the issue of leakage. The leakage issue addresses all potential offsets
that have to be taken into account to obtain the net amount of carbon credits in the various accounting
methods. Potential offsets arise due to (1) carbon emissions outside the enhancement region (spatial leakage)
and to (2) changes in emissions of other GHGs than carbon (GHG leakage). Spatial leakage is addressed by
applying the accounting methods to global data for oceanic carbon uptake, rather than to local data (see
above). The GHG leakage is addressed by deduction rates.12 The deduction rates reduce the gross amount
of carbon credits Igross to the net amount Inet, which can then be used for compliance. Stipulating the
oceanic carbon sink by OIF influences the production of a range of trace gases, notably methane (CH4),
nitrous oxide (N2O), and dimethylsulphide (DMS) (e.g., Fuhrman and Capone, 1991; Jin and Gruber, 2003;
Law, 2008). Combined physical and biogeochemical ocean models have shown that OIF, in particular, might
lead to greater N2O emissions (Jin and Gruber, 2003). Oschlies et al. (2010) focus on N2O emissions for the
determination of the appropriate deduction rates, as changes in CH4 emissions are estimated to be negligible
and increases in DMS emissions would potentially contribute to climate change mitigation.13
Table 3: Annual OIF carbon credits in 2012-2020 in Gt CO2
Exp 1: 1 year OIF Exp 2: 7 years OIF Exp 3: 10 years OIF
Accounting fertilization effectiveness fertilization effectiveness fertilization effectiveness
method high low high low high low
net 1.5252 0.2812 6.2108 1.1451 8.2261 1.6168
discount 3.1491 0.4993 10.4365 2.6642 12.8699 3.4945
shorttemp 3.6917 0.5528 14.7575 4.3879 16.0308 5.1848
Source: Rickels et al. (2010)
In the first step we use the gross amount of carbon credits Igross from Rickels et al. (2010) even though
only the net amount of carbon credits Inet can be used for compliance,. Table 3 shows the corresponding
amounts of carbon credits for a single year in the first compliance period 2012-2020. To obtain the amount
for a single year, the cumulative amount for the whole period is distributed equally over the 8 years. For
12Note that Rickels et al. (2010) misname the deduction rates as discount factors. We revert to the correct notation: deduction
rates.
13Measurements of dissolved CH4 emissions during the Southern Ocean Iron Enrichment Experiment (SOFeX) revealed a
very small increase of less than 1 percent (Wingenter et al., 2004).
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the discount method, we apply a social discount rate of 5 percent taken from Hertel et al. (2008), where it
is applied to determine the amount of carbon credits from forestation (subection 2.2).
By comparing the gross amount of carbon credits shown in Table 3 to the three critical amounts discussed
above, we are able to calculate potential maximum feasible deduction rates. These imply equivalence between
actual net carbon credits from OIF and the critical amounts. Comparing the maximum feasible deduction
rates to the actual deduction rates in Rickels et al. (2010) enables us to observe whether there is sufficient
safety margin if leakage turns out to be larger than expected. The possible maximum feasible deduction
rates are shown in Table 4, where a deduction rate of zero indicates that the gross amount of carbon credits
does not exceed the critical amount.
Table 4: Maximum possible deduction rates in percent
Equivalence Forestation Equivalence CDM Equivalence Policy
0.944 Gt CO2 3.274 Gt CO2 2.924 Gt CO2
fertilization fertilization fertilization
effectiveness effectiveness effectiveness
high low high low high low
Exp 1: net 38.08 0 0 0 0 0
1 year discount 70.01 0 0 0 7.16 0
OIF shorttemp 74.42 0 11.32 0 20.81 0
Exp 2: net 84.80 17.53 47.29 0 52.93 0
7 years discount 90.95 64.55 68.63 0 71.99 0
OIF shorttemp 93.60 78.48 77.82 25.39 80.19 33.37
Exp 3: net 88.52 41.59 60.20 0 64.46 0
10 years discount 92.66 72.98 74.56 6.32 77.28 16.34
OIF shorttemp 94.11 81.79 79.58 36.86 81.76 43.61
To compare the results in Table 4, note that Rickels et al. (2010) estimate an average deduction rate of
10 percent and a maximum deduction rate of 15 percent. If fertilization effectiveness is high, OIF with a
duration of only one year provides annual credits in the commitment period 2012-2020 that allow deduction
rates between 38 percent (net method) and 70 percent (discount method) to be equivalent to the first
critical amount (equivalence forestation). If fertilization effectiveness is low, the duration of OIF has to
be extended to seven years to observe deduction rates between 17 and 64 percent with respect to the first
critical amount . The first critical amount implies an equivalence to forestation, the calculation of which is
based on global forestation projects for the duration of 20 years. The estimated annual potential of forestry
activities in our analysis 0.944 Gt CO2 is slightly above that of reforestation projects in the literature, but
below those also including forest density management, expanded use of forest products, and, in particular,
reduced deforestation. The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report estimates the annual carbon removal potential
of reforestation to be between 0.44 and 0.88 Gt CO2 up to 2030, assuming a CO2 price range of 20 to
100 USD. If, in addition to reforestation, we also include forest carbon density management, expanded use
of forest products, and in particular reduced deforestation, the range is estimated to be 1.47 to 2.93 Gt
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CO2 (Nabuurs et al., 2007; Government of Canada, Minister of Environment, 2008). However, applying
the shorttemp method for carbon credit assignment (which is also applied for forestry activities under the
Kyoto Protocol)14, we obtain sufficient amounts of carbon credits from OIF with a duration of of seven years,
allowing for deduction rates above 15 percent for all three critical amounts, regardless of the effectiveness
of OIF.
4. Distributional prospects of OIF
Transferring the social planner’s solution to the international project level requires the distribution of
potential profits from OIF to country level. This can be realized by either distributing the potential profits
or the carbon credits to the countries, basing the procedure on an allocation formula. The allocation
formula influences the individual countries’ costs but not the overall optimality condition. As an example
of the distributional consequences, we include OIF in our Reference Scenario LimitCDMLimitForest.
We assume that OIF provides net credits equal to the third critical amount (equivalence policy) 2.924
Gt CO2, and that the unit costs cI are equal to pi(FullCDMFullForest) 22 USD. This implies that
including OIF would have the same effect as loosening the existing limits on carbon credits from CDM
and domestic forestation. Additionally, it implies that OIF does not provide any extra profits, as the
unit costs are equal to the prevailing carbon credit price. The OIF carbon credits are either sold on the
market or allocated to the participating countries. If allocated to the various countries, we assume that
only countries with positive emission reduction targets can receive OIF credits. There are several ways of
defining and combining allocation criteria. We assume an allocation of carbon credits to countries with
binding emission targets (Annex1) based on population, but an allocation of payment based either on CO2
emissions or GDP (all in 2005). This implies that the bigger the population of a country is, the higher is
its share in the initial allocation. The richer a country is, or the more it contributes to global warming,
the higher its contribution will be to paying for OIF. Note that if allocation and payment of carbon credits
were based on the same criteria, the market solution would be retained. We compare the distributional
consequences to those observed by switching from the Reference Scenario LimitCDMLimitForest to the
Scenario FullCDMFullForest (equivalence policy).
Table 5 shows the results of including OIF carbon credits in the Reference Scenario for the eight countries
with the highest (all Annex1 countries) and the lowest abatement costs (all CDM or HotAir countries). The
14Two carbon accounting methods that assign temporary carbon credits are applied to account for LULUCF activities under
the Kyoto Protocol. With the first method, temporary credits are valid for a fixed period of time but can be renewed if the
carbon is still stored. With the second method, temporary credits are valid for a fixed period of time and cannot be renewed,
even if the carbon is still stored (Phillips et al., 2001). Decision 5/CMP.1 of the UNFCCC (2003) refers to the first method as
temporary certified emission reductions (tCER) and to the second as long-term certified emission reductions (lCER). tCERs
expire at the end of the commitment period following the period in which they were issued, while lCERs expire at the end of
the crediting period of the project for which they were issued (UNFCCC, 2003; Olschewski et al., 2005)
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Table 5: Distributional effects of including OIF into the Reference Scenario (constant 2000 USD)
Top 8
Payers
(absolute)
Total costs Change in total costs compared to Reference Scenario
109 USD (in percent)
Reference FullCDM LimitCDM10
Scenario FullForest LimitForest
(LimitCDM10
LimitForest
OIF via market OIF via
distribution
OIF via
distribution
no OIF) (no OIF) population/CO2 population/GDP
credit price credit price
119 USD/ 22 USD/
tCO2 tCO2
United States 147.76 -71.52 -71.52 -63.74 -67.00
Germany 18.44 -68.52 -68.52 -74.08 -72.29
Japan 16.09 -73.61 -73.61 -84.95 -51.67
UK 14.92 -73.70 -73.70 -80.95 -73.94
France 10.54 -74.41 -74.41 -92.27 -79.45
Italy 10.21 -69.32 -69.04 -82.57 -79.81
Australia 9.02 -70.79 -62.92 -55.30 -65.13
Spain 6.50 -65.84 -65.47 -80.73 -83.82
Top 8
Receivers
(absolute)
Total Change in total profits compared to Reference Scenario
profits (in percent)
China 27.48 -24.69 -82.02
Russia 6.11 24.23 -79.44
India 5.73 -20.47 -81.92
Brazil 4.36 31.00 -81.92
Ukraine 1.71 -1.41 -82.53
Venezuela 0.72 6.34 -81.92
Colombia 0.58 27.80 -81.92
Mexico 0.53 -30.34 -82.90
results are based on our Reference Emission Target for the year 2020. Table C.3 in the Appendix shows the
results for all countries.
Our calculation indicates that countries with high abatement costs (Top Payers) are more or less indif-
ferent between the option of switching from the Reference Scenario to the Scenario FullCDMFullForest
(third column) and the option of including OIF in the Reference Scenario (columns four to six). Both options
result in lower carbon credit prices and larger total carbon-credit availability, in lower domestic emission
reductions and larger amounts of carbon credits purchased for compliance. However, depending on the allo-
cation rule chosen, moderate differences can be observed. The decrease in costs ranges from 65 to 74 percent
for the first option and from 52 to 92 percent for the second option. For some countries, payment based on
CO2 emissions is more beneficial than a rule based on GDP (e.g. Japan and France). For other countries,
the opposite is true (e.g. United States and Australia). However, in general, the costs decrease in roughly
the same order of magnitude. This is rather straightforward, because we include OIF such as equivalence
in volume and carbon credit price effect is assured to switching from the Scenario LimitCDMLimitForest
to the Scenario FullCDMFullForest.
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Our calculation also shows that countries with low abatement costs (Top Receivers) are not indifferent
between the two options. Under the first option, switching from the Reference Scenario to the Scenario
FullCDMFullForest (third column), profits either decrease (e.g. Mexico and China) or increase (e.g.
Brazil and Columbia). For countries with decreasing profits, the effect of the increase in the amount of
carbon credits sold on the market (volume effect) is overcompensated by the effect of the decrease in carbon
credit price (price effect). For example, China doubles the number of carbon credits sold from 227 Mt CO2
to 504 Mt CO2, whereas the carbon credit prices decrease by a factor six from 119 USD to 22.92 USD,
resulting in a loss of 25 percent overall. For countries with increasing profits, the negative effect of carbon
credit sales is compensated for by the positive effect of additional sales of forestry credits (forestation effect).
For example, Brazil doubles its sale of forestry carbon credits from 36 Mt CO2 to 72 Mt CO2, gaining 31
percent overall. Under the second option (including OIF carbon credits) the profits for all eight countries
decrease by about 80 percent (fourth column). It makes no difference whether OIF carbon credits are sold
on the market or are allocated. None of these countries are considered in the allocation since they have no
binding emission reduction targets. If we include OIF carbon credits, the price effect remains the same, but
is not compensated for by the volume effect or the forestation effect.
Table 6: Reduction targets 2020
Climate Regime OIF reduction target 2020
Gt CO2 rel. 2005 in percent
BAU without OIF 0 -24.7
Reference
emission
target
without OIF 0 -5.4
OIF equiv. forestation 0.944 -0.9
OIF equiv. policy 2.924 8.3
OIF equiv. CDM 3.274 10.0
OIF max 11.583 48.8
With respect to the choice between relaxing existing limitations and including carbon credits from OIF,
we expect the first option to be chosen for several reasons. The underlying regulation requirements are
already in place and potential side-effects are better explored. Realizing both options would decrease the
carbon credit price below pi(FullCDMFullForest) and therefore decrease the incentives for switching to a
low-carbon economy further. To avoid a price decline and to encourage more ambitious emissions reduction
targets, we turn the question round and calculate how the overall emission reduction target would change
if the carbon credit price pi(FullCDMFullForest) were maintained while carbon credits from OIF were
included.
Table 6 shows the various emission reduction targets with and without the Reference Emission Target
and with and without the inclusion of OIF. The emission targets are for 2020 relative to 2005. For the
countries in our analysis, the business-as-usual situation (BAU) without any emissions reduction targets
implies an increase in emissions by 24.7 percent. Realizing our Reference Emission Target still implies an
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increase in emissions by 5.4 percent. Maintaining the carbon credit price pi(FullCDMFullForest) and
including OIF at an amount equivalent to forestation (first critical amount), the overall emission target
can be intensified but would still lead to an increase in emissions of 0.9 percent. Maintaining the carbon
credit price pi(FullCDMFullForest) and including OIF at an amount equivalent to the current policy
option (second critical amount), the overall reduction target gets stricter and reaches 8.3 percent. Overall
emission reduction increases to 10.0 percent if OIF is included at an amount equivalent to CDM (third
critical amount). If we include the maximum amount of permanent carbon credits from OIF by realizing
Experiment 3 (10 years OIF), use a social discount rate of 5 percent, assume a high level of fertilization
effectiveness and the average deduction rate of 10.0 percent suggested by Rickels et al. (2010), the result is
an overall emission reduction of 48.8 percent.
5. Discussion and conclusion
Our main objective has been to determine critical unit costs and critical amounts for OIF as a carbon-
removal option from a market-based perspective and to compare these to existing cost and amount estimates.
We have also considered the distributional implications involved by including carbon credits from OIF in an
international carbon market.
We determine an upper and lower level for the critical unit costs. The upper level values range from
95 to 119 USD per t CO2, and the lower level values from 22 to 23 USD per t CO2, both based on a
top-down, calibrated abatement cost function. The corresponding levels based on a bottom-up calibrated
abatement cost function are considerably higher. We argue that the upper level of our estimates indicates
whether OIF can be considered as a carbon removal option at all. The lower level of our estimates then
indicates whether OIF is comparable to existing abatement options. Even though existing cost estimates are
still rather uncertain and may not be representative of large-scale OIF, the upper and lower levels of those
estimates are below the corresponding range in the upper and lower levels of our estimates (Boyd (2008)
estimates 8-80 USD/tCO2).
To analyze how many credits OIF would have to provide to be equivalent to other options, we calculate
three critical amounts. The first indicates the impact of forestry activities on carbon prices, the second
the impact of emission trading with HotAir and CDM countries on the carbon price, and the third the
impact of an actual policy option (switching to the most efficient scenario) on carbon price. We compare
these critical amounts to the amount of carbon credits obtained from hypothetical Southern Ocean iron
fertilization based on most recently results provided by Oschlies et al. (2010) and Rickels et al. (2010).
Even if iron fertilization effectiveness is on a level equal to observed natural persistent iron fertilization near
islands in the Southern Ocean, 7 years of OIF are sufficient to obtain an amount of annual carbon credits
that is sufficiently larger than the amount provided by forestry activity over 20 years. This result is based
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on a carbon credit accounting method (the net method) that is implicitly applied in the scientific literature.
Applying an accounting method used for assigning carbon credits to forestry activities under the Kyoto
Protocol, we obtain sufficient amounts of carbon credits for a fertilization period of 7 years, exceeding all
three critical amounts with an adequate safety margin.
The analysis of the distributional implications reveals that including OIF may provide new incentives for
the negotiation process of a post-Kyoto climate agreement. Considering the choice between (a) loosening
existing limitations with respect to emission trading and usage of carbon credits from forestation and (b)
including carbon credits from OIF, our calculation suggests that countries with high abatement costs will
be more or less indifferent. Countries with low abatement costs, i.e. sellers of carbon credits, are expected
to favor the first option. Even though not all selling countries gain from first option, they are still better off
than with the second option. Therefore, one might consider a third option offering both alternatives, but in
which CDM and HotAir countries are included in the allocation of OIF, if they accept emissions reduction
targets. An allocation formula could be designed to provide incentives for CDM and HotAir countries to
accept emissions reduction targets, while at the same time ensuring that Annex1 countries are indifferent
between the different options. However, realizing both alternatives requires intensifying overall emission
reduction targets, because otherwise the carbon credit price would decline further. Consequently, including
OIF may not just provide new incentives for the negotiation process in further climate agreements, it may
also favor the negotiation of more ambitious emissions reduction targets in future.
In this study, we have not considered whether and how the model OIF experiments could be realized
in the Southern Ocean, a crucial aspect in the consideration of OIF as a carbon-removal option. It should
also be noted, that we consider a static 2020 compliance problem. Implementing OIF will generate carbon
credits for several years within one commitment period or even spread out over different commitment
periods. Accordingly, the costs of OIF should be compared with a time series of carbon credit prices to
incorporate the dynamic effects of the carbon market. Nevertheless, our study is in line with assessments
of other abatement options, which also concentrate on a given compliance year (e.g., Anger et al., 2009).
Additionally, the economic data necessary for conducting our analysis are more readily available for the next
commitment period. We have focused on a so far neglected aspect in the discussion of OIF: consideration
of the conditions provided by a market for OIF as a carbon-removal option in a post-Kyoto climate regime.
Our results provide information on critical unit costs and critical amounts for OIF, which lead us to the
conclusion that, based on current knowledge, OIF cannot be excluded from the list of potential carbon-
removal options, notably in comparison with forestry activities. This especially holds true if we recall that
the potential of forestry activities is not that certain either. For example, van Kooten and Sohngen (2007)
show that there is great inconsistency across forestry activity studies in the way carbon uptake and costs
are measured, so that the costs estimated for creating carbon credits through forestry vary widely. Hence,
they argue that the widely held notion that forestry activities are a low-cost means of reducing atmospheric
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CO2 (Noble et al., 2000) needs to be reassessed.
Future research should concentrate particularly on evaluating the carbon-removal effectiveness of OIF
and its potential side-effects. But a more detailed assessment of its distributional and dynamic aspects is
also necessary.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Emission Reduction Targets, Abatement Cost Functions, and Forestry Activity
The country-specific emission reduction targets for the Reference Emission Reduction Target can be
found in column 3 of Table A.2. For the calculation of the country-specific emission commitments for the
EU member states, we use aspects of the 20 percent target, the reduction commitment of 21 percent by
2020 relative to 2005 for the European Emission Trading Sector (European Union, 2009, Art. 5), and the
individual reduction commitments in Annex IIa by 2020 relative to 2005 for the non-ETS sector (European
Union, 2009b). With these two reduction targets for the ETS sector and the non-ETS sector in each country,
we calculate the total reduction by 2020 relative to 2005, obtaining the country-specific share of the overall
reduction for the 20 percent target. Using this country-specific share, we calculate the country-specific
reduction target for the 30 percent overall target.
For Canada, we have chosen the emission reduction announcement of 20 percent relative to 2006 for the
industrial sector (Government of Canada, Minister of Environment, 2008). For Japan, we have chosen the
emission reduction announcement of 20 percent relative to 2005 indicated in a speech by Prime Minister
Fukuda (Fukuda, 9 June 2008). For Switzerland, we have chosen the emission reduction announcement of 30
percent relative to 1990 (Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, 2009). For Norway, we have chosen the emission
reduction announcement of 30 percent relative to 1990 (Garnaut, 2008). For the US, Australia, and New
Zealand, we have chosen the emission entitlement allocation from the final report of the Garnaut Climate
Change Review. The reduction target is 28 percent relative to 2000 for the US and 25 percent relative to
2000 for Australia and New Zealand (Garnaut, 2008, p.209). For Russia and Ukraine, we have assumed
an emission target no more ambitious than their current BAU emission projections for 2020. For Croatia,
we have assumed a zero-percent emission target relative to 2005 and for Iceland a 30 percent emission
target relative to 1990. We have converted all emission targets to be based on the reference year 2005.
Table A.1: Estimates for abatement cost functions
Region
Function 1 Function 2
α adj. R2 β1 β2 adj. R2
WEU 0.06438 0.99633 -0.00374 0.07544 0.99832
EEU 0.12604 0.97775 0.02175 0.06177 0.99637
USA 0.08659 0.96463 0.01823 0.03271 0.99165
OAB 0.07746 0.98097 0.01111 0.04462 0.99337
FSU 0.14602 0.97242 -0.03865 0.24742 0.99673
CPA 0.10998 0.98493 -0.02564 0.16672 0.99851
IND 0.06867 0.97600 -0.01980 0.11064 0.99499
LAM 0.07997 0.95598 -0.02498 0.14790 0.99735
JAPANa 0.19466 0.98698 -0.02583 0.27100 0.99812
a The estimated parameters for Japan are based on the observed change in the equivalent variation and not on the observed change
in GDP.
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Table A.2: Reduction targets, abatement cost functions and forestation factors and limits
Country Class
Reduction
2020 rel.
to 2005
(in percent)
Function 1 Function 2 Function 3
Foresty
factor
(Mt CO2)
Forest
limitation
Annex Z
(Mt CO2)α β1 β2 γ
Austria Annex1 29.92 0.06442 -0.00374 0.07544 0.15347 0.03490 2.31021
Belgium Annex1 29.57 0.06536 -0.00368 0.07544 0.15281 0.00603 0.11001
Denmark Annex1 31.99 0.06283 -0.00383 0.07544 0.15449 0.00452 0.18335
Finland Annex1 30.62 0.06469 -0.00372 0.07544 0.15328 0.20330 0.58672
France Annex1 28.30 0.06305 -0.00382 0.07544 0.15433 0.14054 3.22696
Germany Annex1 29.65 0.06538 -0.00368 0.07544 0.15280 0.10008 4.54708
Greece Annex1 27.24 0.06636 -0.00363 0.07544 0.15220 0.03390 0.33003
Iceland Annex1 39.55 0.06181 -0.00389 0.07544 0.15546 0.00042 0.00000
Ireland Annex1 31.94 0.06399 -0.00377 0.07544 0.15373 0.00604 0.18335
Italy Annex1 28.67 0.06522 -0.00369 0.07544 0.15290 0.09017 0.66006
Luxem-
bourg
Annex1 31.73 0.06557 -0.00367 0.07544 0.15267 0.00079 0.03667
Nether-
lands
Annex1 30.07 0.06538 -0.00368 0.07544 0.15280 0.00330 0.03667
Norway Annex1 45.00 0.06163 -0.00390 0.07544 0.15570 0.08482 1.46680
Portugal Annex1 23.55 0.06657 -0.00361 0.07544 0.15208 0.03418 0.80674
Spain Annex1 27.66 0.06571 -0.00366 0.07544 0.15258 0.16188 2.45689
Sweden Annex1 30.23 0.06124 -0.00393 0.07544 0.15653 0.24874 2.12686
Switzer-
land
Annex1 35.76 0.06119 -0.00393 0.07544 0.15700 0.01103 1.83350
United
Kingdom
Annex1 29.99 0.06376 -0.00378 0.07544 0.15386 0.02571 1.35679
United
States
Annex1 29.44 0.08659 0.01823 0.03271 0.15234 4.26042 102.67600
Australia Annex1 32.42 0.08097 0.01182 0.04462 0.15057 1.47895 0.00000
Canada Annex1 19.28 0.07811 0.01124 0.04462 0.15105 2.80229 44.00400
New
Zealand
Annex1 30.37 0.07222 0.01006 0.04462 0.15196 0.07508 0.73340
Japan Annex1 20.00 0.19466 -0.02583 0.27100 0.15475 0.31062 47.67100
Bulgaria Annex1 23.68 0.13657 0.02408 0.06177 0.14502 0.03275 1.35679
Croatia Annex1 0.00 0.12237 0.02094 0.06177 0.15037 0.01929 0.00000
Czech Rep Annex1 23.54 0.13012 0.02265 0.06177 0.14725 0.02393 1.17344
Estonia Annex1 25.97 0.12915 0.02244 0.06177 0.14764 0.02064 0.36670
Hungary Annex1 17.06 0.12117 0.02067 0.06177 0.15089 0.01785 1.06343
Latvia Annex1 12.00 0.11819 0.02001 0.06177 0.15245 0.02657 1.24678
Lithuania Annex1 15.80 0.12015 0.02044 0.06177 0.15138 0.01897 1.02676
Poland Annex1 21.60 0.12702 0.02197 0.06177 0.14854 0.08306 3.00694
Romania Annex1 21.06 0.12931 0.02247 0.06177 0.14757 0.05756 4.03370
Slovakia Annex1 21.32 0.12544 0.02162 0.06177 0.14919 0.01743 1.83350
Slovenia Annex1 22.11 0.11905 0.02020 0.06177 0.15194 0.01142 1.32012
Russia HotAir -14.38 0.14136 -0.03909 0.24742 0.14189 7.30802 64.64921
Ukraine HotAir -17.83 0.15067 -0.03820 0.24742 0.13800 0.08652 4.07037
China CDM no 0.10998 -0.02564 0.16672 0.14454 7.43928 no limit
India CDM no 0.06867 -0.01980 0.11064 0.14763 2.56048 no limit
Argentina CDM no 0.07743 -0.02530 0.14790 0.15268 0.78010 no limit
Bolivia CDM no 0.08280 -0.02461 0.14790 0.14836 1.38769 no limit
Brazil CDM no 0.07828 -0.02519 0.14790 0.15212 11.28531 no limit
Chile CDM no 0.07978 -0.02500 0.14790 0.15127 0.38085 no limit
Colombia CDM no 0.07932 -0.02506 0.14790 0.15151 1.43466 no limit
Ecuador CDM no 0.08238 -0.02467 0.14790 0.14872 0.25640 no limit
Guatemala CDM no 0.07841 -0.02517 0.14790 0.15204 0.58872 no limit
Mexico CDM no 0.07901 -0.02510 0.14790 0.15169 0.00000 no limit
Nicaragua CDM no 0.08154 -0.02478 0.14790 0.14948 0.77574 no limit
Panama CDM no 0.07720 -0.02533 0.14790 0.15284 0.64194 no limit
Paraguay CDM no 0.07733 -0.02531 0.14790 0.15275 0.43646 no limit
Peru CDM no 0.07729 -0.02532 0.14790 0.15277 0.00161 no limit
Uruguay CDM no 0.07509 -0.02560 0.14790 0.15485 0.03558 no limit
Venezuela CDM no 0.08178 -0.02474 0.14790 0.14925 1.12719 no limit
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Appendix B. Hypothetical Large-scale Southern Ocean Iron Fertilization
For the analysis of hypothetical large-scale Southern Ocean iron fertilization, Oschlies et al. (2010) use
the University of Victoria (UVic) Earth System Climate Model (Weaver et al., 2001) in the configuration
described by Schmittner et al. (2008). The oceanic component is a fully three-dimensional primitive-equation
model with 19 levels in the vertical, ranging from 50m thickness near the surface to 500m in the deep ocean.
It contains a simple marine ecosystem model with the two major nutrients nitrate and phosphate and two
phytoplankton classes, nitrogen fixers and other phytoplankton, the former being limited only by phosphate.
Organic matter is produced, processed, and remineralized according to a fixed elemental stoichiometry of
C:N:P=112:16:1. Detritus sinks with a velocity that increases linearly with depth from 7 m/day at the
surface to 40 m/day at 1000m and remaining constant below that. The production of calcium carbonate is
assumed to be proportional to the production of nondiazotrophic detritus, and its instantaneous export and
dissolution is parameterized by an e-folding depth of 3500 m.
The ocean component is coupled to a single-level energy moisture balance model of the atmosphere and
a dynamic-thermodynamic sea-ice component. The terrestrial vegetation and carbon cycle component is
based on the Hadley Centre’s TRIFFID model (Cox et al., 2000).
Because of the difficulty of explicitly modeling the complex iron chemistry and its interaction with marine
biology, the model does not include an explicit parametrization of the iron cycle, but is parameterized against
the changes in export production observed for persistent natural iron fertilization on the Kerguelen Plateau
and Crozet Islands in the Southern Ocean (Blain et al., 2007; Pollard et al., 2009). Although the pragmatic
model does not include an explicit parameterization of the iron cycle, it can nevertheless be tuned to achieve
a reasonable fit with observed biogeochemical tracer distributions, in particular by using a low phytoplankton
growth rate that allows for the persistence of HNLC areas (Schmittner et al., 2008; Oschlies et al., 2008).
The effect of ocean iron fertilization is simulated by doubling the maximum phytoplankton growth rate
from 0.13 per day to 0.26 per day over the fertilized area and during the fertilization period. Increasing the
maximum growth rate mimics the effect of iron in relaxing light limitation (Sunda and Huntsman, 1997), and
the factor-2 enhancement results in an increase in simulated carbon export across z=125m by a factor of 2 to
3 with respect to an unfertilized control experiment. This is in good agreement with the impact of natural
iron fertilization near Kerguelen and the Crozet Islands, where Blain et al. (2007) and Pollard et al. (2009)
estimated particulate carbon export fluxes to be two to three times higher than in the adjacent unfertilized
regions. Additionally, Oschlies et al. (2010) analyze sensitivity experiments with maximum phytoplankton
growth rates enhanced by factors of 3 and 5. In an attempt to simulate an upper bound for possible OIF
impacts, they postulate a hypothetical and very high value of 10 per day, because it cannot be ruled out
that natural iron fertilization is not saturating and that artificial fertilization could be engineered to have an
even larger impact. None of these experiments show complete depletion of macronutrients in the fertilized
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Table C.3: Distributional effects of including OIF in the Reference Scenario
Country
Total costs in 106 USD (constant 2000 USD)
LimitCDM10
LimitForest
(no OIF)
FullCDM10
FullForest
(no OIF)
LimitCDM10
LimitForest
OIF via market OIF via
distribution
population/CO2
OIF via
distribution
population/GDP
credit price credit price
119 USD/ tCO2 22 USD/ tCO2
Austria 1794.25 551.54 551.54 425.22 509.07
Belgium 2589.48 799.13 799.62 720.32 718.29
Denmark 1547.85 375.17 375.17 277.06 430.51
Finland 1413.05 317.04 401.83 356.75 389.99
France 10537.23 2696.62 2696.62 814.35 2164.88
Germany 18440.64 5805.50 5805.50 4780.05 5110.54
Greece 1616.62 611.57 620.62 410.92 325.28
Iceland 97.97 21.10 21.30 13.84 27.46
Ireland 1303.90 340.54 340.54 305.19 366.80
Italy 10213.34 3133.55 3162.39 1780.26 2061.78
Luxembourg 280.04 85.84 85.84 116.30 112.14
Netherlands 4354.86 1331.55 1332.33 1247.63 1243.41
Norway 1729.46 362.31 370.91 267.36 515.86
Portugal 675.57 344.61 344.61 -1.78 -58.95
Spain 6498.49 2220.19 2244.10 1252.41 1051.19
Sweden 1523.36 272.70 345.56 31.81 405.46
Switzerland 1713.63 395.42 395.42 154.21 530.66
United Kingdom 14920.24 3924.72 3924.72 2842.32 3888.08
United States 147758.28 42078.18 42078.18 53580.14 48753.94
Australia 9022.80 2635.58 3345.96 4033.61 3146.14
Canada 1472.30 2184.22 2565.83 3392.31 2428.27
New Zealand 885.33 265.68 285.66 206.02 168.63
Japan 16088.57 4245.13 4245.13 2421.31 7775.66
Bulgaria -362.14 319.74 319.74 63.61 -142.59
Croatia -7.49 56.82 66.09 -117.82 -173.12
Czech Rep -92.71 617.72 617.72 585.74 120.43
Estonia 206.51 123.13 125.00 122.52 57.88
Hungary 470.23 251.32 251.32 -94.63 -260.71
Latvia 15.23 31.73 31.73 -78.41 -89.65
Lithuania 184.49 81.87 81.87 -68.51 -100.24
Poland 1133.68 1479.60 1479.60 580.01 -518.36
Romania 381.04 634.56 634.56 -281.12 -648.63
Slovakia 87.42 190.26 190.26 45.23 -97.75
Slovenia 349.08 122.38 122.38 75.40 47.30
Russia -6105.01 -7584.04 -1255.23 -1255.23 -1255.23
Ukraine -1707.64 -1683.53 -298.26 -298.26 -298.26
China -27482.72 -20695.97 -4941.01 -4941.01 -4941.01
India -5731.23 -4558.27 -1036.33 -1036.33 -1036.33
Argentina -418.64 -475.40 -75.70 -75.70 -75.70
Bolivia -516.95 -688.96 -93.48 -93.48 -93.48
Brazil -4358.00 -5708.81 -788.02 -788.02 -788.02
Chile -219.19 -242.28 -39.63 -39.63 -39.63
Colombia -583.99 -746.36 -105.60 -105.60 -105.60
Ecuador -149.34 -164.33 -27.00 -27.00 -27.00
Guatemala -218.34 -291.62 -39.48 -39.48 -39.48
Mexico -527.76 -367.64 -90.27 -90.27 -90.27
Nicaragua -279.79 -378.81 -50.59 -50.59 -50.59
Panama -229.75 -312.25 -41.54 -41.54 -41.54
Paraguay -155.81 -212.03 -28.17 -28.17 -28.17
Peru -29.32 -20.57 -5.04 -5.04 -5.04
Uruguay -15.44 -19.17 -2.79 -2.79 -2.79
Venezuela -721.29 -766.99 -130.43 -130.43 -130.43
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Abstract
We investigate the socially optimal intervention in the global carbon cycle. Limiting factors are (a) increasing
atmospheric carbon concentration due to fossil fuel-related carbon emissions, and (b) the inertia of the global
carbon cycle itself. Accordingly, we explicitly include the largest non-atmospheric carbon reservoir, the
ocean, to achieve a better representation of the global carbon cycle than the proportional-decay assumption
usually resorted to in economic models. We also investigate the option to directly inject CO2 into the deep
ocean (a form of carbon sequestration), deriving from this a critical level for ocean sequestration costs.
Above this level, ocean sequestration is merely a temporary option; below it, ocean sequestration is the
long-term option permitting extended use of fossil fuels. The latter alternative involves higher atmospheric
stabilization levels. In this connection it should be noted that the efficiency of ocean sequestration depends
on the time-preference and the inertia of the carbon cycle.
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1. Introduction
Today, society has recognized the far-reaching consequences of the increase in atmospheric carbon con-
centration to above its preindustrial level because this contributes to a large extent to global warming.
Nevertheless, the carbon concentration in the atmosphere is growing continuously and its growth rate in-
creased even further in the period 2000-2006 (Canadell et al., 2007). This growth depends not only on global
economic activity and the carbon intensity of the economy but also on the effectiveness of the natural carbon
sinks, namely the terrestrial biosphere and the ocean. The uptake of the terrestrial biosphere is subject to
strong fluctuations that are not well understood yet. Looking at the change in the various carbon reservoirs
from 1800 to 1994, Sabine et al. (2004) show that the terrestrial biosphere has been a total net source of 39
(±28) Gt C.1 They conclude that ‘the ocean has constituted the only true net sink for anthropogenic CO2
over the past 200 years’ (p.370). The absolute value of the long-run atmospheric carbon stabilization level
and the time pattern of its achievement will depend crucially on the marine carbon cycle, which is therefore
perceived to be the most import cycle with regard to the climate (Najjar, 1992). Therefore, any approach
to mitigate global warming that ignores the ocean ignores optimization potential.
In this paper, we address the question how the inclusion of the largest carbon reservoir of the carbon
cycle, the ocean, changes the optimal path of carbon emissions and whether its inclusion allows additional
optimization potential. Since natural forces transport carbon into the deep ocean, where it cannot affect
society as adversely as when in the atmosphere, the logical question is: At which cost level would it be
beneficial to accelerate the process of downward carbon transfer by injecting carbon into the deep ocean?
CO2 could be transported via pipelines or ships to an ocean storage site, where it would be injected into
the water column of the ocean or at the seafloor. This way, it would also become part of the global carbon
cycle, but would enter the cycle in a more favorable way (Marchetti, 1977; Ozaki et al., 2001; IPCC, 2005;
Keeling, 2009).
The growing knowledge about the importance of the marine carbon cycle for the mitigation of global
warming has not just led to the inclusion of the oceanic carbon sink in the pioneering integrated assessment
model (see, e.g., modifications from DICE 94 to DICE 99, Nordhaus, 1994; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000,
respectively). It has also led to the development of highly sophisticated computer models that include
complex coupled atmosphere-ocean general circulation models to represent the global carbon cycle and
the climate system of the world (for an overview of integrated assessment models, see, e.g., Kelly and
Kolstad, 1999; Tol, 2006). However, many general properties of the stock externality problem were derived
in microeconomic optimal control models, like Plourde (1976) or Forster (1980). In the application of these
1Based on the net increase of 165 Gt C in the atmosphere from 1800 to 1994, Sabine et al. (2004) subtract their ocean
inventory estimate of 118 (± 19) Gt C from the total of fossil-fuel-emitted carbon, which amounted to 244(±20) Gt C during
this period. As a consequence, the terrestrial biosphere has to be considered a net source of carbon if the carbon budget is to
be balanced.
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optimal control models to climate change problems, the global carbon cycle is only roughly approximated.
The majority of the models apply a constant rate of decay, which yields a proportional decay of carbon in the
atmosphere. As a result, in these models, global warming presents itself merely as a problem of temporary
duration and the atmospheric carbon stock is represented as a completely renewable resource (see, e.g.,
Tahvonen, 1997). The other extremum is to model the atmospheric carbon stock without decay, whereby
it becomes a completely non-renewable resource (see, e.g., Section 4 in Hoel, 1978; or Farzin, 1996). The
atmospheric carbon stock is neither appropriately represented by a completely renewable description nor by
a completely non-renewable description. Whereas the completely renewable description clearly overestimates
the storing capacity of the global carbon cycle, the completely non-renewable description underestimates the
storing capacity of the global carbon cycle. The first description implies a complete oceanic carbon sink, the
second description neglects the oceanic carbon sink. Taking into account this oceanic carbon uptake, the
atmospheric carbon stock could be considered as a partial non-renewable resource. This approach is followed
by Farzin and Tahvonen (1996). Based on a paper by Maier-Raimer and Hasselmann (1987), they divide
the atmospheric carbon stock within their dynamic system artificially into two different stocks, one with a
constant rate of decay and the other without. Given that the proportion of emissions to the nondecaying
stock is equal to the long-run equilibrium, Farzin and Tahvonen’s model captures important aspects of the
carbon cycle. Nevertheless, the only management option in their dynamic model is to control the amount
of emissions released into the atmosphere, which is proportional to the amount of extracted fossil fuels.
Herzog et al. (2003) consider the injection of CO2 into the deep ocean. They calculate the effectiveness of
this activity, measured as the ratio between the net benefit gained from temporary storage and the benefit
gained from permanent storage. They find ‘that the value of relatively deep ocean sequestration is nearly
equivalent to permanent sequestration if marginal damage (i.e., carbon prices) remains constant or if there
is a backstop technology that caps the abatement cost in the not too distant future’ (p. 306). However,
their calculation of ocean sequestration is not embedded within an optimal control framework, and therefore
is not the result of a combined extraction and sequestration decision.
We analyze the optimal amount of extraction and consumption of fossil fuels whereby the related emis-
sions can be released into the atmosphere and injected into the deep ocean for purposes of ocean sequestration
in a microeconomic partial analysis framework. In Section 2 we explain how we include the oceanic carbon
stock in the optimization problem by applying a two-box model representation for the global carbon cycle.
Thereby, we replace the constant or nonconstant decay assumption and capture the essential nonrenewable
aspects of the global carbon cycle without artificially dividing the atmospheric carbon stock. In Section 3
we presents our results. In Section 3.1 we derive the general optimality conditions for the solution, before
we start in Section 3.2 by analyzing the scenario, where the fossil-fuel related emissions can only be released
to the atmosphere. In Section 3.3 we analyze the scenario where fossil-fuel related carbon emission can also
be injected into the deep ocean and derive a critical level for ocean sequestration costs. In Section 3.4 we
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analyse the policy relevant case, where the start-up costs of ocean sequestration are below the critical level
and the initial levels of atmospheric carbon concentration are still below atmospheric stabilization targets.
Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2. Anthropogenic intervention into the global carbon cycle
We investigate the optimal anthropogenic intervention into the carbon cycle in the light of global warming
as a social planner’s problem in which the planer needs to determine the global optimal amount of fossil fuels
extraction and consumption with related emissions released to the atmosphere, q(t), and the global optimal
amount of fossil fuels extraction and consumption with related emissions injected into the deep ocean for
purpose of sequestration, a(t). Consequently, the total amount of fossil fuels extraction and consumption is
x(t) = q(t) + a(t). The social welfare function can be formalized as follows:
max
q(t),a(t)
∫
∞
0
(U(q(t) + a(t))−A(a(t))−D(S(t)))e−ρtdt, (1)
with a(t), q(t) ≥ 0, (2)
which has to be maximized subject to the constraints:
S˙ = q(t)− γ(S(t)− ωW (t)) with S(t0) = S0, (3)
W˙ = a(t) + γ(S(t)− ωW (t)) with W (t0) =W0, (4)
R˙ = −q(t)− a(t) with R(t0) = R0. (5)
The total amount of fossil fuel extraction and consumption, q(t) + a(t), generates gross utility in the social
welfare function at any instant in time. The gross utility of total fossil fuel consumption is described by
U(x(t)), which has the properties U ′ > 0, U ′′ < 0, and U ′(0) = b < ∞. The last property implies that
there is a choke price or a backstop price. We assume that the costs of fossil fuel extraction are independent
from the resource stock and are included in U(x(t)). The proportional amount of carbon emissions related to
total fossil fuels consumption (the proportionality factor is one) can be released directly to the atmosphere,
q(t) (emissions), or injected into the deep ocean, a(t) (ocean sequestration). Ocean sequestration generates
additional costs in the social welfare function at any instant in time. The costs of ocean sequestration are
described by A(a(t)), which has the properties A′ > 0 and A′′ > 0 and is measured in the same units as
utility. Ocean sequestration summarizes the activities of capturing CO2 generated from the use of fossil
fuels, of transporting the captured CO2 via pipelines or ships to an ocean storage site, and of injecting it
into the deep ocean. The IPCC (2005) special report on carbon dioxide capture and storage provides cost
ranges for CO2 capture. The ranges indicate that sequestration costs vary by differences in the design of
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CO2 capture systems and by differences in the operating and financing of the reference plant to which the
capture technology is applied (p.27). Additionally, their estimates show that the costs are increasing as the
transportation distance on land and on sea increases (p.31, Figure TS.6 and p.39, Table TS.8). We assume
that carbon capture would be first applied to the most cost efficient plants and to plants located nearest to
the shore. However, in order to increase the amount of ocean sequestration, the capture technology has to
applied to less efficient plants and to plants located far away from the shore. Consequently, by including
ocean sequestration into such a microeconomic partial analysis framework such as ours, the most appropriate
representation of the costs becomes a convex function.
Both control variables, q(t) and a(t), increase the amount of carbon in the global carbon cycle, whereas
only the atmospheric carbon stock influences the objective function. The increase in the atmospheric carbon
stock to above preindustrial levels leads to global warming and thereby causes social costs for society at any
instant in time. The social costs of global warming are denoted as damage and are described by the strictly
convex function D(S(t)), with the properties D′ > 0, D′′ > 0, and D′(0) = 0.
Equations (3) and (4) constitute the two-box model representation of the atmosphere and ocean (see
Figure 1), whereby the boxes entail the carbon stocks in the atmosphere and the ocean, respectively. Equa-
tion (5) incorporates the endowment of the fossil resource, R(t). The equations (3) to (5) describe the
dynamics of the global carbon cycle as a consequence of the anthropogenic intervention. The upper box
emissions (q(t))
sequestration (a(t))
atmosphere & upper ocean
deep ocean
S(t)
W(t) ȖS(t) ȖȦ
W(t)
net transfer Ȗ(S(t)-ȦW(t))
Figure 1: Two-Box Model
aggregates the carbon stocks in the atmosphere and in the upper mixed layer of the ocean. There is a net
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transfer of carbon between the atmosphere and the upper mixed layer of the ocean if there is a difference
in the partial pressure of carbon dioxide (pCO2) between these two reservoirs. The equilibration time for
the upper layer of the ocean with the atmosphere takes around one year.2 However, only a small fraction
of the ocean is involved in direct exchange with the atmosphere and the uptake bottleneck is the transport
of anthropogenic carbon to the deeper parts of the ocean. Consequently, we assume that the atmosphere
and the upper mixed layer are always in equilibrium and that the stock of carbon in the atmosphere is a
constant fraction of the carbon stock in the upper box, S(t).
In order to model the transport of anthropogenic carbon to the deeper parts of the ocean, we include
the carbon stock in the deep ocean, W (t), in the lower box. The transport of anthropogenic carbon to the
deeper parts of the oceans is effected by the biological pump and especially by the solubility pump. The term
biological pump designates the small fraction of organic matter and skeletons that survives remineralization
in the euphotic zone and sinks to deeper layers. The main contribution to the transport of anthropogenic
carbon is provided by the solubility pump. The solubility pump is driven by two phenomena: thermohaline
circulation and the solubility of CO2. Surface water in equilibrium with atmospheric CO2 takes up additional
CO2 on its way to the earth’s poles, as the decreasing temperature increases the solubility of CO2. The
formation of deep seawater is driven by thermohaline circulation, which transports cold and high-solubility
high-latitude surface waters into the deep ocean. Consequently, these two phenomena act together to pump
carbon from the atmosphere into the ocean’s deeper layers until the deep ocean is saturated with respect to
the upper layer. At this point in time, the up-welling water in the mid-latitudes transports anthropogenic
carbon back to the upper layer.
The downward flux of carbon from the upper box to the lower box is represented by the fraction γS(t)
and the upwards flux of carbon from the lower box to the upper box by the fraction γωW (t). These two
fluxes are represented in Figure 1 by the two white vertical arrows between the boxes. Both arrows have
the same size, indicating that the upward flux is balanced by the downward flux. Putting these two fluxes
together, we obtain the net transfer between the boxes, γ(S(t)− ωW (t)). There will be a net flux between
these two boxes if there is a difference between the relative stock sizes. An increase in the stock size in the
upper box causes a downward transfer of excess carbon into the deep ocean, whereas up-welling water is
still free of excess carbon, so that we observe a net transfer from the upper box into the lower box. The
upper box is relatively small in comparison to the lower box. Consequently, ω is the proportionality factor
to scale the stock of carbon in the lower box with respect to the upper box and γ is the turnover factor to
describe the speed of the adjustment process.3 The anthropogenic intervention into the carbon cycle, the
2Most of the CO2 dissolves in water, forming carbon acid first and then bicarbonate (HCO
−
3
) and carbonate ions (CO2−
3
).
The sum of these three elements describes the total amount of carbon in the ocean, called dissolved inorganic carbon (DIC).
The amount of DIC in the ocean consists to 89.1% of bicarbonate ions, to 10.4% of carbonate ions and only to 0.5% of CO2
(Najjar, 1992). Regarding the last figure, the atmosphere “sees” only a tiny fraction of the carbon present in ocean surface
water within the chemical process of pCO2 equilibration between the atmosphere and the ocean.
3Currently, this turnover speed is mainly limiting the uptake process by the ocean, so that the total ocean is estimated to
109
amount of emissions and the amount of ocean sequestration are depicted by the grey horizontal arrows in
Figure 1. The amount of emissions enters the upper box and the amount of ocean sequestration enters the
lower box.4 Even though the carbon stock in upper box entails atmospheric and oceanic carbon, we refer
to it as the atmospheric carbon stock.
3. Results
3.1. Optimal solution conditions
The corresponding current value Hamiltonian from (1) and (3) to (5) is
Hc = U(q + a)−A(a)−D(S)− ψS˙ − πW˙ + µR˙, (6)
where lim
t→∞
S(t) ≥ 0, lim
t→∞
W (t) ≥ 0, lim
t→∞
R(t) ≥ 0. (7)
Note that from now on we drop the time variable whenever it is convenient. We have changed the signs
of the costate variables, ψ and π, in order to facilitate their economic interpretation as taxes. Together
with the two Lagrange multipliers for the control constraints (2), θ1 and θ2, we obtain the current value
Lagrangian:
Lc = Hc − θ1(−q)− θ2(−a). (8)
According to Proposition 6.2 and Propostion 7.5 in Feichtinger and Hartl (1986), the admissible solution
candidate has to fulfill the necessary conditions,
∂Lc
∂q
= 0 ⇒ U ′ − ψ − µ+ θ1 = 0, (9)
∂Lc
∂a
= 0 ⇒ U ′ −A′ − π − µ+ θ2 = 0, (10)
−
∂Lc
∂S
= −ψ˙ + ρψ ⇒ −D′(S) + γψ − γπ = ψ˙ − ρψ, (11)
−
∂Lc
∂W
= −π˙ + ρπ ⇒ −γωψ + γωπ = π˙ − ρπ, (12)
−
∂Lc
∂R
= µ˙− ρµ ⇒ 0 = µ˙− ρµ, (13)
∂Lc
∂θ1
≥ 0 θ1 ≥ 0 θ1(−q) = 0, (14)
∂Lc
∂θ2
≥ 0 θ2 ≥ 0 θ2(−a) = 0, (15)
be undersaturated for a long time (order of 103 years) (Ko¨rtzinger and Wallace, 2002).
4Note it would also be possible to apply the control variables x(t) and a(t) instead of q(t) and a(t). As a result, only the
net emissions, x(t)− a(t), would be released to the upper box and the control constraints, (2), would change to x(t)− a(t) ≥ 0
and a(t) ≥ 0. Releasing the first constraint by allowing x(t) − a(t) ≤ 0 would imply the option of air capture. This possibility
is investigated in Lontzek and Rickels (2008).
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as well as the transversality conditions,
lim
t→∞
e−ρtψ = 0, lim
t→∞
e−ρtπ = 0, lim
t→∞
e−ρtµR = 0, (16)
and the constraint qualification for the control constraints (see Appendix A). As any admissible path for
the state and costate variables is non-negative and as any admissible path for the state variables is bounded
due to the description of the carbon cycle as a closed system, the fulfillment of the transversality conditions,
(16), is sufficient for the fulfillment of the general transversality conditions in a infinity horizon problem
(Feichtinger and Hartl, 1986, Remark 2.9 and Remark 7.5). The fulfillment of the necessary conditions,
(9) to (16), provides the optimal solution, because our carbon cycle is described by linear equations, (3)
to (5), the control constraints (2) are quasi-concave, and in Appendix A we show that the maximized
Hamiltonian is concave in the state variables and the Hamiltonian is strictly concave in the control variables
(Feichtinger and Hartl, 1986, Proposition 7.5). The strict concavity of the Hamiltonian in the control
variables implies that the Hamiltonian is regular and that therefore the controls are continuous, in particular
at switching points (Feichtinger and Hartl, 1986, corollary 6.2). Note the equations (3) to (5) constitute a
closed system, which means that no carbon vanishes from the cycle, S˙ + W˙ + R˙ = 0 and one state variable,
e.g.,W (t) = R0+S0+W0−R(t)−S(t), and the corresponding costate variable can be dropped. Consequently,
the modified Hamiltonian dynamic system with a full rank is a 4x4 dynamic system. The remaining two
costate variables also measure then the influence of the omitted state variable on the objective function. To
facilitate interpretation, the analysis is based on the system with all state variables (Full system), whereas
some technical arguments and the calculations in the Appendix are based on the system with only two state
variables (Redux system).
The optimal amounts of the control variables, q and a, are determined by the costate variables, µ, ψ, and
π, where µ measures the shadow resource scarcity rent, −ψ measures the shadow environmental scarcity rent
of the atmospheric carbon stock and −π measures the shadow environmental scarcity rent of the oceanic
carbon stock (Farzin, 1996). The two costate variables ψ and π can be interpreted as the optimal tax values
throughout time for an implementation of the social optimal solution in a decentralized economy. The
costate variable that corresponds to the carbon stock in the upper box, ψ, denotes an emission tax, and the
costate variable that corresponds to the carbon stock in the lower box, π, denotes an ocean sequestration tax.
Conditions (11) and (12) indicate that both taxes are always positive and that the emission tax is always
larger than the ocean sequestration tax, otherwise the transversality conditions (16) would be violated. This
can be seen by solving the equation of motion for the tax difference, λ = ψ − π, which coincides with the
emission tax in the Redux system, in which the state variable W and the corresponding costate variable π
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have been dropped,5 ψR:
λ˙ = λ(ρ+ γ + γω)−D′(S) ⇒ λ(t) = ψR(t) =
∫
∞
t
D′(S)e−(ρ+γ+γω)(τ−t)dτ. (17)
Consequently, if anthropogenic intervention takes place, the tax difference is positive. For an unconstrained
solution, θ1 = θ2 = 0, this can be seen directly by simplifying (10) to A
′ = ψ − π. Both taxes, ψ and π
are increasing in the atmospheric carbon stock as does the tax difference, indicating that the emission tax
is increasing stronger than the ocean sequestration tax.6 The economic interpretation is that the amount
of emissions directly increases the harmful carbon stock in the upper box, while the amount of ocean
sequestration only indirectly does via the natural transfer. Nevertheless, as the ocean sequestration tax is
positive, we see that ocean sequestration does cause social costs due to its temporary storage characteristics
and therefore does not completely offset emissions into the atmosphere.
3.2. Scenario 1: optimal extraction without the option of ocean sequestration
We start investigating the implications of the representation of the carbon cycle as a two-box model by
considering a scenario where only one control variable is available, q, the extraction and consumption of
fossil fuels with related emissions released to the atmosphere (Scenario 1). The anthropogenic intervention
into the global carbon cycle ends when no further carbon is added due to the fact that either the marginal
damage caused by carbon in the atmosphere has increased to such an extent that the choke price has been
hit by the emission tax (Situation A) or the fossil resource stock is completely exploited (Situation B). In
Situation A, the solution approaches a steady state as t → ∞ and the steady state values for the costate
variables, which fulfill the transversality conditions (16), are7
ψA1
∞
=
D′(S∞)
γ + ρ+ γω
+
γωD′(S∞)
ρ(γ + ρ+ γω)
, πA1
∞
=
γωD′(S∞)
ρ(γ + ρ+ γω)
, µA1
∞
= 0. (18)
Using the steady state values for the costate variables, we can derive from (9), in which the Kuhn-Tucker
multiplier, θ1, is zero, the level of the steady state atmospheric carbon stock:
SA1
∞
= D′−1
(
b
ρ(γ + ρ+ γω)
ρ+ γω
)
. (19)
5The costate variables µR and ψR also measure the shadow environmental scarcity rent of the oceanic carbon stock. A
lower R implies cet. par. a higher oceanic carbon stock and therefore µR > µ (sum of shadow resource scarcity rent and ocean
sequestration tax). A lower S implies cet. par. also a higher oceanic carbon stock but ψR < ψ because the negative effect of a
higher oceanic carbon stock is overcompensated by the positive effect of a lower atmospheric carbon stock (difference between
emission and ocean sequestration tax). This can also be seen from (9) and (10) by dropping pi in (10).
6The increase in the emission tax follows directly from the interpretation of −ψ being the shadow environmental scarcity
rent of the atmospheric carbon stock, measuring the change in the value function due to a change in the corresponding state
variable (see, e.g., Sydsæter et al., 2005). The increase in the tax difference follows from (17). The increase in the ocean
sequestration tax follows from pi(t) = γω
∫
∞
t
λe−ρ(τ−t)dτ .
7In the Redux system where the state variable W and the corresponding state variable pi have been dropped, µR has a
positive steady state value equal to the steady state value of piA1
∞
in the Full system.
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Equations (3) and (4) indicate that the two-box model is a non-renewable resource model, because no
carbon vanishes or decays. Therefore, the release of carbon will increase the stock in both boxes forever and
the two-box model approaches a new equilibrium with an atmospheric carbon stabilization level above the
preindustrial one. The comparable atmospheric stabilization levels obtained with a renewable description
of the global carbon cycle (R), like in Tahvonen (1997), obtained with a non-renewable description of the
global carbon cycle (NR), like in Hoel (1978), and obtained with a partially non-renewable description of
the global carbon cycle (PNR), like in Farzin and Tahvonen (1996), are8
SR
∞
= S0, S
NR
∞
= D′−1(bρ), SPNR
∞
= D′−1
(
b
ρ(α+ ρ)
a− αa+ ρ
)
. (20)
Intuitively, the renewable description implies that the atmospheric carbon stock returns to its preindustrial
level when the release of carbon emissions has ended due to physical (R∞ = 0) or economical (R∞ ≥ 0)
exhaustion of the fossil resource. The atmospheric stabilization levels of the non-renewable and partially
non-renewable description are only compared if Situation A also applies, that is, if it is not optimal to
completely exploit the fossil resource. The non-renewable description provides lower atmospheric carbon
stabilization levels than the two-box model, because all carbon emissions remain in the atmosphere. The
partially non-renewable description provides the same atmospheric stabilization levels as the two-box model
if a is chosen to be γ+ω
ρ+γ+ω and α is chosen to be γ in S
PNR
∞
, whereby the parameter a describes the fraction
of emissions that adds to the decaying carbon stock and the parameter α describes the fraction of the carbon
stock that decays within the decaying carbon stock. The renewable description implies a complete oceanic
carbon sink; the non-renewable description neglects the oceanic carbon sink. The reality is somewhere in
between: 15% (Ko¨rtzinger and Wallace, 2002) to 20% (IPCC, 2005) of all anthropogenic CO2 will remain
in the atmosphere within a new carbon cycle equilibrium. Consequently, the most appropriate description
seems to be the partially non-renewable one. The comparison with the partially non-renewable description
in Farzin and Tahvonen’s model shows that the two-box model has no advantage in itself in representing the
global carbon cycle. However, it becomes indispensable if further options to release carbon into the carbon
cycle are considered (see Section 3.3).
The new equilibrium of the two-box model implies that there is no net transfer between the boxes and
that S∞ = ωW∞ is fulfilled. Consequently, we can derive the critical initial level of the fossil resource for
the steady state in Situation A as being feasible:
RA1crit = (
ω + 1
ω
)D′−1
(
b
ρ(γ + ρ+ γω)
ρ+ γω
)
− S0 −W0. (21)
8In Farzin and Tahvonen’s model, they divide the atmospheric carbon stock artificially into two different stocks, one with
a constant rate of decay and the other without. Their objective function includes stock-dependent extraction costs as well,
which we have set to zero in order to compare the steady states.
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If R0 < R
A1
crit, extraction stops in finite time because U
′(0) = b < ∞ (Farzin and Tahvonen, 1996). The
corresponding atmospheric and oceanic carbon stabilization levels are then
SB1
∞
=
ω
1 + ω
(R0 + S0 +W0), W
B1
∞
=
1
1 + ω
(R0 +W0 + S0), (22)
which are lower than the carbon stabilization levels in Situation A. Note the stabilization levels in Situation
B are not approached at the point in time when extraction stops, but as t→∞. According to Meinshausen
et al. (2009), the emission of carbon from all proven fossil fuel resources would exceed the atmospheric
stabilization levels corresponding to a 2◦C temperature increase above preindustrial levels, which has been
accepted by most countries as maximum tolerable limit for global warming. We focus therefore in our
analysis on Situation A, where the limiting factor for optimal extraction is not the endowment of the fossil
resource, but rather harmful levels of atmospheric carbon concentration, and impose therefore
Assumption 1. R0 ≥ R
A1
crit.
We show in Appendix B that the steady state of the 4x4 Hamiltonian dynamic system is a saddle point with
four real eigenvalues, two being positive and two being negative. If Assumption 1 is fulfilled, the steady
state is feasible and the optimal solution is the unique saddle path converging to the steady state as t→∞.
Additionally, it can be seen from (13) and from the steady state levels of the costate variable in Situation A
(18) that µ(t) = 0 for tǫ[0,∞). The fulfillment of Assumption 1 implies that the fossil resource is not scarce
for the optimal solution in Situation A. The optimal path of extraction is therefore only determined by the
emission tax, ψ.
Proposition 1. In Scenario 1 (related emissions can only be released to the atmosphere), if functional forms
(9)-(11) are restricted to be quadratic-linear, Assumption 1 holds, and U ′(0) = b < ∞, the global optimal
path for the emission tax, ψ, is either monotonically increasing or U-shaped.
Proof. Because of the saddle path property with four real eigenvalues, two being positive and two being
negative (see Appendix B), the optimal path of the emission tax towards the steady state for quadratic-linear
functional forms is determined by the two negative real eigenvalues in exponential terms and can therefore
only entail one extremum. As a result, the set of possible paths is limited to a monotonically increasing, a
monotonically decreasing, a U-shaped, and an inversely U-shaped path. The fulfillment of (9) in the steady
state with q∞ = 0 requires ψ∞ = U
′(0) = b ≤ ∞. Therefore, the control constraint q(t) ≥ 0 for tǫ[0,∞)
allows only tax paths that increase into the steady state.
Proposition 2. In Scenario 1 (related emissions can only be released to the atmosphere), if functional
forms (9)-(11) are restricted to be quadratic-linear, Assumption 1 holds, and U ′(0) = b < ∞, the global
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optimal path for the ocean sequestration tax, π, and the tax difference, λ, is either monotonically increasing
or U-shaped.
Proof. Again, the set of possible paths for the ocean sequestration tax and the tax difference is limited to
a monotonically increasing, a monotonically decreasing, a U-shaped, and an inversely U-shaped path due
to the saddle path property with real eigenvalues and the restriction to quadratic-linear functional forms.
From (12), π˙ = (ρ+γω)π−γωψ it can be seen that it is not possible for π to approach its steady state value
from above. Such a path would imply that π is decreasing, while the second term with ψ is increasing due
to Proposition 1. As a consequence, π would continue to decrease. As both, ψ and π have to be increasing
into the steady state so does λ as it can be again seen from (12), π˙ = ρπ−γωλ. Paths for π and λ which are
decreasing do not allow to approach a steady state which in turn would violate the transversality condition
(16).
Note, restricting functional forms to be quadratic-linear allows global statement for the tax paths in Proposi-
tion 1 and 2. Without the functional restriction, the propositions would only be locally in the neighborhood
of the steady state valid. The two excluded paths from the set of possible paths, the monotonically decreas-
ing and the inversely U-shaped path, require an additional term that increases during the movement to the
steady state so that (9) allows a declining amount of extraction even if the emission tax is decreasing. This
requirement can be fulfilled by modeling extraction costs as not stock-independent, as in our model, but as
stock-dependent, as in Farzin and Tahvonen (1996), qC(R) with C′ < 0.9 The inclusion of stock-dependent
extraction costs allows both physical exhaustibility (R∞ = 0) and economical exhaustibility (U
′(0) = C(R∞)
with R∞ ≥ 0) to be considered. However, our formulation with stock-independent extraction costs allows
the implications of the description of the global carbon cycle to be clarified.
The renewable description of the global carbon cycle allows two tax paths, a monotonically decreasing and
an inversely U-shaped path (e.g., Tahvonen, 1997). The non-renewable description of the global carbon cycle
allows only one tax path, a monotonically increasing path (e.g., Farzin, 1996). The partially non-renewable
description allows, compared to the non-renewable description, one additional possible path, a U-shaped
path. Note Farzin and Tahvonen (1996) observe as well the two paths from the renewable description within
their partially non-renewable description, but not as consequence of the partially non-renewable description
but due to the inclusion of stock-dependent extraction costs. The result is confirmed by the fact that the
description with the two-box model allows the two additional paths from the renewable description to be
observed as well if extraction costs are modeled to be stock-dependent (Lontzek and Rickels, 2008).
Additionally, Farzin and Tahvonen (1996) show that for the partially non-renewable description and for
a specific initial level of the atmospheric carbon stock, the possibility of a stationary emission tax with
9An alternative formulation is C(X) with C′ > 0, where X measures the cumulative amount of extracted fossil fuels (Farzin,
1992).
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a stationary atmospheric carbon level to exist, given that there is no steady state, U ′(0) → ∞. The
stationary atmospheric carbon level requires that the decaying atmospheric carbon stock in the sum of the
total atmospheric carbon stock declines at the rate at which the non-decaying atmospheric carbon stock
increases. The decreasing decaying atmospheric carbon stock implies lower decay, so that extraction is
decreasing at a constant rate. Such a stationary atmospheric carbon stock where the amount of emission
is constantly decreasing is also possible with the two-box model. It requires that the amount of carbon
emissions decreases at the same rate as the net transfer between the two boxes decreases due to the carbon
accumulation in the deep ocean. The amount of emission would decline according to
q(t) = γω
(
S¯
ω
−W0
)
e−γωt (23)
and the oceanic carbon stock would increase according to
W (t) =
S¯
ω
+
(
W0 −
S¯
ω
)
e−γωt, (24)
where S¯ denotes the stationary atmospheric carbon level. Additionally, by changing our model formulation
so that U ′(0) → ∞ is valid and stock-dependent extraction costs are included, we could confirm that
a constant emission tax occurs even with fossil fuel endowment as a specific feature of the description
of the carbon cycle by a two-box model as it could be confirmed by Farzin and Tahvonen (1996) as a
specific feature of the description of the carbon cycle by a partially non-renewable atmospheric carbon
stock. However, the constant path requires, first, particular functional forms for U(q) and C(R) so that
a constant percentage of the resource stock is extracted, which implies that extraction declines at this
constant percentage rate (p.523), and, second, that the constant percentage coincides with the parameters
of the carbon cycle description.10 Consequently, the partially non-renewable description of the atmospheric
carbon stock or the two-box model description of the carbon cycle is the precondition for such a path to
occur, but the occurrence of such path is the consequence of a specific extraction path rather than the
consequence of the carbon cycle description. In our analysis, we focus on the situation where the global
carbon cycle approaches a steady state with non-constant taxes (Situation A).
3.3. Scenario 2: optimal extraction with the option of ocean sequestration
We return to the scenario where both control variables, q and a, are available, the extraction and consumption
of fossil fuels with related emissions released to the atmosphere and the extraction and consumption of fossil
fuels with related emissions injected into the deep ocean (Scenario 2). As in the previous section, the
10In Farzin and Tahvonen (1996) the constant percentage is given by αa, the decay parameter and the fraction being added
to the non-decaying stock, whereas in our model the constant percentage is given by the turnover speed between the boxes, γ,
and the proportionality parameter, ω.
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anthropogenic intervention into the global carbon cycle ends when no further carbon is added due to the
fact that either the marginal damage caused by carbon in the atmosphere has increased to such an extent
that the choke price has been hit or even exceeded by the emission tax (Situation A) or the fossil resource
stock is completely exploited (Situation B). Again, in Situation A the solution approaches a steady state as
t → ∞ and the steady state values for the costate variables are given by (18) from Section 3.2. However,
unlike in the previous section, not just (9) has to be fulfilled, but also (10) as well, which can be simplified
to
A′ + θ1 − θ2 = ψ − π. (25)
Condition (25) shows that the amount of ocean sequestration is determined by the difference between the
two taxes, because by injecting carbon emissions into the ocean, one saves the emission tax, but instead has
to pay the ocean sequestration tax. We already pointed out in the previous section that Situation A requires
an increasing emission tax for (9), U ′(0) = ψ∞, to be fulfilled in the steady state. However, the amount
of ocean sequestration is increasing in ψ due to the convexity of the ocean sequestration cost function, and
therefore we cannot further assume that the solution is unconstrained. Using the steady state levels of the
taxes (18), we can derive two conditions (a and b) for the steady state atmospheric carbon stock to fulfill
(9) and (10):
SA2a
∞
= D′−1
(
(b+ θ1)
ρ(γ + ρ+ γω)
ρ+ γω
)
, SA2b
∞
= D′−1
(
(b−A′(0) + θ2)
ρ(γ + ρ+ γω)
γω
)
. (26)
By equating SA2a
∞
and SA2b
∞
, we obtain
A′(0) = b
ρ
ρ+ γω
−
γω
ρ+ γω
θ1 + θ2, (27)
by which we distinguish three cases for the steady state:11
Case 1: A′(0) > b ρ
ρ+γω ⇒ θ1 = 0 θ2 > 0, (28)
Case 2: A′(0) = b ρ
ρ+γω ⇒ θ1 = 0 θ2 = 0, (29)
Case 3: A′(0) < b ρ
ρ+γω ⇒ θ1 > 0 θ2 = 0. (30)
The value of A′(0) is somehow the counterpart of the choke price b. Whereas b denotes the maximum value
for marginal utility, A′(0) is the minimum level of the marginal sequestration costs. Therefore, A′(0) can
11We only consider carbon cycle equilibriums that are approached via anthropogenic intervention into the global carbon cycle
and do not consider a potential Case 4 with both Kuhn-Tucker multipliers being positive, because in such a case the carbon
cycle equilibrium is determined only by the initial levels, S0 and W0.
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be interpreted as the start-up cost for ocean sequestration. Due to the importance of A′(0) within Case 1
to 3, we define
Acrit = b
ρ
ρ+ γω
. (31)
Proposition 3. In Scenario 2 (related emissions can be released to the atmosphere and injected into the
deep ocean), if A′(0) < Acrit holds, the atmospheric stabilization level increases compared to Scenario 1 .
Proof. If A′(0) ≥ Acrit, θ1 is zero, (28) and (29), and we obtain
SA2a
∞
= SA2b
∞
= SA1
∞
= D′−1
(
b
ρ(γ + ρ+ γω)
ρ+ γω
)
with θ2 = A
′(0)−Acrit. (32)
If A′(0) < Acrit, θ1 =
bρ−A′(0)(ρ+γω)
γω
> 0, θ2 is zero, and the function arguments in S
A2a
∞
and SA2b
∞
increase
uniformly and consequently the atmospheric stabilization level increases, so that SA2a
∞
= SA2b
∞
> SA1
∞
.
If the atmospheric carbon stabilization level increases compared to Scenario 1, so does the oceanic carbon
stabilization level in order to satisfy the carbon cycle equilibrium condition S∞ = ωW∞. Consequently, we
can again derive the critical initial level of the fossil resource for the steady state in Situation A as being
feasible:
RA2crit(A
′(0)) = (
ω + 1
ω
)D′−1
(
(b−A′(0)
ρ(γ + ρ+ γω)
γω
)
− S0 −W0, (33)
whereas R2crit(A
′(0)) > R1crit requires A
′(0) < Acrit to be fulfilled. If R0 < R
A2
crit(A
′(0)), extraction stops
again in finite time, as in Section 3.2, because U ′(0) = b <∞ (Situation B). The corresponding atmospheric
and oceanic carbon stabilization levels are only determined by the initial level of the fossil resource, R0
(see (22)). It is possible to observe RA2crit(A
′(0)) > R0 > R
A1
crit if A
′(0) < Acrit, so that the opportunity to
inject carbon emissions related to fossil fuel consumption directly into the ocean would lead to the complete
exploitation of the fossil resource (Situation B), whereas without this opportunity the fossil resource would
not be completely exploited (Situation A). In Scenario 2, we also concentrate on Situation A and therefore
extend Assumption 1,
Assumption 2. R0 ≥ R
A2
crit(A
′(0).
Again, if Assumption 2 is fulfilled, it can be seen from (13) and from the steady state level of the costate
variable in Situation A (18) that µ(t) = 0 for tǫ[0,∞). The fulfillment of Assumption 2 implies that the fossil
resource is not scarce for the optimal solution in Situation A. The optimal path of extraction is therefore
determined only by the emission tax, ψ, and the ocean sequestration tax, π. The steady states in Case
1, (28), and Case 3, (30), have positive Kuhn-Tucker multipliers. Taking into account the continuity of
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the control variables, a point in time has to emerge, ts, with ts < ∞, after which the dynamic system is
either described by q(t) ≥ 0 and a(t) = 0 for tǫ[ts,∞) (Case 1) or by q(t) = 0 and a(t) ≥ 0 for tǫ[ts,∞)
(Case 3) on the path towards the steady state. Note after ts the dynamic system leading toward the steady
state coincides with a dynamic system which allows only extraction with related emissions released into the
atmosphere (Case 1) or with a dynamic system which allows only extraction with related emissions injected
into the deep ocean (Case 3). To formalize this idea, we define three control regimes:12
Regime 1: No sequestration: a = 0 and q ≥ 0 (θ1 = 0 and θ2 > 0),
Regime 2: Sequestration: a ≥ 0 and q ≥ 0 (θ1 = 0 and θ2 = 0),
Regime 3: Only sequestration: a ≥ 0 and q = 0 (θ1 > 0 and θ2 = 0).
Proposition 4. In Scenario 2 (related emissions can be released to the atmosphere and injected into the
deep ocean), if Assumption 2 holds, and U ′(0) = b < ∞, the movement into the steady state is not an
interior solution, but is, after some point in time, ts, described either by Regime 1 (A
′(0) ≥ Acrit; R0 >
RA2crit(A
′(0)) = RA1crit), or by Regime 3 (A
′(0) < Acrit; R0 > R
A2
crit(A
′(0)) > RA1crit).
Proof. Movement into the steady cannot be determined by Regime 2 because q(t)→ 0 requires an increasing
emission tax, whereas a(t)→ 0 requires a decreasing emission tax so that the tax difference is also decreasing.
Consequently, movement into the steady state implies at least one control constraint to be active (either θ1
or θ2).
We already referred in Section 3.2 to Appendix B, where we show that Regime 1 (which is equal to Scenario
1), obeys saddle path properties with real eigenvalues. In Appendix B we also show that Regime 3 obeys
saddle path properties. For the eigenvalues to be real in Regime 3, the condition
1
4
(γ(1 + ω)(ρ+ γ + γω)−D′′(a′µR) + a
′
piR
)2 > −γω(γ + ρ+ γω)D′′a′µR (34)
has to be fulfilled in the steady state, where the subscript R indicates the costate variables of the Redux
system.
Proposition 5. In Scenario 2 (related emissions can be released to the atmosphere and injected into the
deep ocean), if functional forms (9)-(11) are restricted to be quadratic-linear, Assumption 2 holds, and
U ′(0) = b < ∞, the global optimal path for the emission and ocean sequestration tax after ts (final regime)
is either monotonically increasing or U-shaped (A′(0) ≥ Acrit) or monotonically increasing (A
′(0) < Acrit)
.
12We only consider control regimes with anthropogenic intervention into the global carbon cycle and do not consider a
potential Regime 4 with q = a = 0 (θ1 > 0 and θ2 > 0).
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Proof. After point ts, the optimal path is either determined by Regime 1 or Regime 3. We showed already
in Propositions 1 and 2 that the optimal path is either monotonically increasing or U-shaped for Regime 1.
For Regime 3, we see from (10), U ′(a) − A′(a) = π, that only ocean sequestration tax paths that increase
into the steady state fulfill the condition due to the concavity of the utility function and the convexity of
the ocean sequestration cost function. We can therefore exclude paths that decrease into the steady state
such as an inversely U-shaped path. Additionally, at ts, U
′(a(ts)) = ψ(ts), U
′(a(ts)) − A
′(a(ts))) = π(ts),
and q(ts) = 0 have to be fulfilled. We know from (12) that a U-shaped ocean sequestration tax requires a U-
shaped emission tax for the transversality conditions to be fulfilled, (16). The decreasing emission tax ψ(t) on
the U-shaped path contradicts q(t) = 0 for tǫ[ts, t
∗], where t∗ is defined by ψ˙(t∗) = 0 and ψ¨(t∗) > 0, because
a(t) would be decreasing for tǫ[ts, t
∗] due to the decreasing tax difference (see Proposition 2) and therefore
the LHS in U ′(a(t)) = ψ(t) would be increasing whereas the RHS would be deceasing. Consequently, if
A′(0) < Acrit only monotonically increasing tax paths are possible for tǫ[ts,∞].
Proposition 5 is only valid for tǫ[ts,∞). Before the point ts is reached, various successions of regimes are
possible, so that the possible set of optimal emission and ocean sequestration tax paths becomes more
complex. Additionally, the dynamics in the regimes before the final regime are no longer determined by
just the negative eigenvectors, but by the full set of eigenvectors. The reason for this is that the negative
eigenvectors describe the optimal path towards the steady state corresponding to the regime (saddle path).
However, in regimes prior to the final regime, the corresponding steady state is not feasible, and as a result
the path towards such a non-feasible steady state cannot describe the optimal path towards the regime
switching point.
3.4. Utilizing ocean sequestration within a global carbon management strategy
Consider the situation where the initial values for atmospheric and oceanic carbon stocks, S0 and W0, are
low, the initial value for the fossil resource, R0, fulfills Assumption 1, and the start-up costs for ocean
sequestration are at least equal to the critical level, A′(0) ≥ Acrit. In this situation, the optimal solution
is completely described by Regime 1 for tǫ[0,∞). The tax difference between the emission and ocean
sequestration tax is never sufficient to bear the additional costs of ocean sequestration. The tax difference,
which determines the amount of ocean sequestration, A′(a) = ψ− π, does not reach the critical level, Acrit,
before the steady state, so that with A′(0) ≥ Acrit ocean sequestration is not beneficial. Obviously, if the
initial levels for the carbon stocks are low, there is no difference between ocean sequestration that is too
costly (A′(0) ≥ Acrit in Scenario 2) and ocean sequestration that is not available or prohibited (Scenario 1).
We refer to this situation as Policy 1.
Consider the situation where the initial values for atmospheric and oceanic carbon stocks, S0 and W0,
are low, the initial value for the fossil resource stock, R0, fulfills Assumption 2, and the start-up costs for
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Figure 2: Dynamics for low initial atmospheric carbon stocks with constant extraction costs
ocean sequestration are below the critical level, A′(0) < Acrit. In this situation, the optimal solution might
be described by a succession of various regimes, but each succession involves Regime 3 for tǫ[ts,∞). Even
though a succession of various regimes is possible before ts, the non-renewable description of the carbon
cycle by the two-box model and the low initial levels imply tax paths that are increasing in direction towards
ts. Consequently, the tax difference will be at some point in time, t < ts, above the start-up costs for ocean
sequestration. Then it becomes beneficial to pay the ocean sequestration costs for some fraction of the
emissions but to save the emission tax (Regime 1 to Regime 2). With the tax difference increasing into the
steady state, the overall amount of fossil fuel consumption decreases, but the fraction of ocean sequestration
for the related emissions increases. Consequently, at ts the complete amount of emissions related to fossil
fuel consumption is injected into the deep ocean (Regime 2 to Regime 3). We see that from ts onwards,
ocean sequestration is declining until b − π∞ = A
′(0) is fulfilled and that the emission tax increases above
the choke price, b = ψss − θ1 with θ1 > 0. The increasing tax paths prevent backward regime switches, e.g.,
from Regime 2 to Regime 1. Consequently, if ocean sequestration is not too costly, more than one regime
can occur in the optimal solution. We refer to this situation as Policy 2.
In Figure 2 we show the dynamics of the atmospheric and oceanic carbon stock, the emission and ocean
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sequestration tax and the controls for Policy 1 and Policy 2 for low initial levels by using simple quadratic-
linear functional forms.13 Policy 2 shows the succession from Regime 2 to Regime 3. We see in the upper left
graph that the atmospheric carbon stock increases slower in the beginning with Policy 2 than with Policy 1.
With Policy 2 carbon emissions are not only released into the atmosphere but are also injected into the deep
ocean, consequently, the oceanic carbon stock increases faster with Policy 2 than with Policy 1, where it only
increases due to the natural carbon transfer (upper right graph). Due to a slower increase in atmospheric
carbon concentration, fossil fuel consumption declines slower with Policy 2 than with Policy 1 (lower right
graph). The fraction of ocean sequestration for the related carbon emissions increases until it reaches 100
percent and only fossil fuels which allow related carbon emissions to be captures and injected into the deep
ocean are consumed. This occurs, before upper and lower box have equilibrated, which can seen by a slight
temporary decrease in the atmospheric carbon stock. However, in the long run, the atmospheric carbon
concentration increases more with Policy 2 due to the extended use of the fossil resource and by a positive
net transfer from the ocean to the atmosphere. Both taxes are increasing with Policy 2 in the long run
above the levels which are obtained with Policy 1.
Even though we observe in Figure 2 with Policy 2 a switch from Regime 2 to Regime 3, the dynamics are
not characterized by a significant increase in volatility. One reason for this is that the long-run dynamics are
mainly influenced by the natural transfer parameters, γ and ω, which are rather low in order to represent the
inertia of the carbon cycle. Consequently, the eigenvalues have a different magnitude and the Hamiltonian
dynamic system is rather stiff. To demonstrate this effect, in Figure 3 we again show Policy 1 and Policy 2
with a switch from Regime 2 to Regime 3, but this time with stock-dependent extraction costs included.14
However, instead of the emission tax and the ocean sequestration tax we show in Figure 3 the difference
between the two taxes. Due to the presence of stock-dependent extraction costs, the use of fossil fuels cannot
be extended through ocean sequestration as it can in the case without stock-dependent extraction costs.
Consequently, the atmospheric and oceanic stabilization levels are not affected by the magnitude as in Figure
2. Total fossil fuel consumption in Scenario 2 is rather similar to fossil fuel consumption in Scenario 1 and
at some point in time even slightly lower (lower right graph). Note that even with rather similar paths for
total fossil fuel consumption, the atmospheric peak concentration is significantly lower due to the presence
of ocean sequestration (upper left graph). Additionally, we see that both the atmospheric carbon stock and
tax difference show a inverted S-shape with Policy 2 and confirm that the inclusion of ocean sequestration
extends the set of possible tax paths so far discussed in the literature. The influence of ocean sequestration
13The utility function is U(q) = bq − u2q2, the ocean sequestration cost function is A(a) = a1a + a2a2, and the damage
function is D(S) = v1(sS −Apreind)
2. As a result of the linear-quadratic functional forms, the start-up costs, A′(0), simplify
to the parameter value a1. The parameter values are b = 5/10, γ = 1/10, ω = 1/10, ρ = 3/100, a1 = 1/4 a2 = 1/10, u2 = 1/20,
v1 = 0.1, s = 3/10, and Apreind = 6/10, S0 = 2, W0 = 20. These parameter values yield acrit = 3/8 and R
A2
crit(a1) = 64.1667.
14The stock-dependent extraction cost function is c1 − c2 ∗ R(t), with the parameter values c1=5/10, c2 = 1/200, and
R0 = 100. Note the parameter value for a1 has to be smaller than 1/8 in order to still observe a final Regime 3, because, with
the stock-dependent extraction costs, the critical level for the start-up costs changes to Acrit = (b− C(R∞))
ρ
ρ+γω
.
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Figure 3: Dynamics for low initial atmospheric carbon stocks with stock-dependent extraction costs
on atmospheric peak concentration and also the possibility of an interior solution due to inversely U-shaped
tax paths are investigated in Lontzek and Rickels (2008).
The situation where the initial values for the atmospheric carbon, S0, stock is high, whereas the initial
level of the oceanic carbon stock, W0, is low and the initial value for the fossil resource stock, R0, fulfills
Assumption 2 remains to be briefly considered. In this situation, the optimal solution might be described
by a succession of various regimes, even with A′(0) ⋚ Acrit. In contrast to the non-renewable atmospheric
carbon stock models (e.g. Hoel, 1978; Farzin, 1996), the non-renewable two-box model allows periods of
time where the atmospheric carbon stock is decreasing. A decreasing atmospheric carbon stock implies
that the natural downward transfer into the deep ocean exceeds the amount of emissions released into the
atmosphere. If the harmful carbon stock in the atmosphere is initially high, the emission tax starts at a high
initial level so that only small amounts of emissions are released into the atmosphere and the atmospheric
carbon stock can equilibrate with the oceanic carbon stock due to the natural transfer while the emission tax
is declining. However, whereas high emission tax levels imply low extraction with related emissions released
to the atmosphere, they favor the utilization of ocean sequestration for the related emissions. Consequently,
given that the tax difference starts decreasing at a initial level that is higher than its steady state level,
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λ(t) > λ∞ for tǫ[0, ta), ocean sequestration is utilized if λ(t) ≥ A
′(0) ≥ Acrit = λ∞ for tǫ[0, ta) with ta
defined by λ(ta) = λ∞.
If the start-up costs are above the critical level, ocean sequestration can only be utilized until ta, thereafter
the dynamics are again complete described by Regime 1. Consequently, if the initial levels for the atmospheric
carbon stock are high, there is a difference between ocean sequestration that is too costly (A′(0) > Acrit
in Scenario 2) and ocean sequestration that is not available or prohibited (Scenario 1). Even though ocean
sequestration is not an option for the long-run management of the global carbon cycle because it is too
costly, it might be beneficial to utilize ocean sequestration for some period of time for the consumption of
fossil fuels if the atmospheric carbon stock is rather high, but the oceanic carbon stock is still rather low.
If the start-up costs are below the critical level, ocean sequestration will be utilized beyond ta, but not
necessarily as the only control option. If the emission tax decreases sufficiently along the U-shaped path, it
might be beneficial to switch back to Regime 2 and release some of the emissions again to the atmosphere,
or even switch further back to Regime 1 and release all of the emissions again into the atmosphere. However,
as the atmospheric carbon stock will start increasing again at some point in time so will the emission tax
and therefore the dynamic system will return to Regime 3 at ts if A
′(0) < Acrit.
Irrespective of the tax paths that are realized, the effectiveness of ocean sequestration in this two-box
model depends crucially on generating utility by using fossil fuels while delaying the damage resulting from
increased levels of carbon in the atmosphere. As result, the effectiveness of sequestration depends on the
time preferences and the adjustment times of the two boxes. The critical level, Acrit, is determined by the
discount rate and the adjustment parameters of the two-box model. When the discount rate decreases, the
critical level also decreases. As a result, the effectiveness of sequestration decreases because, with a lower
discount rate, delaying damage pays off less. When γ and ω decrease, the critical level increases. As a result,
the effectiveness of sequestration increases because, with lower adjustment factors, the adjustment time of
the two boxes decreases. A smaller value of γ implies a slower mixing of the two boxes. A smaller value of ω
implies a greater lower box, which in turn implies that the lower box can contain greater amounts of carbon.
In the context of our two-box model, variations in the amount of carbon active in the lower box can be used
to approximate various injection depths for ocean sequestration. A deeper injection depth goes along with
a greater lower box and a slower adjustment process. Therefore, the effectiveness of ocean sequestration
depends on the injection depth.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated optimal intervention into the global carbon cycle. To capture the complete
accumulation of carbon in the global carbon cycle, we included, besides the atmospheric carbon stock,
the oceanic carbon stock in a two-box model representation. Using a two-box model to describe the global
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carbon cycle does not in itself provide optimal atmospheric stabilization levels that are different from models
with a partially non-renewable description of the atmospheric carbon stock. However, factoring in ocean
sequestration may do so. Thus it is important to account for the amount of carbon that ‘decays’ by including
the oceanic sink in the lower box. By doing so, we could show that ocean sequestration does not serve as a
complete offset for a carbon emission tax, but has a price itself, an ocean sequestration tax. Furthermore,
we clarified the implications of the non-renewable description of the carbon cycle and therefore also for the
partial non-renewable description of the atmospheric carbon stock for the optimal tax paths.
By deriving the critical level for the start-up costs of ocean sequestration we could determine the role of
ocean sequestration in a global carbon management strategy. For ocean sequestration start-up costs above
this level, ocean sequestration is merely a temporary option given initial atmospheric carbon concentration
is high; below this level, ocean sequestration is the long-term option permitting extended use of fossil fuels.
The latter alternative accompanies higher atmospheric and oceanic stabilization levels.
Given a climate policy that formulates an atmospheric carbon stabilization goal, ocean sequestration
cannot increase the total amount of fossil fuels that can be consumed. Carbon injected into the deep ocean
in excess of the atmosphere-ocean equilibrium amount corresponding to the atmospheric stabilization goal
is expected to leak back to the atmosphere, because the ocean becomes supersaturated in relation to the
atmosphere. However, the option of ocean sequestration does extend the period of time in that fossil fuels
can be extracted in reasonable amounts, whereas without ocean sequestration the amounts of extraction
would have to decline much earlier due to the inertia of the carbon cycle. Consequently, ocean sequestration
constitutes a serious option with which to buy time to deal with the atmospheric carbon accumulation
problem. The effectiveness of this option depends on the injection depth of the sequestered carbon and the
time preference of society.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Necessary and sufficient optimality conditions
For the two constraints, g1(q, a) = −q ≤ 0 and g2(g, a) = −a ≤ 0, the constraint qualification is fulfilled, if
the matrix

 ∂g1∂q ∂g1∂a g1 0
∂g1
∂q
∂g1
∂a
0 g2

 (A.1)
has the full row rank (Feichtinger and Hartl, 1986, p.161), which can be seen to be fulfilled from

 −1 0 −q 0
0 −1 0 −a

 (A.2)
The concavity of the maximized Hamiltonian follows from the negative semi-definiteness of the Hessian
matrix of the Hamiltonian (Feichtinger and Hartl, 1986, Remark 2.4). For the calculation of the Hessian
matrix we eliminate the state variable W (t) so that the carbon cycle equations (3) to (5) simplify to
S˙ = q − γ(S − ω(S0 +R0 +W0 − S −R)) (A.3)
R˙ = −q − a. (A.4)
Consequently, the Current Value Hamiltonian is Hc = U(q + a) − A(a) − D(S) + µRR˙ − ψRS˙, where the
subscript R indicates the costate variables of the Redux system, and we can calculate the Hessian matrix:


HSS HSR HSq HSa
HRS HRR HRq HRa
HqS HqR Hqq Hqa
HaS HaR Haq Haa


=


−D′′ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 U ′′ U ′′
0 0 U ′′ U ′′ − A′′


, (A.5)
which has the eigenvalues
σ1,2,34 =
(
−D′′, 12 (2U
′′
−A′′ −
√
4(U ′′)2 + (A′′)2), 12 (−U
′′
−A′′ +
√
4(U ′′)2 + (A′′)2), 0
)
. (A.6)
The Hessian matrix being negative semi-definite requires σ1,2,3,4 ≤ 0. Taking into account our function
properties, A′′ > 0, U ′′ < 0, and D′′ > 0, the negativeness of the third eigenvalue can be see from:
A′′ − 2U ′′ >
√
(A′′)2 + 4(U ′′)2, and − 4A′′U ′′ > 0, (A.7)
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whereas the first and second eigenvalue are obviously negative and the fourth eigenvalue is zero.
The regularity of the Hamiltonian follows from the strict concavity of the Hamiltonian in the control
variables. The strict concavity can be seen from the lower right bloc matrix in the Hesse matrix (A.5),
because the first leading principal minor is negative (U ′′ < 0) and the determinant of the lower right bloc
matrix is positive, −A′′U ′′ > 0.
Appendix B. Saddle path properties for Regime 1 and Regime 3
Following Dockner (1985, Theorem 3) the fulfillment of first K < 0 and second 0 < Det(MHDS) < (K/2)2
is necessary and sufficient for the eigenvalues to be real, two being negative and two being positive. MHDS
abbreviates modified Hamiltonian dynamic system and K is defined as
K = Det

 ∂x˙∂x ∂x˙∂λx
∂λ˙x
∂x
∂λ˙x
∂λx

+Det

 ∂y˙∂y ∂y˙∂λy
∂λ˙y
∂y
∂λ˙y
∂λy

+ 2Det

 ∂x˙∂y ∂x˙∂λy
∂λ˙x
∂y
∂λ˙x
∂λy

 , (B.8)
where x, y, λx, and λy denote state variables and the corresponding costate variables, respectively.
Regime 1
TheMHDS for Scenario 1 as well as for Regime 1 is, again based on the system with full rank and eliminated
state variable W (t), where the subscript R indicates the costate variables of the Redux system:
R˙ =
S˙ =
µ˙R =
ψ˙R =
−q(µR, ψR),
+q(µR, ψR)− γ(S − ω(S0 +R0 +W0 − S −R),
ρµR − γωψR,
(ρ+ γ + γω)ψR −D
′,
(B.9)
and the corresponding Jacobian is
JR1 =


0 0 −q′µR −q
′
ψR
−γω −γ − γω q′µR q
′
ψR
0 0 ρ −γω
0 −D′′ 0 ρ+ γ + γω


. (B.10)
We see that the determinate of det(JR1) = −γ
2ω2D′′q′µR − γρωD
′′qψR and KR1 = −γ(1+ω)(ρ+ γ + γω)+
D′′q′ψR fulfill the conditions KR1 < 0 and det(JR1) > 0, because q
′
ψR
< 0 and q′µR < 0. Additionally,
det(JR1) < (K/2)
2 is fulfilled, because
(K/2)2 − det(JR1) = γωD
′′(γωq′µR + ρq
′
ψR
+
1
4
(γ(1 + ω)(ρ+ γ + γω))−D′′q′ψR)
2 > 0. (B.11)
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Regime 3
The MHDS for Regime 3 is, again based on the system with full rank and eliminated state variable S(t),
where the subscript R indicates the costate variables of the Redux system:
R˙ =
W˙ =
µ˙R =
π˙R =
−a(µR, πR),
a(ψR, πR) + γ(S0 +R0 +W0 −R−W )− γωW,
ρµR − γπR −D
′,
(ρ+ γω)πR −D
′,
(B.12)
and the corresponding Jacobian is
JR3 =


0 0 −a′µR −a
′
piR
−γ −γω a′µR a
′
piR
D′′ D′′ 0 −γ
D′′ D′′ 0 ρ+ γω


. (B.13)
We see that the determinate of det(JR3) = −γω(ρ+ γ + γω)D
′′a′µR and KR3 = −γ(1 + ω)(ρ + γ + γω) +
D′′(a′µR +a
′
piR
) fulfill the conditions det(JR3) > 0 and KR3 < 0, because a
′
µR
< 0 and a′piR < 0. Additionally,
det(JR1) < (K/2)
2 is fulfilled, if
1
4
(γ(1 + ω)(ρ+ γ + γω)−D′′(a′µR) + a
′
piR
)2 > −γω(γ + ρ+ γω)D′′a′µR (B.14)
is fulfilled in the steady state. If (B.14) is not fulfilled, the saddle path property is not affected, but the
eigenvalues are complex (Tahvonen, 1989).
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The role of sequestration costs with a ceiling on atmospheric carbon
concentrationI
Abstract
I investigate the optimal role of carbon sequestration for mitigation in the presence of a ceiling on atmo-
spheric carbon concentration and consider aspects that have so far only been analyzed in the context of a
damage function to measure the consequences of climate change for society. I assume extraction costs to be
stock-dependent, replace the proportional decay description of the global carbon cycle by a two-box model,
investigate the differences resulting from linear versus convex sequestration costs, and consider oceanic in-
stead of geological carbon storage. Using a two-box model allows the non-renewable aspects of the global
carbon cycle to be accounted for and implies that carbon emissions have to decline at the ceiling due to
the ongoing saturation of the ocean with anthropogenic carbon. Convex sequestration costs result in a
continuous use of such a technology and allow the ceiling to be reached later than without sequestration,
whereas linear sequestration costs result in a discontinuous use of such a technology and earlier reaching of
the ceiling. Consequently, taking into the account the uncertainties in defining an appropriate ceiling, the
policy recommendations with respect to carbon sequestration differ crucially according to the underlying
assumptions of sequestration costs.
Keywords: atmospheric ceiling, global carbon cycle, ocean sequestration
JEL: Q30, Q54
IThe DFG provided financial support through the Excellence Initiative Future Ocean. I would like to thank Lena-Katharina
Do¨pke, Paul Kramer and Martin Quaas for helpful comments and suggestions. The usual caveats apply.
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1. Introduction
Unhindered climate change implies the risk of catastrophic damage to society. Quantifying of this risk is
complicated or even impossible due to our still limited understanding of the earth’s climate system and in
particular to the presence of tipping points in the climate system. Exceeding thresholds corresponding to
such tipping points might involve sharp and non-linear changes in climate dynamics, determined intrinsically
by the climate system and the feedback mechanisms involved. The location of such thresholds with respect
to atmospheric carbon concentration or temperature increase and the degree of irreversibility of crossing such
thresholds are still very uncertain (e.g., Lenton et al., 2008; Hoffmann and Rahmsdorf, 2009; Zickfeld et al.,
2010). With respect to these uncertainties, countries agreed to limit temperature increase to 2◦C as it has
again been confirmed at the recent global warming summit in Cancun (UNFCCC, 2010). This temperature
increase limit can be converted to a ceiling on atmospheric carbon concentration or a cumulative budget for
carbon emissions into the atmosphere (Meinshausen et al., 2009).
Actual greenhouse gas emission (GHG) trends and corresponding reduction announcements challenge
the credibility of this target. Furthermore, postponement of the necessary emission reductions implies
increasing mitigation costs.1 However, this target or the corresponding corresponding ceilings can still be
met if substantial emission cuts are made. To achieve these emissions cuts, in addition to improving energy
efficiency and making increased use of renewable energies, increased carbon sequestration, i.e. carbon capture
and storage, within energy consumption is expected to be necessary (IEA, 2010).
The optimal global role of carbon sequestration for mitigation in the presence of a ceiling on atmospheric
carbon concentration has so far mainly been analyzed quantitatively by numerous integrated assessment
models that consider various atmospheric stabilization levels (e.g., Gerlagh and van der Zwaan, 2006; Azar
et al., 2006; van der Zwaan and Gerlagh, 2009; Lemoine et al., 2011). The theoretical literature related to
carbon sequestration addresses the problem of increasing atmospheric carbon concentration primarily by
a damage function that measures the related consequences of climate change for society. As pointed out
above, it is obviously difficult to determine or agree on such a damage function. Theoretical implications of
imposing a ceiling on atmospheric carbon concentration while carbon emissions can be sequestered have been
studied first of all by Chakravorty et al. (2006) and Lafforgue et al. (2008). Chakravorty et al. investigate
the implication of a ceiling while energy consumption is provided by fossil fuels and a clean backstop
technology. Additionally, in their model it is possible to reduce fossil-fuel-related carbon emissions to the
atmosphere by costly abatement. However, there is little potential to abate carbon emissions once fossil
fuels have been combusted, implying that abatement implies sequestration but without any scarcity related
to potential storage sites. This has been further investigated by Lafforgue et al.. They consider geological
1The rather moderate emission reductions in the Copenhagen Accord until 2020 are estimated to cost an additional 1 trillion
USD of investment costs in the period from 2010 to 2035 compared to a more efficient mitigation path (IEA, 2010).
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carbon sequestration into a single reservoir or multiple reservoirs where carbon storing capacity is limited.
Chakravorty et al. and Lafforgue et al. find that sequestration only takes place in a discontinuous manner
once the ceiling has been reached and the availability of sequestration determines endogenously the period
when the ceiling is binding.2 Both papers assume extraction and sequestration units costs to be constant,
describe the global carbon cycle by proportional decay of atmospheric carbon, and consider geological carbon
storage. In this paper, I take a closer look at these assumptions and clarify the implications of four relevant
aspects related to the issue: the implications of stock-dependent extraction cost, (2) the implications of
modeling the global carbon cycle with a two-box model instead of a proportional decay, (3) the implications
of modeling sequestration costs convexly rather than linearly, and (4) the implications of oceanic instead of
geologic carbon storage.
Extraction costs are expected to be determined not only by the extraction rate, but also by the stock
of fossil resource left in the ground. Decreasing resource availability in existing deposits and exploitation
of economically less favorable deposits might be reflected by increasing marginal costs for a given rate of
extraction (Farzin, 1992). The recoverable amount of the resource might therefore not be determined by
geological constraints but by economic costs and the opportunity costs of backstop technologies (e.g., Farzin,
1992; Epple and Londregan, 1993; Farzin, 1996).
Furthermore, the carbon fluxes in the global carbon cycle are only roughly approximated by the pro-
portional decay of carbon in the atmosphere that implies that the atmospheric carbon storing capacity is
a renewable resource. The dimension and length of the anthropogenic disturbances to atmospheric car-
bon concentration is, besides the carbon emission path, mainly influenced by oceanic carbon uptake (e.g.,
Najjar, 1992; Sabine et al., 2004). Oceanic carbon uptake is estimated to increase disproportionally with
increasing atmospheric carbon concentration as the buffer capacity declines (e.g., Sarmiento et al., 1995).3
Even though uptake is currently mainly limited by kinetic constraints implied by the slow mixing of surface
waters with the deep ocean (e.g., Sarmiento and Gruber, 2006), it is important to note that a renewable
description of the atmospheric carbon concentration overestimates the storing capacity of the global carbon
cycle on timescales reasonable to mankind. Consequently, a proportional decay description oversimplifies
the atmospheric carbon accumulation problem (Farzin and Tahvonen, 1996; Rickels and Lontzek, 2011).
The IPCC (2005) special report on carbon dioxide capture and storage provides cost ranges for carbon
sequestration. The ranges indicate that sequestration costs vary by differences in the design of carbon
capture systems and by differences in the operating and financing of the reference plant to which the capture
technology is applied. Additionally, their estimates show that the costs increase as the transportation
2Chakravorty et al. (2006) distinguishes in his analysis between decreasing, constant, and increasing demand for energy. For
the first two assumptions, abatement takes place at the beginning of the ceiling, for the latter assumption at the end of the
ceiling.
3Note the buffer capacity should not be confused with the buffer or Revelle factor, as the latter measures the ratio of
the change in atmospheric carbon concentration to the change in oceanic carbon concentration, ∂ ln pCO2
∂ lnDIC
, and is therefore
increasing with anthropogenic carbon perturbation (Sarmiento and Gruber, 2006).
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distance on land and on sea increases. By assuming that increasing the amount of carbon capture implies
that this technology has also to be applied to less efficient plants and plants that are located farther from
storage sites or the shore, the sequestration costs are expected to increase in a convex manner. This is
also usually assumed in quantitative analyses, like Gerlagh and van der Zwaan (2006), who assume carbon
sequestration to be described by an effort variable which is assumed to be a second-order polynomial function.
The captured carbon can be stored in geological formations like depleted oil fields or saline formations
(IPCC, 2005). However, it could also be injected into the deep ocean via pipelines or ships (Marchetti, 1977;
IPCC, 2005). As pointed out above, the ocean uptake is not linear, but it is expected that on timescales of
several hundred years it will take up about 80 percent of the anthropogenic carbon emitted to the atmosphere
(e.g., Archer et al., 1997; Ko¨rtzinger and Wallace, 2002; Sarmiento and Gruber, 2006). Consequently, when
this fraction of anthropogenic carbon enters the deep ocean, is just a matter of time. Even though currently
implicitly prohibited by the London protocol,4 deep ocean sequestration would be an option to accelerate
this process by overcoming kinetic constraints (Keeling, 2009). With respect to the overall carbon storage
capacity of the ocean, there are practically no physical limits to oceanic carbon sequestration. However,
carbon injected into the deep ocean in excess of the atmosphere-ocean equilibrium amount corresponding
to the atmospheric stabilization goal is expected to leak back into the atmosphere, because the ocean will
become supersaturated in relation to the atmosphere (IPCC, 2005).
Even though there are further papers that analyze the implications of a ceiling on atmospheric carbon,
none of these papers addresses the issue from the perspective used by Chakravorty et al. (2006) and Lafforgue
et al. (2008). The papers of Chakravorty et al. (2008) and Smulders and van der Werf (2008) focus on the
order of extraction of two fossil fuel resources when these differ with respect to their related carbon emissions.
Henriet (2010) focuses on the role of the backstop price and the optimal R&D effort to develop a backstop
technology. Dullieux et al. (2010) focus on the strategic interaction between consumers, who set the carbon
tax to comply with the ceiling, and fossil fuel producers, who respond by adjusting the fossil fuel prices.
However, none of these papers includes carbon sequestration. Hoel and Jensen (2010) focus on the strategic
implications involved in carbon sequestration by analyzing its implications in a two-stage decision problem.
Amigues et al. (2010) extend the model of Chakravorty et al. (2006) by including stock-dependent extraction
costs and the possibility of air capture. They analyze the optimal solution from a decentralized perspective
by assuming two different sectors that are distinguished by the availability of abatement options and costs
related to these options. They show that abatement can take place before the ceiling has been reached in the
sector with the lower abatement costs. However, their result originates from the decentralized perspective
4Paragraph 1.8 in Appendix 1 of the London Protocol allows dumping of “Carbon dioxide streams from carbon dioxide
capture processes for sequestration”. However, this is restricted by paragraph 4: “Carbon dioxide streams referred to in
paragraph 1.8 may only be considered for dumping, if: (1) disposal is into a sub-seabed geological formation; and (2) they
consist overwhelmingly of carbon dioxide. They may contain incidental associated substances derived from the source material
and the capture and sequestration processes used; and (3) no wastes or other matter are added for the purpose of disposing of
those wastes or other matter.”
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and not from the curvature of the related costs, as those are again assumed to be linear. All the papers
assume proportional atmospheric carbon decay, except Dullieux et al. (2010) and Hoel and Jensen (2010),
who assume no natural decay at all.5
The present paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I explain the optimization problem involved
in using fossil fuels and a clean backstop-technology, while extraction costs are stock-dependent. Further-
more, I explain the description of the global carbon cycle using a two-box model. In Section 3 I show the
results. Section 3.1 provides the general conditions for the optimal solution. Section 3.2 analyzes first the
simple extraction-backstop decision and shows then that the description of the global carbon cycle using a
two-box model implies declining carbon emissions at the ceiling. Consequently, it is possible to observe the
simultaneous use of fossil fuels and the clean backstop technology from some point at the ceiling onwards
even if carbon sequestration is not available. Section 3.3 shows first the difference between convex and
linear sequestration costs by using the proportional decay description for the global carbon cycle. Whereas
linear sequestration costs imply that the ceiling is reached earlier than without sequestration, convex se-
questration costs allow the ceiling to be reached later. Additionally, convex sequestration costs imply that
such a technology is used in a continuous manner. Then I show that ocean sequestration allows the kinetic
constraints of oceanic carbon uptake to be overcome and that, even though the storage capacity of the
ocean is not scarce in and of itself, the ongoing saturation of the global carbon cycle determines the optimal
amount of sequestration. Finally, I present a numerical example to demonstrate the dynamics of the simple
extraction-backstop decision while atmospheric carbon concentration is limited with a ceiling and how the
dynamics change if ocean sequestration is included. I doing so, I distinguish whether sequestration costs are
linear or convex. Section 4 concludes.
2. Two-box model with oceanic carbon storage and ceiling
I investigate the dynamic global optimal sequestration decision in the presence of a ceiling on atmospheric
carbon stock as a social planner’s problem where the social rate of discount is assumed to be positive and
constant. The optimal sequestration decision is embedded in the decision regarding the global optimal energy
consumption. Energy consumption is composed of fossil-fuel-based energy, x(t), and non-fossil-fuel-based
energy like solar or wind power, y(t), which I denote as backstop technology. The total amount of energy
consumption, x(t) + y(t), generates gross utility in the social welfare function at any instant in time. Gross
utility is described by U(x(t) + y(t)) and is assumed to have the properties
Assumption 1. U ′ > 0, U ′′ < 0.
5Smulders and van der Werf (2008) assume a ceiling for the flow of emissions and abstract therefore from atmospheric carbon
accumulation. Note that a ceiling on the flow of emissions, e.g., q¯, implies an atmospheric carbon stock with proportional decay,
e.g., −βS(t), where the emission flow ceiling is equal to natural decay, so that q¯ = βS(t).
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The extraction of fossil fuels generates extraction costs at any instant in time which are assumed to depend
on the resource stock R(t) and the extraction cost function C(R) is assumed to have the property
Assumption 2. C′(R) < 0,
so that extraction costs increase with the rate of exploitation of the available resource resource stock:6
R˙ = −x(t) with R(t0) = R0. (1)
Following Chakravorty et al. (2006) and Lafforgue et al. (2008), I assume that the backstop technology
has constant unit costs cy and can be provided at an extent such that U
′(y(t)) = cy with y(t) = y¯ > 0 is
feasible at each point in time. Due to the presence of a backstop technology with the constant unit costs
cy, there is no need to specify whether the utility function satisfies the Inada condition or entails a choke
price, U ′(0) = b <∞, as long as b > cy. With respect to the constant unit costs of the backstop technology,
I assume
Assumption 3. R0 > C
−1(cy),
because otherwise energy consumption would only be provided by the backstop technology. In Section 3.2,
I investigate this basic extraction-backstop optimization problem and refer to it as Scenario Ext.
The proportional amount of carbon emissions related to fossil fuels consumption (the proportionality
factor is assumed to be one) increases the amount of carbon in the atmosphere and therefore in the global
carbon cycle. The global carbon cycle is represented by a two-box model, where the upper box S(t) entails
the sum of the carbon stock in the atmosphere and the upper ocean and the lower box W (t) entails the
carbon stock in the deep ocean:
S˙ = x(t) − γ(S(t)− ωW (t)) with S(t0) = S0, (2)
W˙ = γ(S(t)− ωW (t)) with W (t0) =W0. (3)
The atmospheric carbon stock is assumed to be a constant fraction of S(t).7 In the equations of motion
for the upper and lower box, (2) and (3), the amounts γS(t) and γωW (t) represent the natural fluxes
between the boxes, which amount to a net transfer if there is a difference between the relative stock sizes,
e.g., S(t) > ωW (t). Consequently, an increase in the atmospheric carbon concentration and therefore an
6An alternative formulation would be to model extraction costs to be increasing in the cumulative amount of fossil fuels
extracted: C(X) with C′ > 0, while X(t) =
∫ t
0
q(τ)dτ (Farzin, 1992).
7There is a net transfer of carbon between the atmosphere and the upper mixed layer of the ocean if there is a difference in
the partial pressure of carbon dioxide (pCO2) between these two reservoirs. It takes around one year for the upper layer of the
ocean to equilibrate with the atmosphere. Consequently, I assume that the atmosphere and the upper mixed layer are always
in equilibrium and focus on the transport of anthropogenic carbon to the deeper parts of the ocean, which is the limiting factor
of oceanic carbon uptake.
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increase in the carbon stock in the upper box causes a net downward transfer of excess carbon into the
deep ocean because up-welling water is still free of excess anthropogenic carbon. The deep ocean saturates
with anthropogenic carbon only at the rate ω because anthropogenic carbon reacts with carbonate ions
to bicarbonate ions. Consequently, the term inside the parenthesis of the net exchange can be interpreted
as a simplified representation of the chemical reactions caused by the uptake of anthropogenic carbon by
the ocean.8 The parameter γ represents the kinetic constraint, as it measures the speed of the adjustment
process. Taking into account the inertia of the carbon cycle with respect to the carbon exchange with the
deep ocean, realistic initial values are restricted to satisfy S0 ≥ ωW0. For simplicity I impose
Assumption 4. S0 = ωW0.
Even though the two-box model is a very simple representation of the global carbon cycle, it allows a more
appropriate description of the inertia and the non-renewable aspects of the global carbon cycle than the
proportional-decay description does. A more detailed description of this two-box model can be found in
Rickels and Lontzek (2011), where it is also shown that the two-box model does not provide any advantages
in itself compared to modeling the atmospheric carbon stock as a partially renewable resource, as is done in
Farzin and Tahvonen (1996), but becomes indispensable if options like ocean sequestration are considered.
An overview of such box models used to represent the dynamics of the global carbon cycle can be found
in Sarmiento and Gruber (2006). Even though the carbon stock in the upper box entails atmospheric and
oceanic carbon, I refer to it as the atmospheric carbon stock and to the carbon stock in the lower box as the
oceanic carbon stock. If we abstract from the ongoing saturation of the ocean with anthropogenic carbon,
the oceanic uptake would only be limited by the kinetic constraint and we would regain the proportional
decay description as used by Chakravorty et al. (2006) and Lafforgue et al. (2008): S˙ = x(t) − γdS(t),
implying that all anthropogenic carbon will be taken up by the ocean in the long run, W˙ = γdS(t). The
subscript d indicates that the parameter value does not necessarily coincide in the two-box model and the
proportional decay description because in the latter the initial value of S is normalized to represent the
deviation from its preindustrial level.
Further, I assume that society has agreed on that atmospheric carbon concentration should not exceed
a certain ceiling:
Assumption 5. S¯ ≥ S(t) for t ǫ (0,∞) with S¯ > S0.
In Section 3.2, I investigate in the Scenario Ceil how the basic extraction-backstop optimization problem
changes in the presence of a ceiling on atmospheric carbon concentration when the global carbon cycle is
described by the two-box model.
8I abstract from chemical reactions with the sediments and chemical reactions due to enhanced weathering. These reactions
operate on timescales of 1000 to 100 000 years and are assumed to be beyond the economic optimization horizon due to
discounting.
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Additional to releasing carbon emissions into the atmosphere, I assume that these emissions can also
be captured and injected into the deep ocean for purposes of ocean sequestration. I subdivide the total
amount of fossil fuels extracted into those with related emissions released into the atmosphere q(t) and
those with related emissions captured and injected into the deep ocean a(t), so that x(t) = q(t) + a(t) with
q(t), a(t) ≥ 0.9
Ocean sequestration generates additional costs in the social welfare function at any instant in time.
These costs are assumed to be described by A(a(t)) and summarize the costs of carbon capture in energy
generation, transportation of carbon to the shore, and injecting it via pipelines or ships into the deep ocean.
I distinguish two cases for the properties of A(a(t)):
Assumption 6. Case C: A′ = ac and Case X: A
′ > 0, A′′ > 0.
The costs are measured in the same units as utility. In Section 3.3, I investigate the optimal sequestration
decision for both cases when the global carbon cycle is described either by proportional decay or the two-
box model. With the former description, this model version coincides with the one used by Chakravorty
et al. (2006) apart from stock-dependent extraction costs. Even though Chakravorty et al. refer to the
control variable a(t) as abatement, it should be noted that there exist literally no abatement measures for
fossil-fuel-related carbon emissions once the fossil fuels have been combusted.10 Consequently, abatement
in this context can be interpreted as sequestration without scarcity of the carbon storing facility. I refer to
the two scenarios with the proportional decay description as AC and AX , and to the two scenarios with the
two-box model description as SeqC and SeqX .
3. Results
3.1. Optimal solution conditions
The social welfare function can be formalized as follows:
max
q(t),a(t),y(t)
∫
∞
0
(U(q(t) + a(t) + y(t))− C(R(t))(q(t) + a(t))−A(a(t)) − cyy(t))e
−ρtdt, (4)
with q(t), a(t), y(t) ≥ 0, (5)
9Note that I could also apply the control variables x(t) and a(t) instead of q(t) and a(t), which would imply that only the
net emissions x(t) − a(t) would be released into the upper box and the resource stock would decrease by x(t). In doing so,
I would retain the model description of Chakravorty et al. (2006) and Lafforgue et al. (2008), where it becomes necessary to
include the additional control constraints x(t) − a(t) ≥ 0 if you do not want to consider the possibility of air capture.
10With respect to abatement the variable a(t) could also be interpreted as costly additional efficiency gains, so that the
amount of energy provided by q(t) increases to q(t) + a(t). A more profound description of this interpretation would be
a(t)q(t), with a(t)ǫ(aBAU , amax), where an increase in energy efficiency to above its business-as-usual (BAU) level would be
associated with additional costs.
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where ρ is the constant social rate of discount and the dynamic and state variable constraints are given by
S˙ = q(t)− γS(t)− γωW (t) with S(t0) = S0, (6)
W˙ = a(t) + γS(t)− γωW (t) with W (t0) =W0, (7)
R˙ = −q(t)− a(t) with R(t0) = R0, (8)
S(t) ≤ S¯. (9)
If the carbon cycle is described using the proportional decay description, the term γωW (t) drops out in (6)
and (7) and γ is replaced by γd. From now on, I drop the time variable whenever it is convenient and the
optimization problem described in (4) to (9) leads to the corresponding current value Lagrangian
Lc = U(q+a+y)−A(a)−C(R)(q+a)−cyy−λRR˙−λSS˙−λW W˙−θ1(−q)−θ2(−a)−θ3(−y)−θ4(S(t)−S¯), (10)
where
lim
t→∞
R(t) ≥ 0, lim
t→∞
S(t) ≥ 0, lim
t→∞
W (t) ≥ 0. (11)
I have changed the signs of the costate variables, λS and λW , in order to facilitate their economic inter-
pretation as taxes. According to Proposition 6.2 and Propostion 7.5 in Feichtinger and Hartl (1986), the
admissible solution has to fulfill the necessary conditions
∂Lc
∂q
= 0 ⇒ U ′ − C(R)− λR − λS + θ1 = 0, (12)
∂Lc
∂a
= 0 ⇒ U ′ − C(R)−A′ − λR − λW + θ2 = 0, (13)
∂Lc
∂y
= 0 ⇒ U ′ − cy + θ3 = 0, (14)
−
∂Lc
∂R
= λ˙R − ρλR ⇒ C
′(R)(q + a) = λ˙R − ρλR, (15)
−
∂Lc
∂S
= −λ˙S + ρλS ⇒ γλS − γλW − θ4 = λ˙S − ρλS , (16)
−
∂Lc
∂W
= − ˙λW + ρλW ⇒ −γωλS + γωλW = ˙λW − ρλW , (17)
∂Lc
∂θ1
≥ 0 θ1 ≥ 0 θ1(−q) = 0, (18)
∂Lc
∂θ2
≥ 0 θ2 ≥ 0 θ2(−a) = 0, (19)
∂Lc
∂θ3
≥ 0 θ3 ≥ 0 θ3(−y) = 0, (20)
∂Lc
∂θ4
≥ 0 θ4 ≥ 0 θ4(S − S¯) = 0, (21)
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and also the transversality conditions11
lim
t→∞
e−ρtλRR = 0, lim
t→∞
e−ρtλS = 0, lim
t→∞
e−ρtλW = 0, . (22)
Given the necessary conditions (12) to (22) are fulfilled, the solution is optimal because the control constraints
fulfill the constraint qualification (see Appendix A) and are quasi-concave, because the equations of motion
are described by linear equations and because the maximized Hamiltonian is concave in the state variables
(see Appendix A)(Feichtinger and Hartl, 1986, p.181, Proposition 7.5). Given the optimization problem
did not entail the backstop technology y and sequestration costs had the properties according to Case X
in Assumption 6, the Hamiltonian would be strictly concave in the control variables (see Appendix A),
which implies that the control variables are continuous (Feichtinger and Hartl, 1986, p.167, Corollary 6.2).
Without this restriction, jumps in the controls variables can be observed when using sequestration (Case
C) and switching to the backstop technology. Even though there can be jumps in the control variables,
the costate variables are continuous if the ceiling constraint for the atmospheric carbon stock is not just
tangentially approached (Feichtinger and Hartl, 1986, p.168, Corollary 6.3).
Note the equations of motion (6) to (8) constitute a closed system, so that ,e.g., a decrease in the
resource stock must be balanced by an equivalent increase in the atmospheric and oceanic carbon stock,
S˙+ W˙ + R˙ = 0. Therefore, it is possible to reduce the system by replacing one of the state variables. I refer
to such a reduced system as a ReduxX system, where the superscript indicates the dropped state variable.
If the oceanic carbon stock has been excluded, the equation of motions for ReduxW would read as follows:
R˙W = −q − a, (23)
S˙W = q − γ(S − ω(K0 − S − R)), (24)
where K0 is the sum of the initial values of the stock variables K0 = S0 +W0 +R0. In the Redux
X system
the corresponding costate variable λX vanishes and the remaining two costate variables then also measure
the influence of the omitted state variable on the objective function.
3.2. Stock-dependent extraction costs and the two-box model
I consider first the implications of our model without the option of oceanic carbon storage to clarify the
implications of stock-dependent extraction costs and the two-box model description of the global carbon
cycle. However, independent of the carbon cycle representation, without a ceiling on the atmospheric carbon
11As any admissible path for the state and costate variables is non negative and as any admissible path for the state variables
is bounded due to the description of the carbon cycle as a closed system, the fulfillment of the transversality conditions, (22), is
sufficient for the fulfillment of the general transversality conditions in a infinity horizon problem (Feichtinger and Hartl, 1986,
Remark 2.9 and Remark 7.5).
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stock in Scenario Ext, the optimization problem reduces to the simple extraction-backstop decision. The
optimal solution is determined by the stock-dependent extraction costs C(R), the shadow resource scarcity
rent λR, and the constant price of the backstop technology cy. As atmospheric or oceanic carbon stocks do
not affect the objective function, the corresponding costate variables λS and λW are zero.
12 The marginal
costs for fossil fuel extraction are increasing whereas the marginal costs of using the backstop technology are
constant. Consequently, fossil fuels and backstop technology are not used simultaneously (e.g., Dasgupta
and Heal, 1979). From Assumption 3 follows that there will be first a period when energy consumption is
only provided by fossil fuels. The dynamics are described by
q˙ =
ρ(U ′ − C(R))
U ′′
, (25)
R˙ = −q, (26)
indicating that both q and R are monotonically decreasing until q = y¯. At this point in time fossil fuel
extraction drops to zero and energy consumption switches to the backstop technology for t ǫ (tb,∞) where tb
denotes the switching point. As shown by Farzin (1996), the inclusion of stock-dependent extraction costs
changes the behavior of the shadow scarcity rent and the total amount of fossil fuel extraction, which is
summarized in the context of our model in the presence of a backstop technology in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If C(0) ≥ cy and Assumption 3 holds, R(tb) = R∞ ≥ 0, and λR(tb) = 0, with λ˙R < 0 for
t ǫ (0, tb), and λ˙R = 0 for t ǫ (tb,∞). If C(0) < cy and Assumption 3 holds, R(tb) = 0, λR(tb) = cy − C(0),
with λ˙R < 0 for t ǫ (0, tb), and λ˙R > 0 for t ǫ (tb,∞).
Proof. At the switching point tb, the marginal costs for extraction and the backstop technology have to be
equal. Any solution including C(R(tb) + λR(tb) = cy cannot be optimal because a lower λR(tb) would allow
q(tb) > y¯, so that the objective could be raised by increasing tb. Consequently, λR is decreasing until either
C(R(tb)) = cy with λR(tb) = 0 or until R(tb) = 0 with λR(tb) = cy −C(0). The closed form solution for λR
is
C(0) ≥ cy λR(t) =
∫ t
tb
C′(R(τ))q(τ)e−ρ(τ−t)dτ,
C(0) < cy λR(t) = (cy − C(0))e
−ρ(tb−t) +
∫ t
tb
C′(R(τ))q(τ)e−ρ(τ−t)dτ,
(27)
which shows that the transversality condition limt→∞ e
−ρtλRR = 0 is fulfilled because
either λR(tb) = λR(t)t→∞ = 0 or R∞ = 0.
In contrast to Chakravorty et al. (2006) and Lafforgue et al. (2008), the shadow scarcity rent is declining
12This can also be seen from the closed-form solution for λS in, e.g., the Redux
W system: λWS (t) = λS0e
(γ+γω+ρ)t. If the
initial level λS0 is positive, the transversality condition would be violated because θ4 is zero due to the non existent ceiling
and limt→∞ λS(t) =∞.
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and the fossil fuel stock is not necessarily entirely extracted because extraction costs are modeled as stock-
dependent. Moreover, the possibility that C(0) < cy is more a theoretical concept, as it implies that
extraction costs are still below the cost of the backstop technology when fossil fuel stocks are completely
depleted. The more reasonable concept seems to be C(0) > cy so that the amount of the economic recoverable
resource is endogenously determined by C−1(cy) = R(tb) = Rb > 0 (Farzin, 1996).
The carbon emissions related to the extraction in Scenario Ext affect the dynamics of the global carbon
cycle. According to Assumption 4, atmospheric carbon concentration is initially increasing and thereby also
the net transfer into the deep ocean nt = γS − γωW because the downward flux increases by γ, whereas
the upward flux only by γω. Even if Assumption 4 is not fulfilled, oceanic carbon stock is monotonically
increasing given the initial values fulfill S0 > ωW0.
13 However, atmospheric carbon concentration increases
at a declining rate (S¨ < 0) or might even reverse its sign (S˙ < 0) because of the monotonically decreasing
carbon emissions.
Proposition 2. If Assumption 4 is fulfilled, atmospheric carbon concentration approaches a unique peak
concentration Sp at tp with 0 < tp ≤ tb if U
′′′ > 0.
Proof. If atmospheric carbon concentration is monotonically increasing until tb, the peak concentration will
be approached at tp = tb because from S˙ = q(tb)− γS(tb) − γωW (tb) > 0, from the continuity in the state
variables, and from q(tb) = y¯ > 0 follows that S˙ = γS(tb+ ǫ)− γωW (tb+ ǫ) < 0 with ǫ→ 0. If atmospheric
carbon concentration is not monotonically increasing until tb, the peak concentration will be approached at
tp < tb with −
q˙
q
> γω which follows from S¨R = q˙ − γωR˙R < 0. The atmospheric carbon concentration can
only once reverse its sign between t ǫ (0, tb). Observing two extrema would require
Smax : −q˙/q > γω
Smin : −q˙/q < γω,
(28)
requiring an inflection point for q between Smax and Smin. From
q¨ =
ρ(U ′′q˙ + C′(R)q)U ′′ − ρ(U ′ − C(R))U ′′′q˙
(U ′′)2
(29)
it can be seen that q¨ = 0 is not feasible if U ′′′ > 0 because U ′ − C(R) < 0 follows from the necessary
optimality condition (12).
The proposition would also be valid if Assumption 4 only required qExt0 > γ(S0 − ωW0), where q
Ext
0 is
13This can be seen from the closed-form solution for W (t) if emissions are zero: W (t) = e−(γ+γω)t(ωW0−S0
1+ω
) + 1
1+ω
W0,
where the first term inside the parentheses is zero if the initial values constitute a carbon cycle equilibrium but is negative if
initial atmospheric carbon concentration has already increased. As the parentheses are multiplied by a declining exponential
term, the oceanic carbon stock is monotonically increasing. This property does not change if carbon emissions are included
because these are only released into the atmosphere.
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the initial amount of carbon emissions in Scenario Ext. From the proposition, it follows that if qExt0 <
γ(S0−ωW0), the atmospheric carbon concentration is either monotonically decreasing until t→∞ or is U-
shaped until tb with Sp(tb) ⋚ S0. However, no matter when the atmospheric peak concentration is reached,
the carbon cycle is in disequilibrium at tb because q(tb) = y¯ > 0. Consequently, the steady state values for
atmospheric and oceanic carbon stocks are approached by the natural adjustment process, as t → ∞, and
are given by
S∞ =
ω
1 + ω
(S0 +W0 +R0 −Rb), W∞ =
1
1 + ω
(S0 +W0 +R0 −Rb). (30)
I turn now to Scenario Ceil, where atmospheric carbon stock is limited by a ceiling S(t) ≤ S¯ . If S∞ > S¯,
the ceiling would be limiting for the total carbon accumulation in the carbon cycle and the total amount of
fossil fuel extraction would decrease to
∫ tCeil
b
0
qCeil(τ)dτ =
1 + ω
ω
S¯ − S0 −W0 = R0 −R
Ceil
b < R0 −R
Ext
b . (31)
If Sp < S¯ holds, the ceiling would never be binding and the optimal solution would coincide with the
solution in Scenario Ext. With respect to the total storing capacity of the global carbon cycle but also the
inertia of oceanic carbon uptake, I focus on the situation where the ceiling only limits the atmospheric peak
concentration SExtp > S¯ > S∞ > S0. S
Ext
p > S¯ implies that t
Ceil
cr < t
Ceil
cl , where tcr and tcl denote the
points in time when the ceiling is reached and left, respectively. S¯ > S∞ implies that the total amount of
fossil fuel extraction is not affected (SExt
∞
= SCeil
∞
) but that the extraction dynamics are. S¯ > S0 implies a
period in the beginning when atmospheric carbon stock is below the ceiling. The binding ceiling requires
θ4 to be positive between t
Ceil
cr and t
Ceil
cl , resulting in positive costate variables λS and λW for t ǫ (0, t
Ceil
cl ),
where λS measures the shadow environmental scarcity rent of the atmospheric carbon storing capacity and
λW measures the shadow environmental scarcity rent of the oceanic carbon storing capacity (Farzin, 1996).
The overall carbon storing capacity is only scarce before and at the ceiling. Once the ceiling has been left,
there is no scarcity and therefore λS(t) = λW (t) = 0 for t ǫ (tcl,∞). The dynamics of the costate variables
can be seen from the closed form for λS in the Redux
W system14:
λWS (t) = λ
W
S0e
(ρ+γ+γω)t
−
∫ t
0
θ4(τ)e
−(ρ+γ+γω)(τ−t)dτ (32)
The closed form shows that the costate variables in the ReduxW system and therefore both costate vari-
ables in the complete system are increasing on the path towards the ceiling and decreasing at the ceiling
because θ4(t) = 0 for t ǫ (0, tcr) and θ4(t) ≥ 0 for t ǫ (tcr, tcl) with λS(t) ≥ λW (t) for t ǫ (0, tcl) For the
14The costate variable associated to the atmospheric carbon stock in the ReduxW system is equal to the tax difference in
the complete system: λ˙S − λ˙W = (λS − λW )(ρ + γ + γω) + θ4.
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atmospheric carbon stock at the ceiling, the entire dynamics are exogenously determined by the two-box
model description.
Proposition 3. When atmospheric carbon concentration is at the ceiling, extraction is monotonically de-
creasing at a constant contraction rate −γω.
Proof. From S˙W = 0 = q − (γ + γω)S¯ + γω(K0 −R(t)) follows that
q˙
q
= −γω.
In contrast to Chakravorty et al. (2006) and Lafforgue et al. (2008) extraction is not constant but decreasing
at the ceiling because of the increasing saturation of the carbon cycle with anthropogenic carbon. This is
implicitly confirmed by Farzin and Tahvonen (1996) who capture the non-renewable aspect of the global
carbon cycle by artificially dividing the atmospheric carbon stock into two stock, on with decay and the other
one without. However, they consider a damage function to measure the social costs of increasing atmospheric
carbon concentration instead of a ceiling. They show that for certain functional forms and initial levels the
situation of a stationary policy arises, where atmospheric carbon concentration is constant and extraction
is decreasing at a constant contraction rate. The differences between a two-box model description versus
an artificially division of the atmospheric carbon stock are further discussed in Rickels and Lontzek (2011).
They show that the two-box model does not provide an advantage in itself, but becomes indispensable if
options like ocean sequestration are investigated.
With the two-box model the relationship between the resource stock and the amount of extraction at
the ceiling is linear:
qCeilc (R) = K1 + γωR with K1 = (γ + γω)S¯ − γωK0, (33)
which follows from S˙W = 0. Using this relation, three cases can be distinguished for switching to the
backstop technology.
Case 1: If qCeilc (Rb) > y¯ holds, the ceiling will be left before energy consumption switches to the backstop
technology. The point in time when the ceiling is left tCeilcl is determined by q
Ceil
c (R) = q
Ext(R, λR) and
I denote the corresponding resource stock by RCeilcl . From t
Ceil
cl until tb, the dynamics are determined
by Scenario Ext, where the initial level for the resource stock is RCeilcl . Energy consumption switches
to the backstop technology at tCeilb with t
Ceil
cl < t
Ceil
b .
Case 2: If qCeilc (Rb) < y¯ holds, the backstop technology will already be used at the ceiling and t
Ceil
b is
determined by qCeilc (R) = y¯ with R > R
Ext
b . Instead of a complete switch to the backstop technology
at tCeilb , both energy sources will be used simultaneously in this case. From t
Ceil
b onwards, energy
consumption is fixed at y¯ = qCeilc (R) + y(t), where q
Ceil
c (R) is monotonically decreasing (according to
Proposition 3) and in turn y(t) is monotonically increasing. Simultaneous use requires the marginal
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costs for both energy sources to be equal cy = C(R)+λ
Ceil
R +λ
Ceil
S , which holds true until R(t) = Rb,
so that cy = C(Rb) and λ
Ceil
R = λ
Ceil
S = 0. At this point in time, the ceiling is left and the consumption
of the backstop technology jumps from y¯− qCeilc (Rb) up to y¯, whereas consumption of fossil-fuel-based
energy jumps to zero. Consequently, in this case tCeilcl > t
Ceil
b holds.
Case 3: If qCeilc (Rb) = y¯ holds, the ceiling will be left at the point in time when energy consumption
switches to the backstop technology. Consequently, in this case tCeilcl = t
Ceil
b holds.
In Case 1 and Case 3, the marginal costs of extraction are monotonically decreasing, but in Case 2 marginal
costs are constant during the simultaneous use of both energy sources, implying λS to be decreasing at a
slower rate after tCeilb . This case is investigated in more detail in Chakravorty et al. (2006) but with the
carbon cycle being described by proportional decay so that extraction is constant at the ceiling, q¯c = γdS¯. If
γdS¯ < y¯, backstop technology utilization will start at a level of y(t) = y¯−γdS¯ once the ceiling is approached.
Observing starting points for backstop technology utilization later at the ceiling requires the inclusion of
sequestration so that energy consumption is above y¯ at the beginning of the binding ceiling. The two-box
model description allows such a result to be observed without the inclusion of sequestration. Following
Lafforgue et al. (2008), I focus on Case 1 where qCeilc (Rb) > y¯.
Obviously, the ceiling is reached later in Scenario Ceil than it is exceeded in Scenario Ext, tCeilcr > t
Ext
cr
because qExt(R0, λR0) > q
Ceil(R0, λR0, λS0) and q
Ext(tExtcr ) > q
Ceil(tExtcr ). Accordingly, the resource stock
R(tcr) = Rcr also changes.
Proposition 4. The ceiling is approached with a lower fossil fuel resource stock in Scenario Ceil than in
Scenario Ext: RCeilcr < R
Ext
cr .
Proof. This can be seen from the closed-form solution for S(t) in the ReduxW system:
S(t) = e−(γ+γω)t
(∫ t
0
((q(τ) − γωR(τ))e(γ+γω)τdτ +
S0
1 + ω
−
ω(R0 +W0)
1 + ω
)
+
ωK0
1 + ω
. (34)
By taking the derivative with respect to time at tcr where S(tcr) = S¯ one obtains
γωR(tcr)− q(tcr)
γ + γω
= S¯ −
ωK0
1 + ω
, (35)
from which follows that a lower amount of extraction in Scenario Ceil at tcr also implies a lower fossil fuel
resource stock.
The ceiling is not just approached later due to the lower extraction rate in Scenario Ceil but also to the
higher cumulative oceanic carbon uptake compared to Scenario Ext: WCeil(tcr) = K0 − S¯ − R
Ceil
cr >
WExt(tcr) = K0 − S¯ −R
Ext
cr .
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Note that the cumulative oceanic uptake with the two-box model at tcr, does not necessarily differ from
the cumulative uptake obtained with the proportional decay assumption, W (t) = γd
∫ t
0
S(t) +W0, if the
decay parameter γd is chosen appropriately:
γd =
e−γωtγ
∫ t
0 S
Ceil(τ)eγωτdτ +W0(e
−γωt
− 1)∫ t
0 S
Ceil
d (τ)dτ
. (36)
Obviously, γd varies with time, so that the endogenous oceanic carbon uptake in the two-box model de-
scription also alters the optimal extraction path before the ceiling has been approached compared to the
proportional decay description. If the ceiling is approached at the same point in time with both the propor-
tional decay and the two-box model description, then the initial extraction must be larger with the latter
description as the net transfer into the deep ocean is not only influenced by the atmospheric carbon stock
but also by the saturation of the ocean with anthropogenic carbon. Therefore, the dynamics of λS are
influenced by the oceanic saturation, as it can be seen from (16) and (17). The initial level of λS is not only
influenced by S0 but also by W0, where an initial lower oceanic saturation level implies a lower value for λS
for a given value of S0.
3.3. Convex sequestration costs and oceanic carbon storage
We include now the option of capturing carbon and injecting it into the deep ocean. The implications
for the optimal solution depend crucially on the behavior of the costs associated with such an activity.
According to Assumption 6, we distinguish between A′ = ac, as is assumed in Chakravorty et al. (2006) and
Lafforgue et al. (2008) and A′ > 0 with A′′ > 0. To clarify the difference, we apply first the proportional
decay description for the global carbon cycle without endogenous oceanic carbon uptake as is done in those
papers and investigate the Scenarios AC and AX .15 Note that with the proportional decay description,
W (t) does not affect the objective function so that it does not have to be included in the Hamiltonian
function. Consequently, the necessary conditions for an optimal solution are only described by (12) to (16)
and (18) to (22), where λW vanishes in conditions (13), (15), and (22). Considering ocean sequestration
with a proportional decay description is equivalent to considering geological storage without scarcity with
respect to storage volume. Furthermore, we presuppose that the Scenarios Ext and Ceil can be accordingly
defined for the proportional decay description.
In Scenario AC, it follows from conditions (12) and (13) that only the total amount of fossil fuel energy
consumption xAC = qAC + aAC is determined and that positive sequestration requires λS = ac. However,
even if the latter condition were fulfilled, it would be beneficial to provide total energy consumption only
by qAC because aAC > 0 would imply additional costs in the objective function. This changes if qAC is
15From Assumption 4 follows that the initial value S0 has to be normalized to be zero for the proportional decay description.
147
determined by the binding ceiling to be qAC = γdS¯, implying that a
AC = x − γdS¯, as pointed out by
Chakravorty et al. (2006) and Lafforgue et al. (2008). From ac > 0 and U
′(γdS¯) − C(R(tcl) − λR(tcl) = 0
follows that there exists a point in time tACa < t
AC
cl where U
′(γdS¯) − C(R) − λR − λS − ac = 0, so that
sequestration does not take place over the entire period at the ceiling. The price continuity condition implied
by (12) requires that qAC(tACcr ) = γdS¯ + a
AC(tACcr ).
16 Consequently, at tACcr , q
AC jumps down from xAC to
γdS¯ and a
AC jumps up from zero to xAC−γdS¯. The costate variable λ
AC
S is increasing, constant, decreasing,
and zero for t ǫ (0, tACcr ), (t
AC
cr , t
AT
a ), (t
AC
a , t
AC
cl ), and (t
AC
cl ,∞), respectively, implying that λ
AC
S stays at its
maximum value for t ǫ (tACcr , t
AC
a ), which is equal to ac (Chakravorty et al., 2006; Lafforgue et al., 2008).
In ScenarioAX , the regularity condition for q and a is fulfilled, so that the control variables are continuous
apart from the switch to the backstop technology that is assumed to take place after the ceiling has been
left. Conditions (12) and (13) determine not only the total optimal amount of energy consumption but
also its composition because A′(aAX) = λS . From the continuity in the control variables follows that
qAX(tAXcr ) = γS¯. The costate variable λ
AX
S is increasing, decreasing, and zero for t ǫ (0, t
AX
cr ), (t
AX
cr , t
AX
cl ), and
(tAXcl ,∞), respectively, implying that λ
AX
S approaches its maximum value at t
AX
cr . If A
′(0) = 0, sequestration
will be used for t ǫ (0, tAXcl ); if A
′(0) > 0, sequestration will be used for t ǫ (tAXas , t
AX
ae ) with 0 ≤ t
AX
as < t
AX
cr <
tAXae < t
AX
cl . From λ
AX
S0 > 0 follows that even if A
′(0) > 0 holds, sequestration can start at t = 0, but must
end before tAXcl because λ
AX
S (t
AX
cl ) = 0.
Proposition 5. If sequestration costs are constant, sequestration is used only at the ceiling and the ceiling
is approached earlier than without sequestration. If sequestration costs are convex, sequestration is also used
before the ceiling is approached and the ceiling can also be approached later than without sequestration.
Proof. In both scenarios, AC and AX , energy consumption x is larger at tcr than in Scenario Ceil if
sequestration is used, requiring the right hand side in (12) to be smaller. If tACcr = t
AX
cr = t
Ceil
cr , λS(tcr) is
lower in scenario AC and AX . From λS(t) = λ0e
(ρ+γ)t follows for both scenarios that also the initial values
are lower, so that then x(t) > xCeil(t) for t ǫ (0, tcr) extraction is monotonically decreasing. Consequently, in
Scenario AC xAC = qAC(t) > xCeil = qCeil(t) holds for t ǫ (0, tcr). From S(tcr) = S¯ =
∫ tcr
0 q(τ)e
−γ(tcr−τ)dτ
follows that tACcr < t
Ceil
cr . In Scenario AX , it follows from
qAX(t) = U ′−1(C(R) + λR + λS)−A
′−1(λS) (37)
that qAX(t) ⋚ qCeil(t) for t ǫ (0, tcr) is possible because ∂q
AX
∂λS
= (U ′−1)′λS − (A
′−1)′λS < 0. Even though∫ tcr
0 x
AX(τ)dτ =
∫ tcr
0 q
AX(τ) + aAX(τ)dτ >
∫ tcr
0 q
Ceil(τ)dτ needs to be fulfilled, it is possible that∫ tcr
0 q
AX(τ)dτ ⋚
∫ tcr
0 q
Ceil(τ)dτ , so that from S(tcr) = S¯ =
∫ tcr
0 q(τ)e
−γ(tcr−τdτ follows tAXcr ⋚ tCeilcr .
16This can also be seen by the carbon balance equation:
∫ tcr
0 q
AC(τ)dτ + γS¯ (tcl − tcr) +
∫ ta
tcr
aAC(τ)dτ +
∫ tb
tcl
qAC(τ)dτ =
R0 − Rb. From derivation with respect to tcr follows q
AC(tcr) = aAC(tcr) + γdS¯.
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With respect to the point in time when the ceiling is reached, Chakravorty et al. (2006) argue that if
sequestration is costless, the energy consumption from Scenario Ext is realized and therefore the ceiling is
approached earlier than in Scenario Ceil, while qExt(t)− γS¯ is sequestered once the ceiling is reached with
λACS (t) = 0 for tǫ(0,∞). But one could also argue that if sequestration is costless, Condition (12) and (13)
coincide and only total energy consumption x is determined to be equal to qExt. Consequently, it is also
possible to use sequestration for total energy consumption so that the atmospheric carbon stock would remain
unchanged and never reach the ceiling. Assuming very small sequestration costs, then in both Scenarios
AC and AX , almost the energy consumption of Scenario Ext would be realized. However, in Scenario AC,
sequestration is only realized at the ceiling, which is approached only slightly later than in Scenario Ext,
whereas in in Scenario AX , a substantial fraction of energy consumption involves sequestration before and
at the ceiling, so that the ceiling is approached substantially later than in Scenario Ext and probably also
later than in Scenario Ceil.17
In Scenarios AC and AX , it is assumed that sequestration is determined only by the associated costs and
not by the availability of appropriate storage sides. The case where a scarcity of the carbon storing capacity
of geological reservoirs exists, is investigated for constant sequestration costs by Lafforgue et al. (2008). If the
cumulative stored amount of carbon for Scenario AC or AX , denoted by, e.g., A(t) =
∫ t
0 a(τ)dτ , exceeds the
capacity of the geological reservoir, denoted by, e.g., A¯, an additional costate variable measuring this scarcity,
e.g., λA, has be to included in the optimization problem. The amount of sequestration is determined not
only by the sequestration costs and the scarcity of atmospheric storing capacity with respect to the ceiling
but also by the scarcity of the storing capacity: A′(a) = λS − λA. Irrespective of whether sequestration
takes place before the atmospheric ceiling has been reached, as in Scenario AX , or once the ceiling has
been reached, as in Scenario AC, the overall period of sequestration shrinks, so that
∫ t2
t1
a(τ)dτ = A¯. Even
if A′(0) = 0 holds in Scenario AX , sequestration ends before tcl because λS is decreasing at the ceiling
whereas λA(t) = λA0e
ρt is monotonically increasing until the storing limit has been reached. Obviously,
even if sequestration is costless, the extraction path of Scenario Ext is not regained. Lafforgue et al. (2008)
distinguish between the case where only one or the case where many geological reservoirs exists. The former
case implies that sequestration cost are equal for all geological reservoirs and only the overall storing capacity
has to be considered. The latter case requires that sequestration costs differ with respect to the geological
reservoirs. They show that the reservoirs are used for sequestration in ascending order with respect to their
costs without the simultaneous use of two reservoirs. This results requires, apart from the sequestration unit
cost being constant, that there is no kind of regeneration of the reservoirs, e.g., due to chemical processes
or leakage. This can easily been seen by thinking about the overall optimization problem of storing carbon
17The fraction of total energy consumption that involves sequestration in Scenario AX is relative to
λAX
S
C(R)+λAX
R
+λAX
S
, so
that the share of sequestration is largest at tAXcr .
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in reservoirs with limited capacity, where the atmosphere is the cheapest storing reservoir that regenerates
naturally. The case of multiple reservoirs n with different costs shows that even if overall storing capacity
is not limited, e.g.,
∫ tcl
0 a(τ)dτ < A¯ =
∑n
1 A¯n, a shadow value must be associated with the n− 1 reservoirs,
where the storing capacity of the nth reservoir will not entirely be used (Lafforgue et al., 2008).
We also consider possible scarcity issues related to the storage side, but with respect to ocean seques-
tration instead of geological sequestration (Scenario SeqC and SeqX). In contrast to the scenarios AC and
AX , sequestration is determined not only by the scarcity of the atmospheric storing capacity but by the
difference between this scarcity and the scarcity of oceanic storing capacity:
A′(a) = λS − λW = λ
W
S , (38)
As explained in Section 3.2 and above, the difference between both scarcities increases until tcr, is
constant until ta, and then decreases until tcl, to zero, if sequestration unit costs are constant, or it directly
decreases to zero from tcr onwards if sequestration costs are convex, whereby λS(t) ≥ 0 and λW (t) ≥ 0 for
t ǫ (0, tcl). Note neither the storing capacity of the atmosphere nor that of the ocean is scarce by itself if the
ceiling is such that S¯ > S∞ so that S¯/ω > W∞. Nevertheless, scarcity arises if the inertia of the carbon cycle
to move carbon into the deep ocean and the decreasing oceanic buffer capacity result in an atmospheric peak
concentration with Sp > S¯. The benefit of ocean sequestration arises from overcoming this inertia and using
the oceanic buffer capacity. This can be understood by considering instantaneous equilibration between
atmospheric and oceanic carbon stocks without including oceanic buffer capacity (γ = ω = 1), implying
that both carbon stocks would be monotonically increasing to their steady state values (S∞ = W∞). If
the ceiling is binding with respect to the steady state values (S¯ < S∞), both costate variables are almost
equal and ocean sequestration is nearly of no benefit, as it increases both stocks equally. Factoring in either
the inertia (γ < 1) or the oceanic buffer capacity (ω < 1) implies that ocean sequestration causes the
atmospheric carbon stock to increase by only γa or ωa, respectively. As a result, the difference between the
scarcities becomes positive and ocean sequestration is of benefit if A′(0) < λS − λW . With both the inertia
and the buffer capacity included, ocean sequestration causes the atmospheric carbon stock to increase by
only γωa so that the difference between the scarcities increases further.
Because the two-box model description includes the oceanic buffer capacity, it is able to demonstrate
that ocean sequestration does not only economically but also physically influence the amount of extraction.
In the two-box model, extraction at the ceiling is given by qSeq = γ(S¯ − ωW ), where W is influenced by
ocean sequestration. Therefore, Proposition 3 needs to be modified:
Proposition 6. When atmospheric carbon concentration is at the ceiling, extraction must be monotonically
decreasing at a faster rate if sequestration is used.
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Proof. From S˙W = 0 = q − (γ + γω)S¯ + γω(K0 − R(t)) follows that
q˙
q+a = −γω, whereas without
sequestration q˙
q
= −γω holds.
Proposition 6 implies that we observe a kink in the extraction path at the ceiling at the point in time when
extraction ends in Scenario SeqC and in Scenario SeqX given A′(0) > 0. For a given value of the resource
stock and therefore also the oceanic carbon stock at tcr (K0 − S¯ − R(tcr) = W (tcr)), the period at the
ceiling is shorter for Scenario SeqC and SeqX than for Scenario Ceil because from (33) follows that the
oceanic carbon stock is unique for all three scenarios at tcl. Consequently, the path from tcl onwards until
the switching point tb is the same for all three scenarios. However, as implied by Proposition 4 and 5, the
initial values at tcr are not unique for the three scenarios. In Scenario SeqC, the ceiling is approached earlier
and therefore with a higher resource stock and a lower oceanic carbon stock than in Scenario Ceil. If in
Scenario SeqX the ceiling is approached later than in Scenario Ceil, the resource stock is lower and the
oceanic carbon stock is higher, so that initial extraction at the ceiling is lower than in Scenario Ceil. Note,
even if the ceiling is reached at the same point in time or earlier than in Scenario Ceil, the oceanic carbon
stock can be higher due to positive sequestration. However, that would again imply lower initial extraction
at the ceiling, so that it seems more likely that in an optimal solution the ceiling is approached later than
in Scenario Ceil.
To illustrate the implications of the various scenarios, we provide a numerical example.18 Figure 1
shows the optimal paths for extraction, sequestration, total energy consumption by fossil fuels, and backstop
technology in the left column and the atmospheric carbon concentration in the right column for the scenarios
Ext, Ceil, SeqC, and SeqX . The parameter values are chosen so that assumptions 3 to 6 are fulfilled. In
the unconstrained Scenario Ext, atmospheric carbon stock approaches its peak concentration before energy
consumption switches to the backstop technology, whereby the ceiling is crossed twice. Accordingly, in
Scenario Ext, tcr and tcl, denote when the ceiling is crossed, whereas in the other scenarios they denote the
start and end of the ceiling period. In Scenario Ext, the amount of extraction at tcl is actually lower than
in the other scenarios. This can be seen from the shorter period between tExtcl and t
Ext
b , compared to other
scenarios where this period is equal for Scenario Ceil, SeqC, and SeqX , as explained above. However, the
period at the ceiling varies between these three latter scenarios. In line with Proposition 5, the ceiling is
approached earlier in Scenario SeqC than in Scenario Ceil due to sequestration. Even though the ceiling
is left earlier in Scenario SeqC, the overall period at the ceiling is extended. Consequently, the effect of
approaching the ceiling earlier because of higher initial extraction overcompensates the faster decline in fossil
fuel energy consumption at the ceiling. For the chosen parameter values, the ceiling is reached later and left
18The utility function is U(q) = b1∗q−b2∗q2, the stock-dependent extraction cost function is c1−c2R, the ocean sequestration
cost function for Scenario SeqX is A(a) = ax ∗ a2 and for Scenario SeqC A(a) = ac ∗ a. The parameter values are b1 = 6,
b2 = 6/20, c1 = 6, c2 = 1/10, ax = ac = 2/10, cy = 5.6, γ = 1/10, ω = 1/10, ρ = 3/100, and the initial values are R0 = 50,
S0 = 20, andW0 = 200. The ceiling is S¯ =
45
28
S0 = 32.1429 where 280 ppm is the preindustrial atmospheric carbon stabilization
level and 450 ppm is a ceiling that could possibly be used to comply with the 2◦C temperature limit discussed above.
151
tb : 34.31tcr : 7.39 tcl : 28.15
qHtL
yHtL
0 10 20 30 40
time0
1
2
3
4
Energy consumption in Scenario Ext
tcr : 7.39 tcl : 28.15 tb : 34.31
SHtL
Ceiling
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
time20
25
30
35
40
45
Atmospheric carbon stock in Scenario Ext
tb : 37.35tcr : 10.02 tcl : 23.12
qHtL
yHtL
0 10 20 30 40
time0
1
2
3
4
Energy consumption in Scenario Ceil
tcr : 10.02 tcl : 23.12 tb : 37.35
SHtL
Ceiling
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
time20
25
30
35
40
45
Atmospheric carbon stock in Scenario Ceil
tcr : 8.09 tcl : 22.12 tb : 36.35
qHtL
yHtL
aHtL
aHtL + qHtL
0 10 20 30 40
time0
1
2
3
4
Energy consumption in Scenario SeqC
tcr : 8.09 tcl : 22.12 tb : 36.35
SHtL
Ceiling
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
time20
25
30
35
40
45
Atmospheirc carbon stock in Scenario SeqC
tcr : 10.71 tcl : 21.11 tb : 35.34
qHtL
yHtL
aHtL
aHtL + qHtL
0 10 20 30 40
time0
1
2
3
4
Energy Consumption in Scenario SeqX
tcr : 10.71 tcl : 21.11 tb : 35.34
SHtL
Ceiling
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
time20
25
30
35
40
45
Atmospheirc carbon stock in Scenario SeqX
Figure 1: Energy consumption and atmospheric carbon stock in scenarios Ext, Ceil, SeqC, and SeqX
earlier in Scenario SeqX than in Scenario Ceil because of continuous sequestration. Scenario SeqX has the
shortest period at the ceiling, Scenario SeqC the longest period. In both scenarios SeqC and SeqX , the
option of sequestration allows an path of energy consumption to be reached which looks more like the energy
consumption path in Scenario Ext. Note if the initial values S0 and W0 are chosen such that Assumption
4 is violated but such that S0 > ωW0 and Assumption 5 are still satisfied, the period until the ceiling is
reached shrinks and the path for atmospheric carbon concentration until the ceiling could be U-shaped.
It remains to briefly discuss the implications of the change in path of the oceanic carbon stock caused
by ocean sequestration. As explained above, the oceanic carbon stock W (tcl) is unique for the scenarios
Ceil, SeqX , and SeqC. Leaving the ceiling earlier with ocean sequestration implies that the oceanic carbon
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stock has increased faster than without ocean sequestration. Consequently, ocean sequestration influences
the rate of ocean acidification even though the total level of ocean acidification is not affected, as it follows
from the unaffected steady state values (S¯ > S∞). A ceiling for the oceanic carbon stock or a damage
function capturing the social costs of an increasing oceanic carbon stock could be included in the objective
function. Both of these possibilities would have a similar effect as the oceanic carbon stock is monotonically
increasing to its steady state value. Therefore, λW and, in turn λS , would be positive for t ǫ (0,∞) and
total fossil fuel consumption would shrink.19 The amount of ocean sequestration would also shrink or even
become zero in the period until tcl, as the tax difference decreases. After the ceiling has been left, the tax
difference would become negative, implying that it would be beneficial to “pump” carbon back from the
ocean to atmosphere (θ2 > 0). Furthermore, the positive costate variable λS for t → ∞ implies that fossil
fuels and the backstop technology would be used simultaneously from tb onwards.
4. Conclusion
In this paper I investigate the optimal role of carbon sequestration from a social planner’s perspective
while the atmospheric carbon concentration is constrained by a ceiling. In contrast to existing analyses, we
include stock-dependent extraction costs, describe the carbon cycle using a two-box model, assume carbon
sequestration costs to be convex, and consider oceanic instead of geological carbon storage.
The inclusion of stock-dependent extraction costs does not influence the optimal sequestration decision
as discussed in the literature. However, their inclusion can imply that not the entire stock of fossil resources
is extracted, as is shown by Dasgupta and Heal (e.g., 1979) and Tahvonen (1997). The description of the
carbon cycle using a two-box model allows the ongoing saturation of the ocean with anthropogenic carbon
to be taken into account. Consequently, extraction at the ceiling is not constant, as is the case with a
proportional decay description, but is monotonically decreasing. This implies that the simultaneous use of
fossil fuels and a backstop technology could start at some point at the ceiling which is not possible with the
proportional decay description without also using sequestration. The non renewable description of the carbon
cycle provided by the two-box model implies positive atmospheric and oceanic carbon stock stabilization
values that have to be larger in sum than the initial values as a consequence of the anthropogenic release of
carbon into the cycle. Therefore, it is possible that the ceiling limits total carbon accumulation in the cycle,
where with the proportional decay description, the ceiling is a temporary problem per definition. When the
ceiling is permanently binding in the two-box model, the stock of fossil resources left in the ground must
increase, compared to a when a ceiling is only temporarily binding regardless of whether extraction costs
are stock-dependent or not.
19In the case of a damage function instead of a ceiling the steady state values for λS and λW are: λS(∞) =
D′(W )γ
ρ(γ+ρ+γω)
and
λW (∞) =
D′(W )(γ+ρ)
ρ(γ+ρ+γω)
.
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Convex carbon sequestration costs imply that sequestration is used in a continuous manner, increasing
on the path towards the ceiling and decreasing at the ceiling. Constant sequestration costs imply that
sequestration is used in a discontinuous manner, jumping from zero to its maximum value and decreasing at
the ceiling (Chakravorty et al., 2006; Lafforgue et al., 2008). Both cost assumptions result in a total energy
consumption path that looks more like the one observed in the unconstrained solution. However, the path
resulting from convex sequestration costs seems to be more realistic with respect to physical and investment
requirements related to the implementation of such a technology. This is confirmed by simulation results
that project an increasing share of carbon sequestration for various temperature stabilization targets (e.g.,
IEA, 2010). Furthermore, constant sequestration costs imply that in an optimal solution, the atmospheric
ceiling will be approached earlier if sequestration is used at the ceiling. Convex sequestration also allows the
atmospheric ceiling to be approached later. Our ability to profoundly determine a ceiling on atmospheric
carbon concentration that can be regarded as safe with respect to climate change is restricted by our still
limited understanding of the earth’s climate system, in particular with respect to tipping points. Accordingly,
at the meeting of the parties in Cancun, it was recognized that the limit for temperature increase to 2◦C need
to revised to a limit of 1.5◦C because of new scientific knowledge (UNFCCC, 2010). Therefore, technologies
allowing society to approach an agreed ceiling later and to gain time to learn more about the consequences
of climate change can be regarded as preferable. Results based on linear sequestration costs, suggest that
carbon sequestration would not be a recommend option to deal with the atmospheric carbon accumulation
problem, whereas results based on convex sequestration costs suggest that such technology could be an
important option.
Ocean sequestration and therefore oceanic carbon storage allows the kinetic constraints of natural oceanic
carbon uptake to be overcome. The atmospheric carbon accumulation problem is crucially influenced by
the inertia of the global and in particular the marine carbon cycle in balancing anthropogenic disturbances
to the carbon cycle. About 80 percent of the anthropogenic carbon emitted to the atmosphere is expected
to be taken up by the ocean on timescales of several hundred years (e.g., Archer et al., 1997; Ko¨rtzinger
and Wallace, 2002; Sarmiento and Gruber, 2006). Ocean sequestration takes advantage of the oceanic buffer
capacity and the slow turnover speed of the natural adjustment process. Therefore, the optimal amount of
ocean sequestration is determined by the difference between the scarcities of the atmospheric carbon storing
capacity and of the oceanic carbon storing capacity. Whereas the former results from the temporarily
binding ceiling, the latter results from its negative feedback effect on natural oceanic carbon uptake. Ocean
sequestration contributes to the saturation of the ocean with anthropogenic carbon, implying that emissions
released into the atmosphere at the ceiling have to decline at a faster rate than without ocean sequestration.
If the oceanic carbon storing capacity becomes scarce by itself, e.g., by accounting for ocean acidification,
ocean sequestration is less beneficial. Furthermore, after the ceiling has been left, the optimal amount of
fossil fuel extraction would no longer be limited by the atmospheric carbon stock but rather by the ongoing
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ocean acidification. With respect to ocean acidification, geological storage would be more beneficial, as it
allows overall atmospheric and oceanic stabilization levels to be decreased, whereas ocean sequestration does
not. Apart from ocean acidification, geological storage does not affect the buffer capacity of the ocean, so
that, if costs for geological and oceanic carbon sequestration are equal, the geological storage capacity will
be fully used, irrespective of whether simultaneous use is implied by convex sequestration costs or successive
use is implied by linear sequestration costs. However, if carbon sequestration is applied on a large scale, it
will be probably more expensive to inject carbon into suitable geological storage sites which each require
specific investments with respect to pipelines and injection facilities, than to inject carbon into the ocean.
Therefore, the interesting case for future research arises from considering various storage options that can
be ranked according to the associated injection costs but also according to the associated environmental
costs, which would probably result in different ranking orders.
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A. Necessary and sufficient optimality conditions
For the three control variable constraints, g1(q, a, y) = −q ≤ 0, g2(q, a, y) = −a ≤ 0, and g3(q, a, y) = −y ≤
0, and the state variable constraint, h(S(t)) = S(t) − S¯ ≤ 0, the constraint qualification is fulfilled if the
matrix
m =


∂g1
∂q
∂g1
∂a
∂g1
∂y
g1 0 0 0
∂g2
∂q
∂g2
∂a
∂g2
∂y
0 g2 0 0
∂g3
∂q
∂g3
∂a
∂g3
∂y
0 0 g3 0
∂ ∂h
∂t
∂q
∂ ∂h
∂t
∂a
∂ ∂h
∂t
∂y
0 0 0 h


(A.1)
has the full row rank (Feichtinger and Hartl, 1986, p.165, 6.17), which can be seen to be fulfilled from
m =


−1 0 0 −q 0 0 0
0 −1 0 0 −a 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0 −y 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 S(t)− S¯


(A.2)
The concavity of the maximized Hamiltonian can be shown by proving that the Hessian Matrix of the
Hamiltonian is at least negative semi-definite (Feichtinger and Hartl, 1986, p.37, Remark 2.4). To do so,
we use the ReduxW system, where the oceanic carbon stock is dropped. The corresponding Current Value
Hamiltonian is Hc = U(q + a + y) − A(a) − C(R)(q + a) − cyy + λRR˙ + λSS˙, so that the corresponding
Hessian matrix is:


HSS HSR HSq HSa HSy
HRS HRR HRq HRa HRy
HqS HqR Hqq Hqa Hqy
HaS HaR Haq Haa Hay
HyS HyR Hyq Hya Hyy


=


0 0 0 0 0
0 −C′′(R)(q + a) −C′(R) −C′(R) 0
0 −C′(R) U ′′ U ′′ U ′′
0 −C′(R) U ′′ U ′′ −A′′ U ′′
0 0 U ′′ U ′′ U ′′


. (A.3)
The negative semi definiteness can easily be seen by checking whether all the leading principal minors are
zero.
The regularity of the Hamiltonian follows from the strict concavity of the Hamiltonian in the control
variables (Feichtinger and Hartl, 1986, p.167). If the optimization problem is restricted to the control
variables q and a and sequestration costs are defined by Case X in Assumption 6, this strict concavity is
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fulfilled:
Det

 Hqq Hqa
Haq Haa

 = −U ′′A′′ > 0. (A.4)
If sequestration costs are defined by Case C in Assumption 6 and/or the backstop technology is included,
we see from (A.4) and the lower right 3x3 matrix in the Hesse matrix (A.3) that the regularity condition is
not fulfilled because the Hamiltonian is not strictly concave in the control variables anymore.
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